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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In 2007, a google search on the term “retirement planning” resulted in about 1.2
million hits, giving guidance for decisions regarding saving and investment for retire-
ment (see Brown, 2007). Seven years later, in 2014, the same google search results
in over 24 million hits, showing the importance and rapid development in this area.
However, the main focus still lies on the wealth accumulation part of retirement
planning whereas how to spend retirement savings only gets little attention. The
same picture emerges in the scientific literature. The majority of research on retire-
ment planning deals with strategies for wealth accumulation and problems thereof.
Thereby, the literature can be split in two categories. The first category studies com-
mon saving and investment mistakes by individual households. Typical examples,
for insights emerged from this category, are the findings that individuals are under-
diversified (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991), underlie the equity home bias (e.g. Coval
and Moskowitz, 1999) and tend to sell winner assets too early and hold losers too
long (e.g. Weber and Camerer, 1998). The second category applies principles from
psychology and behavioral finance to develop tools to overcome these common mis-
takes. For example, Madrian and Shea (2001) show that individuals savings rate can
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be increased by simply changing the savings decision from an opt-in to an opt-out
decision. Moreover, reducing the investment choices within a retirement plan can
increase participation: offering workers too many investment choices can produce
“choice overload” and increases the complexity of the decision. As a result, pension
plan participation is reduced (Sethi-Iyengar et al., 2001). Probably the most famous
example is the “Save More Tomorrow” program by Thaler and Benartzi (2004). They
showed that retirement savings can be heavily increased by applying a combination of
different principles from psychology and behavioral economics. The program became
a success in a midsized manufacturing company and as a result, it is now offered
by more than half of the large employers in the United States, and a variant of the
program was incorporated in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (Benartzi, 2011).
The intake of psychological and behavioral aspects into the savings and invest-
ment decision literature contributed to a better understanding of individual behavior.
However, these aspects only slowly enter the literature dealing with decisions made
close to retirement. When retirement is near, two decisions become important: 1)
one has to think about when to retire, i.e. plan the retirement age. 2) When entering
retirement, one has to decide how to spend the accumulated savings. On an indi-
vidual level, these decisions belong to the economically most important decisions in
ones life since they influence the financial well-being for a long time. As stated by
Brown (2007):
”While wealth accumulation is an important ingredient in any finan-
cial plan, it is not sufficient to ensure financial well-being in retirement.
A particularly glaring shortcoming of the focus on wealth accumulation is
that it fails to consider how ones assets will be converted into a stream
of consumption in retirement. A comprehensive retirement planning strat-
egy requires that one think more than about how to save: it also requires
thinking about how to spend.“
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This thesis contributes to the literature by studying the retirement decision
(“when and how”) from a behavioral economics point of view. Thereby, depend-
ing on the type of pension insurance, the question when to retire or how to retire
is more pronounced. Therefore, in the following I will descirbe the German pen-
sion system and the decisions accompanied by when retiring. The German pension
system is based on three pillars. 1) The mandatory state pension insurance (geset-
zliche Rentenversicherung), 2) the occupational pension insurance which is provided
within an employer-employee relationship (betriebliche Altersvorsorge) and 3) pri-
vate pension insurance (private Altersvorsorge). In the following, the development
and importance of each of the three pillars is illustrated. Furthermore, from the view
of an individual decision maker, it is outlined which decisions he or she faces when
entering retirement and which consequences arise with respect to each pillar.
1) State pension insurance
The necessity of a social security system became apparent at the end of the nine-
teenth century. Until then, old-age provision was provided within an extended family.
The employed generation provided financial support for both, their children and par-
ents. However, with the industrial revolution the, until then, classical family structure
was replaced by smaller families. The few employed family members, therefore, could
not provide enough income anymore (see e.g. Rosen and Windisch, 1997). As part of
the “social law”, Otto van Bismarck introduced the German pension system in 1891.
On account of this, Germany has the oldest formal pension system in the world.
After the second world war, the statutory pension insurance system was funda-
mentally reformed. To mention are important reforms of 1957, 1972, 1992 and 20071.
In 1957, the wage-indexed pension formula was introduced. Pensions were tied to the
gross income of the workforce. Therefore, also retirees could benefit from the general
development of wages. To finance pensions, the system was shifted to a pay-as-you-
1After 1972, the pension system has also been reformed in 1978, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003 and 2004.
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go system where pensions are financed through contributions made by those still
actively employed. This reform lead to a well-financed pension system and therefore,
in 1972, the system was opened up to the the self-employed and to housewives. In ad-
dition, flexible age limits, depending on the occupation, have been introduced and a
minimum-income pension was established. However, these reforms weighed heavy on
the system and twenty years later additional reforms were necessary. In 1992, it was
decided that the wage-index should not be based on the gross income anymore, but
on the net income (see e.g. Wolter, 2002). Moreover, the entry coefficient which rep-
resents a penalty for early retirement, was introduced to take pressure off the pension
system. However, an increasing life expectancy combined with low birthrates made
an additional reform necessary. In 2007, a stepwise increase of the full retirement age
to 67 was decided. Before 2007, the full retirement age has been 65 2.
The legal basis for the currently valid form of the pension system is the social
act (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB). In particular, laws regarding the pension system are
formulated in the 6th book of the social act (SGB, VI). With the system in place, the
amount of monthly pension payments (MP) depends on the product of four factors
(see §64, SGB VI):
(1) Number of accumulated earning points.
(2) Entry coefficient.
(3) Pension coefficient.
(4) Current pension value.
The number of earning points (EP) a person accumulates each year depends on his
or her gross income. The gross income is divided by the average gross income in Ger-
many to calculate the number of EPs in a specific year (see §70, SGB VI). Thereby,
two specific features have to be taken into consideration: 1) The maximum number
2The reform of 2007 is described in more detail in chapter 3.
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of EPs per year is restricted by the income threshold (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze).
In 2013 the maximum number was about 2.1. 2) To account for wage differences
between the eastern and western states of Germany, the EPs of East German in-
habitants are multiplied by a constant factor. In 2014, the factor amounts to 1.1873
according to §254d, SGB VI and attachment 10, SGB VI.
The second factor of the pension formula, the entry coefficient (EC), is determined
by the age of the claimant. If social security benefits are claimed at the full retirement
age, the EC amounts to 1.000. For each month benefits are claimed before the full
retirement age, the EC is reduced by 0.003. Claiming after the full retirement age
results in an increase of 0.005 per month (§77 SGB VI). For example, claiming
pension benefits 2 years prior to the full retirement age would result in an EC of
1− 2 · 12 · 0.003 = 0.928.
The pension coefficient (PC) only plays a minor role in this thesis. It depends
on the type of pension benefits claimed. For old-age pensions the PC equals 1 (§67,
SGB VI). Other forms are for example pension because of reduced earning capacity
(PC=0.5) or orphan’s pension (PC=0.2). In all studies presented in this, thesis old-
age pensions are regarded. Therefore, the PC is neglected in the following analyses.
The last factor, the current pension value (CPV), is the link between the pension
benefits and the general wage development. Each year, on July 1st, the CPV is
determined. According to §68, SGB VI, new pension value (CPVt) is calculated as
the product of the old pension value (CPVt−1) with the change in 1) the gross income
per employee, 2) the contribution to the pension system and 3) a factor which relates
the number of employees to the number of retirees (Nachhaltigkeitsfaktor). In 2014,
the CPV amounts to 28.61.
Following the formula presented in §64, SGB VI, monthly pension payments (MP)
are calculated as MP =
∑
EP ·EC ·PC ·CPV . If old-age pensions are considered,
the PC equals one and the formula simplifies to MP =
∑
EP ·EC ·CPV . Since the
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CPV is determined by the government, the individual facing the retirement decision
has no influence on it. The only two factors he or she can influence are the entry
coefficient and the earning points. Both increase if retirement is delayed and decrease
if benefits are claimed earlier. Therefore, the main decision regarding the first pillar is
the answer to the question: “When should I retire and claim social security benefits?”
Chapter 3 and 4 focus on factors that influence that decision.
2) Occupational pension insurance
The occupational pension insurance is an employer-employee contract where the
employer commits to support the employees old-age provision. The legal basis is the
occupational pension law (Betriebsrentengesetz, BetrAVG), which came into force in
1974. As in many countries, the commitment of the employer can be of two types: 1)
A defined benefit (DB) plan or 2) A defined contribution (DC) plan (§1, BetrAVG).
In a DB-plan, pension benefits are determined by a formula which takes into account
the number of years of employment and the wage or salary (e.g. Bodie et al., 1988).
Therefore, the employer promises a specified monthly benefit as long as the employee
is alive. On the other hand, in a DC-plan, the employer commits to make a contribu-
tion into an individual account for each employee. In most cases, also the employee
contributes some amount into that account. All contributions are then invested and
investment returns are credited to the account to which the employee has access at
retirement. Benefits depend on the total contributions and investment earnings of
the accumulation in the account (Bodie et al., 1988).
From the point of view of an employee, the main advantage of the DB-plan is
that it provides a certain income stream in retirement as long as the employee is
alive. Therefore, the DB-plan provides insurance against longevity. From the point
of view of an employer, however, DB-plans are costly: in years of low earnings or if the
number of employees entering retirement increases, retirement benefits heavily affect
the firm’s financial well-being. Since DC-plans do not guarantee a certain retirement
benefit but a certain contribution during the employee’s working life, they provide
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less uncertainty and financial risk for the employer. Therefore, in most countries, a
shift from DB- to DC-plans can be observed (e.g. Pang and Warshawsky, 2010).
The shift to DC-plans puts more responsibility on the employee. During the ac-
cumulation phase, he or she has to undertake several investment decisions. Also, at
retirement, the account holder hast to decide how to transform the the account bal-
ance into a stream of consumption in retirement. One way of doing so is purchasing
a life annuity. Annuities are financial contracts designed to insure against longevity
risk by allowing an individual to exchange a lump sum of wealth for an income stream
that is guaranteed to last for the rest of the annuitant’s life (Brown, 2007). Therefore,
regarding the second pillar of the German pension system, one of the main questions
an individual has to answer at retirement is “how to transform accumulated wealth
into a stream of consumption.“ Chapter 2 of this thesis concentrates on behavioral
factors that influence the answer of this particular question.
3) Private pension insurance
In the past ten years, the third pillar of the German pension system, the private
pension insurance, became more and more important. Reasons therefore are the first
pillar being under pressure due to unemployment, a decrease of the overall volume of
work, the demographic change, and the costs of the German reunification (see Miegel,
2000). This leads to a decrease in trust towards the social security system (e.g. Fo¨ste
and Janssen, 1997; DIA, 2002). Politics reacted to this development by introduc-
ing different tax-deductible and government-sponsored private pension schemes. The
two most famous schemes are called Riester-Rente and Ru¨rupp-Rente and were intro-
duced in 2002 and 2005, respectively. The legal basis is the Altersvermo¨gensgesetz,
AvmG. Besides these government-sponsored pension schemes, any scheme into which
individuals contribute from their earnings is classified as a private pension insurance.
In many cases, investments are made into saving schemes or mutual funds run by
insurance companies.
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The private insurance market offers a very diverse set of products and investment
opportunities. However, most of these products only differ in the accumulation phase.
What they have in common is that, with the beginning of the retirement phase, the
retiree faces the decision how to transfer the accumulated wealth into consumption.
Similar to the second pillar, the main question when entering retirement is how to
best consume the accumulated wealth (chapter 2).
In summary, the decision when to retire and how to consume during retirement
are studied in this thesis. Thereby, the focus lies on behavioral factors that influence
these decisions. In particular, the influence of time preferences and the presentation
format of the decision is studied. The next section will give a brief introduction in
the time preference literature.
1.2 Time preferences
Almost every decision in our everyday life can be classified as an intertemporal
choice - a decision involving tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different
times (Frederick et al., 2002). This applies for day-to-day decisions such as deciding
where to have lunch as well as for more important decisions such as investing a
certain amount into a pension plan. In the lunch case, for example, the tradeoff can
be between the immediate benefit of tasty but unhealthy fast food and the possible
weight gain that occurs some days later. The investment for a pension plan represents
the tradeoff between today’s and future consumption.
The idea of intertemporal choice was first introduced by John Rae (1834), who
studied wealth differences among nations and identified the “desire of accumulation”
as an important factor. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many scholars
were concerned with the idea of intertemporal choice and considered time preferences
as an interaction of different motives and factors (for example Jevons, 1888; Bo¨hm-
Bawerk, 1989; Fisher, 1930)3. This view changed when Samuelson (1937) introduced
3For a detailed overview of the development in the nineteenth and early twentieth century see Frederick et al.
(2002) p.352–355.
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the discounted utility model (DU-model). The model incorporates all motives and
factors into a single discount rate, δ. Today’s utility (U0) of an outcome at a future
date t (xt) is described as:
U0 = δt · U(xt).
Furthermore the DU-model describes a decision maker’s utility over consumption
profiles (x0, · · · , xT ) by:
U0 =
T∑
t=0
δt · U(xt)
Even though if Samuelson himself was concerned about the normative and descriptive
validity of his model (“ In the first place, it is completely arbitrary to assume that the
individual behaves so as to maximise an integral of the form envisaged in [the DU-
model].”) it became the most prominent framework for intertemporal choice. This
development is mainly owed to two features of the DU-model. First, its simplicity and
analytical tractability and second, its axiomatic foundation by Koopmans. Koopmans
(1960) showed that the model can be derived by a set of intuitive axioms. In addition
to Koopmans (1960), also Lancaster (1963), Fishburn (1970), Meyer (1976), Fishburn
and Rubinstein (1982) and others presented an axiom system for the DU-model. The
main axioms of Koopmans (1960) are:
(1) Continuity
(2) Sensitivity
(3) Non-Complementarity (independence)
(4) Stationarity
Thereby, axioms (1) to (3) are standard axioms in utility theory. In brief, the con-
tinuity axiom states that slight variations in a consumption profile do not lead to
drastic changes in the utility assigned to it. Sensitivity requires that utility assigned
to a profile can be changed by changing the consumption vector in any particular
period (Koopmans, 1960, p. 290). The non-complementarity or independence axiom
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states that if there are two consumption profiles that differ only in one period, then
the identical periods are not relevant when comparing the two profiles.
The most famous and most discussed axiom is axiom (4), stationarity. It says that
the preference relation between two consumption profiles remains the same if both
profiles are put forward or backward in time. For example, assume a decision maker
prefers the consumption profile CA = (x0, x1, · · · , xT ) over the profile CB = (x′0,
x1, · · · , xT ). If now both profiles are shifted forward by n = 1 period, the stationary
decision maker will also prefer profile CA = (0, x0, x1, · · · , xT ) over CB = (0, x′0, x1,
· · · , xT ). This implies that the discount rate between any two consecutive periods t
and t + 1 has to be constant. For example, consider two profiles with consumption
over two periods, Ctoday and Ctomorrow. Each profile, thereby, only consists of one
outcome with Ctoday = (x0, 0) and Ctomorrow = (0, x1). Then, with respect to time
preferences, only the time distance between the two outcomes (today vs. tomorrow)
but not how far these outcomes are away from today matters for the preference
relation. Or, as stated by Kirby and Herrnstein (1995):
“if you would like a chocolate bar next Tuesday twice as much as an
apple next Wednesday, you would like them in the same ratio for successive
Tuesdays and Wednesdays a month, a year, or 10 years from now.”
The only discount function that fulfills the stationary axiom is the exponential
discount function. Therefore, the DU-model can be written as:
U0 =
T∑
t=0
δt · U(xt), with δt = 1
(1 + ρ)t
.
In the late twentieth century, researchers started to empirically study time prefer-
ences of human and animal subjects. One of the first studies was conducted by Ainslie
and Herrnstein (1981)4. They studied the behavior of six male white Carneaux pi-
geons. The subjects were trained to chose between a smaller but earlier reward and
4The study builds on an analysis by Chung and Herrenstein (1967).
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a larger reward received later by pecking on the respective button. In the first set-
ting, the earlier reward was received immediately and the later was delayed by 4
seconds. All subjects preferred the smaller reward on all trails. In the second setting,
both rewards were delayed by 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 or 12 seconds. For all subjects in almost
every trail a preference reversal for the later outcome could be observed. This be-
havior conflicts with the idea of stationarity since only the time difference between
two outcomes should matter for the decision. However, for the Carneaux pigeons,
it was also important how far the outcomes were away from right now (immediate
consumption).
Solnick et al. (1980) were the first to investigate preference reversal in human
behavior. In their study, the reward was a period of silence during a 180 seconds
interval of noise. The results supported the idea of preference reversal since the
small, immediate reward was preferred when no delay was added, but the larger, later
reward was preferred when both rewards were delayed. These results were confirmed
by many other studies with different types of rewards and delays (see for example
Millar and Navarick, 1984; Green et al., 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995).
One way of explaining the phenomenon of preference reversals is a declining dis-
count rate. Thaler (1981) elicited discount rates from human subjects by asking
them to state the amount of money, received in T month, that would make them
indifferent to receiving 15 USD today. Thereby, T could take the values 1 month,
12 month and 120 month. On average, the implied annual exponential discount rate
declined from 345 percent (T=1) over 120 percent (T=12) to 19 percent (T=120)5. A
discount function that incorporates declining discount rates, which can lead to pref-
erence reversals, has to be more convex compared to the exponential function. From
the hyperbolic shape of such a function the term “hyperbolic discounting” or “hyper-
bolic discount function” originated. Such a function in most cases fits the observed
data better than an exponential function (see e.g. Howard et al., 1991; Myerson and
5Similar results were obtained by Redelmeier and Heller (1993), Chapman and Elstein (1995), Pender (1996) and
Chapman (1997).
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Green, 1995; Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Kirby, 1997; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997;
Abdellaoui et al., 2010).
Since the late twentieth century, the influence of hyperbolic discounting on in-
tertemporal choice has been studied for many economic and non-economic decisions.
The axiomatic foundation of the hyperbolic discount function by Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992) as well as the introduction of quasi-hyperbolic discounting by Laibson
(1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) helped to speed up the development6. The
main feature of the quasi-hyperbolic discount function is its good analytical tractabil-
ity without giving up the main properties of the general hyperbolic function. With
this tool at hand, the relevance of how individuals perceive and weight time became
more and more apparent. In the following, a few examples will be given7:
• Hyperbolic discounting on an aggregate level can explain, among other things,
the comovement of consumption and income (Laibson, 1997) as well as declining
national savings rates in developed countries (Laibson et al., 1998).
• On an individual level, Meier and Sprenger (2010) find that people who behave
as if they would discount the future hyperbolically are more likely to have credit
card debt and to have higher amounts thereof. They also delay debt paydown
more frequently (Kuchler, 2014), participate less in financial literacy programs
(Meier and Sprenger, 2013) and use illiquid savings (Ashraf et al., 2006; Beshears
et al., 2011) and deadlines (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002) as a commitment
device.
• Time preferences can explain individuals workout patterns (DellaVigna and
Malmendier, 2006).
• Medical studies find that smokers have decreasing discount rates over time and
therefore put too much weight on immediate rewards and costs even in tasks
6Thereby, Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) build on the work of Strotz (1955), Phelps and
Pollak (1968) and Akerlof (1991).
7For a detailed overview, see for example DellaVigna (2009) and Kuchler (2014).
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not related to smoking (see for example Bickel et al., 1999; Baker et al., 2003;
Reynolds and Fields, 2012).
The above list only abstracts a very small fraction of the time preference literature
and is meant to give an idea of the importance in economic and day-to-day decisions.
This thesis extends the literature by relating time preferences with the retirement
decision.
1.3 Cooperation with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Most of the empirical analysis in this thesis is based on an online survey conducted
in cooperation with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). In particular, the
online department of the FAZ (FAZ.NET) agreed to post a link to our survey on
their website. The survey ran on a server, independent from FAZ.NET. In addition,
in the weekly print edition, which is published every Sunday (Frankfurter Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung, FAS), the survey was promoted twice. Readers of FAZ.NET and
FAS could participate from October 14th, 2012 to November 5th, 2012. The FAS
promoted the survey on Sunday, October 14th and Sunday, October 28th. Appendix
A.1 presents the first promotion in the print edition and appendix A.2 presents the
survey. Since participants are assigned to different treatments, appendix A.2 is only
exemplary.
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of participants per hour over the first five days.
After the survey went online, the link was placed very prominent on the first page
of FAZ.NET. Therefore, the majority of participants participated at the first two
days (NSunday = 2, 076 and NMonday = 1, 157). Afterwards, when new articles were
posted and the survey was moved further back, participation flatted rapidly. From
Tuesday, 16th to Thursday, 18th only 321 participants came on top. From Friday, 19th
until the end of the survey participation stayed on a very low level (not reported in
figure 1.1). Also the second promotion in the print edition did not help to boost
participation again. Overall, 3,077 participants filled out the survey up to the last
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page. However, not all of them answered every question and therefore, observations
are below 3,077 for most variables. A detailed summary statistic will be given in
chapter 2. In addition, since different aspects of the survey are of interest for different
research questions, also chapter 3 and 4 describe specific parts of the survey in detail.
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1.4 Outline of the thesis and main results
In this thesis, three main research questions are studied:
(1) Which individual specific factors influence the annuitization decision? What is
the role of time preferences in general and specifically hyperbolic discounting?
(2) How does the way in which the retirement decision is presented influence the
decision when to retire? Can the presentation format be used to induce a greater
actual retirement age?
(3) Do hyperbolic time preferences empirically lead to a time inconsistent retirement
decision? Is the temptation of early retirement stronger, the closer retirement
comes?
Chapter 2 (joint work with Martin Weber) studies the decision whether to have
the balance of a retirement savings account paid out as a lump sum or to annuitize
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this amount (annuitization decision). Thereby, the main focus lies on the influence of
time preferences: a hyperbolic decision maker exhibits impatience towards the near
future but is patient when it comes to outcomes in the more distant future. Relating
this feature of empirically observed time preferences to the annuitization decision
shows that theoretically the age at which the decision is made should be important.
Young people should prefer to annuitize retirement benefits whereas older individ-
uals should prefer the lump sum. Hyperbolic discounting leads to undervaluation
of earlier payments and overvaluation of later payments (compared to exponential
discounting). Older decision makers expect less later payments than young decision
makers, simply due to a shorter remaining lifetime. Therefore, older hyperbolic deci-
sion makers overvalue fewer expected payments and the annuity seems unattractive
to them. We test this hypothesis using the online survey described above (FAZ sur-
vey) and find that indeed young people have a strong preference for annuities whereas
older people tend to prefer lump sum payments. This effect is considerably stronger
for survey participants that answer simple time preference questions inconsistently.
These findings suggest to think about precommitment devices for the annuitization
decision.
The third chapter (joint work with Martin Weber) stands out in the sense that
the research question does not focus on time preferences. It relates the willingness-
to-accept (WTA)/ willingness-to-pay (WTP) disparity to the retirement decision
and shows that the presentation of the decision problem strongly influences the
decision when to retire. According to standard theory, under a few assumptions, the
maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay for a specific good (WTP) should
equal the minimum price at which he or she accepts selling the good (WTA). In
the retirement context, the good of early retirement is considered. We show that in
this case the willingness-to-accept is more than twice as high as the corresponding
willingness-to-pay. Using the reduction in German social security benefits for early
retirement as a market price also shows that the presentation of the retirement
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decision as a willingness-to-accept problem can induce early retirement. In addition,
also the cause for the WTA/WTP disparity is analyzed. It is shown that the disparity
gets stronger with stronger loss aversion of participants. However, this is due to a
significant decrease of the WTP. The WTA is not affected by loss aversion. The main
results are robust when the analysis is repeated with a representative panel survey
for Germany (SAVE panel).
Chapter 4 (joint work with Martin Weber) analyzes the empirical relation be-
tween the decision when to retire and time preferences. Implications proposed in
recent theoretical work about the influence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting on the
savings and retirement decision of individuals (e.g. Zhang, 2013; Findley and Feigen-
baum, 2013) are tested. These studies suggest that hyperbolic discounting leads to
an inconsistent retirement decision. Thereby, inconsistent retirement means that an
individual initially plans on working until a specific retirement age but then reverse
his plan by actually retiring before that planned retirement age. Therefore, dynamic
inconsistent decision makers will decrease their planned retirement age with increas-
ing age. The main analysis is carried out using the FAZ survey and the SAVE panel.
To test for dynamic inconsistency three main analyses are performed: 1) the effect
of age on the planned retirement age is considered. 2) In a panel framework we track
individuals over time and analyze the effect of ongoing time on the planned retire-
ment age. 3) The effect of different proxies for hyperbolic discounting on the actual
retirement age of retirees is studied. The analysis shows that participants of both
studies decrease their planned retirement age with increasing age. The temptation
of early retirement seems to get stronger, the closer retirement comes. In a panel
specification, it is shown that the result is not driven by birth cohorts. Analyzing
the actual retirement decision of retirees, we find that on average participants classi-
fied as hyperbolic discounters retire 2 years earlier. This behavior has consequences
for the financial well-being during retirement: the German pension system punishes
an early retirement of 2 years by a constant decrease of about 12% in monthly pen-
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sion benefits. These results indicate that, even after controlling for demographics and
personal characteristics, time preferences strongly influence the budget in retirement.
Chapter 2
Time Inconsistent Preferences and
the Annuitization Decision
2.1 Introduction
Winning the state lottery of California is a beautiful thing but it is accompanied by
a tough decision: The SuperLOTTO Plus jackpot can either be paid out in 26 annual
installments or as one big lump sum payment1. Unfortunately, most of us won’t have
to deal with this kind of decision problem as a consequence of winning the jackpot of
some national lottery. However, at time of retirement people are increasingly faced
with the decision to take out a lump sum of money from their retirement account
or to opt for an annuity payment (for example in 401(k) plans). Based on standard
theoretical analysis, people should opt for the annuity payment to maximize expected
utility. However, empirically people by a vast majority opt for the lump sum, both in
the retirement and lottery case. This behavior is called the ”annuity puzzle”. Since
Yaari (1965) there has been plenty of research focusing on how to model the observed
behavior in the retirement case, i.e. explain the annuity puzzle. But even the intake of
a bequest motive, background risk, incomplete markets, adverse selection and many
1The jackpot payment options can be found on the official California Lottery website.
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other factors only partly explains the low demand for annuities. One aspect which
all these models have in common is that they assume rational behavior of modeled
agents. Brown (2007) states that ”[. . . ] the mixed success of explaining annuitization
behavior in a fully rational context suggests that other factors are at play.” These
others factors can be found in the behavioral economics literature of retirement saving
and planning. The recent literature on the annuity puzzle incorporates factors such
as framing, loss aversion, endowment effects and others to explain real life decisions.
In this paper, we focus on peoples’ time preference and its importance in a choice
between a monthly payment and a lump sum payment. It is well known that decision
makers time preferences can best be described by hyperbolic discounting (see for
example Ainslie and Herrnstein, 1981; Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Ahlbrecht
and Weber, 1997). Hyperbolic discounting leads to strong discounting for outcomes
in the near future and subsequently weaker discounting for distant ones which might
lead to time inconsistent behavior.
To our knowledge, a connection between time preferences and the annuitization
decision has not been studied yet. We investigate which annuitization decisions are
implied by hyperbolic discounting and test this implication using a questionnaire
study. We conduct a large online survey in cooperation with one of the biggest Ger-
man newspapers, ”Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ). Throughout the whole
study subjects had to choose between a lump sum payment and a fair annuity. We
used two conditions: In what we call the immediate case, subjects are asked to choose
between a lump sum paid out today and a (fair) annuity also starting today (com-
parable to the decision problem when winning the California lottery). In the future
case, participants choose between an annuity starting at retirement age and a lump
sum also received when entering retirement. Each subject was asked to choose be-
tween the annuity and the lump sum followed by a consecutive question to choose an
annuitization rate between 0% and 100% in steps of 10%. Note that, by definition,
the expected value of the lump sum is equal to the expected value of the fair annuity.
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Taking hyperbolic discounting into account, simple calculations show that older peo-
ple will prefer the lump sum over the annuity. The effect reverses for younger people
where hyperbolic discounting leads to a preference for annuity payments. This is true
for the immediate and the future decision.
The data shows that in both cases young people have a strong preference for an-
nuities whereas older people tend to prefer lump sum payments. We find an increase
of about 20% in annuitization from the oldest 10% to the youngest 10%. Also, the
annuitization rate increases by about 12% from the oldest to the youngest decile.
This finding is in line with other studies empirically investigating real and hypo-
thetical annuity choices (see Brown et al., 2013; Hurd and Panis, 2006; Beshears
et al., 2012; Shu et al., 2013). The age effect gets stronger for participants whose
answers to simple time preference questions indicate that they follow stronger hy-
perbolic discounting. Since a negative effect of age on the annuity demand can not
only be driven by hyperbolic discounting but also other factors, we rule out these
other explanations by introducing and confirming two further hypotheses that are
specific to hyperbolic discounting. It is shown, that the results indeed are driven by
participants time preferences.
Further results show that risk preferences and subjective life expectancy are im-
portant factors to understand the annuitization decision. The more risk averse partic-
ipants are, the less likely they are to choose the lump sum leading to a corresponding
increase in the annuitization rate. Comparing the most risk averse to the least risk
averse participants results in a difference of about 15% points in probability of choos-
ing the annuity. The effect of subjective life expectancy is strong. We find that the
longer someone expects to live the more likely he/she is to annuitize.
The findings are particular important as people face the annuitization decision
late in life and therefore, following hyperbolic discounting, are more likely to choose
a lump sum. In the future case, the switch of preferences can be seen as a self-control
problem of participants as they make the optimal decision (according to expected
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utility theory) when thinking about what to choose in the future but they reverse
the decision once the day of the actual decision has arrived. These results imply
that there are two ways to increase annuitization. 1) By introducing a commitment
device allowing people to bind or precommit their behavior (see Strotz, 1955). If
people choose the lump sum because of self-control problems a precommitment device
is a powerful tool to help people overcome this problem (see for example Thaler
and Shefrin, 1981; Laibson, 1997; Beshears et al., 2011). This would also have the
advantage of a reduced adverse selection problem: real life annuities pay only about
80% - 90% of the fair annuity value, where part of this deduction is due to adverse
selection as potential annuity buyers have more information about their own life
expectancy. However, if people would be able to make a binding annuity choice in
younger years, the information asymmetry regarding their future condition would be
reduced. The annuity seller could offer annuities closer to the fair value and create
an incentive to make a binding decision. 2) Making it mandatory to determine the
payout scheme at the beginning of the contract when people are (still) young and
not at retirement, is another way to increase real life annuitization rates. Reversing
this decision has to be associated with a cost (either monetary or effort-wise, e.g.
paperwork).
2.2 Overview of related literature
Yaari (1965) was the first to extend the standard life-cycle hypothesis and include
mortality risk. He showed that in a model of rational decision making, a risk averse
individual with no bequest motive should annuitize 100% of his wealth to maximize
utility. This result was confirmed forty years later by Davidoff et al. (2005) in a model
with less restrictive assumptions. In contrast to these results the empirically observed
annuitization rates are very low2. As a consequence, a large body of work concentrates
2See for example Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 1998 - 2008, Buetler and Teppa (2007) or for a summary
Johnson et al. (2004).
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on explaining these low rates of annuitization. In the following it is distinguished
between the ”rational” and ”behavioral” reasons against full annuitization:
2.2.1 Rational aspects
a) Bequest motive
If an individual wants to leave a bequest it is not optimal for him/her to fully
annuitize because annuity payments immediately stop after death. Friedman and
Warshawsky (1990) study a model of saving and annuity demand and find that a
bequest motive in combination with actuarial unfairly priced annuities can reduce
annuity demand. Ameriks et al. (2011) also conclude that the bequest motive is an
important factor to determine the individual annuity demand. In contrast, Hurd
(1989) finds that the utility of a bequest is small and therefore desired bequests are
small on average. He also finds that elderly households with children do not dissave
more rapidly than those without children and concludes that both households have
the same (small) interest in leaving a bequest. Brown (2001) examines a life-cycle
model of consumption and finds that neither the presence of children nor the self
reported bequest motive has any influence on the annuity demand.
b) Family compensation
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) compare family insurance with perfect market insur-
ance and find that family insurance can substitute a considerable proportion of the
market insurance. Brown and Poterba (2000) find that the utility gain from annu-
itization is smaller for couples than it is for single individuals. Also, Brown (2001)
finds that marital status is an important source of variation in the annuity decision,
with married couples being less likely to annuitize.
c) Background risk
Horneff et al. (2009) build a framework where the investor faces uninsurable shocks
to housing, medical expenses, health, and income during the work life and retirement.
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They find that these uninsurable shocks increase the preference for liquid savings
(e.g., bonds) only marginal. Also, Pang and Warshawsky (2010) find that health
shock risk leads to precautionary savings and a shift from risky equities to riskless
bonds. But with increasing age, annuities become superior to equity and bonds even
in the presence of health shock risk.
d) Further rational aspects
Other possible explanations are adverse selection problems and the resulting un-
fair annuity prices (Mitchell et al., 1999; Murthi et al., 2000; Finkelstein and Poterba,
2004; Brunner and Pech, 2006), incomplete annuity markets (Davidoff et al., 2005)
and the crowding out of private annuitization by the government (Mitchell and
Moore, 1998; Dushi and Webb, 2004; Purcal and Piggott, 2008). Despite all the
efforts to explain the annuity puzzle, the success of the studies and models described
above is only moderate. Even models that incorporate most of the previously men-
tioned factors can explain only parts of the low demand for annuities. Therefore, it
seems logical to search for additional factors that may help to understand the puzzle.
2.2.2 Behavioral aspects
The more recent literature has a focus on behavioral considerations which po-
tentially could influence the annuity demand. The most prominent factors are loss
aversion and framing. Hu and Scott (2007) calculate reservation prices for annuities
under the standard expected utility model (EUT) and under cumulative prospect
theory (CPT). Results show that under expected utility reservation prices are always
above one, indicating that the annuity is attractive for the EUT-decision maker. Un-
der CPT, because of loss aversion, almost all values are below one and therefore the
annuity seems unattractive to the CPT-decision maker.
Brown et al. (2008) examine framing as a possible explanation for low annuity
demand. They argue that under a consumption frame an annuity should be attractive
because it serves as a form of insurance. But under a narrow investment frame the
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annuity can appear riskier than a bond for example, because it’s payments depend
on a random variable (i.e. time of death). Results of their survey study show, that if
people were presented an annuity in a consumption frame, the majority chooses the
annuity (72%). In contrast, when people were faced with the same decision problem
in an investment frame, only 21% preferred the annuity. Agnew et al. (2008) also find
strong effects of framing on the annuitization decision. In addition Benartzi et al.
(2011) examine the fixed, immediate payout annuity market and also propose loss
aversion and framing (among others behavioral explanations) as an explanation for
the low annuity demand.
Further aspects are the complexity of annuity products (Brown et al., 2012) and
myopic extrapolation of stock market returns (Previtero, 2012; Chalmers and Reuter,
2012).
From a marketing perspective Shu et al. (2013) show that some attributes of an
annuity (e.g. a period-certain guarantee) are particular important as they seem to
affect decision makers utility beyond their influence on the actuarial present value of
the annuity.
2.2.3 Hyperbolic discounting and measuring time preferences
Hyperbolic discounting
Most of the theoretical work dealing with the annuity puzzle assumes rational be-
havior and all of it assumes that investors have stationary time preferences. According
to Koopmans (1960), the only discount function that fulfills these assumptions is the
exponential discount function given by δ(t) = δt with δ ∈ (0, 1]. The stationarity of
the exponential discount function leads to the constant discount rate δ = δ
t
δt−1 be-
tween two consecutive periods. In the 1980s scientists started eliciting discount rates
from decision tasks with different subjects3. Many studies find anomalies in behavior
compared to what a stationary discount function would predict (e.g., Thaler, 1981;
3The first experiments were conducted with pigeons (see for example Ainslie and Herrnstein, 1981) and the
observed effects correspond with the effects observed later in human behavior.
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Benzion et al., 1989; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997). One of the most robust findings is
that individual’s exhibit impatience in their decisions. This leads to strong discount
rates for outcomes that are in the near future and weak discount rates for more
distant ones. Thaler (1981) describes this behavior with the following example:
(A) Choose between: (A1): One apple today and
(A2): Two apples tomorrow.
(B) Choose between: (B1): One apple in one year and
(B2): Two apples in one year and one day.
If A1 over A2 is preferred stationarity would imply that B1 over B2 is preferred.
However almost nobody chooses B1 over B2 whereas some people might prefer A1.
This inconsistent behavior can’t be explained by exponential discounting.
One way of dealing with this phenomena is by assuming a hyperbolic discount
function with relatively high discount rates for outcomes in the near future and
relatively low discount rates for distant outcomes (see for example Ainslie, 1975;
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Frederick et al., 2002).
Strotz (1955) was one of the first to analyze declining intertemporal discount rates in
a theoretical framework. He showed that if discount rates are not constant, a planner
will not stick to the optimal plan evaluated at some point in time t. This plays an
important role in the literature dealing with self-control problems. People with low
self-control put too much weight on the near future disregarding long-term costs
and benefits. For example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) find that most people
plan to attend the gym on a regular basis when signing the membership contract,
but actual attendance is much lower (for further evidence on self-control problems
see DellaVigna, 2009; Beshears et al., 2011). One way to overcome these problems is
to bind or precommit one’s own behavior (see for example Strotz, 1955; Thaler and
Shefrin, 1981; Laibson, 1997; Sorger, 2007). However, commitment devices are only
useful if the decision maker is aware of his self-control problem, which means that
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he is not a naive but a sophisticated hyperbolic discounter. This distinction between
naive and sophisticated decision makers is important for possible policy implications
of our results and will be discussed in more detail in section 2.6.
Time preferences also seem to matter in many other economic and non-economic
fields. For example, Meier and Sprenger (2010) find that people who behave as if they
would discount payments hyperbolically are more likely to have credit card debt and
to have higher amounts thereof. Meier and Sprenger (2013) find that hyperbolic
decision makers participate less in financial literacy programs. Medical studies find
that smokers have decreasing discount rates over time and therefore put too much
weight on immediate rewards and costs even in tasks not related to smoking, see for
example Bickel et al. (1999).
Measuring time preferences
In experimental economics choice based and matching based approaches are pop-
ular (see Hardisty et al., 2013). Choice methods ask participants in a set of questions
to choose between a smaller earlier payment (or reward) and a later larger payment.
Thereby the later payment is constantly increased or the earlier payment constantly
decreased to find participants switching point, which is then used to calculate a lower
and a upper bound for the discount rate. The matching approach in contrast directly
asks for indifference points. Participants have to state which earlier payment would
make them indifferent to later payments or vice versa. This has the advantage that
not only an upper and lower bound but an exact discount rate can be calculated.
Frederick et al. (2002) present a broad discussion of further advantages and disad-
vantages of these two methods. To test for hyperbolic discounting in both methods
payments (the earlier and later) are delayed by the same amount of time. Declining
discount rates for the delayed payments are treated as evidence of hyperbolic dis-
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counting. We follow the standard eliciting procedure in decision analysis literature
(see for example Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997; Sayman and Oencueler, 2009)4.
2.3 Hypotheses
In the following, we derive five hypotheses about how time preferences influence
the annuitization decision. In the analysis, a decision maker who has to choose be-
tween a lump sum and an annuity is considered. The starting point is the expected
present value (EPV) of the annuity. By definition the EPV of a fair annuity equals the
lump sum if the decision maker has exponential time preferences. This is compared
to a decision maker who follows hyperbolic discounting. In this case the absolute
EPV and also its change with the decision maker’s age will be regarded. The EPV
presents a natural starting point for our analysis as therewith an easy comparison
of the annuity with the lump sum is possible. In addition, the EPV is a well known
and simple method to value investment decisions. Brown et al. (2008) show that
peoples tendency to perceive an annuity as an investment can help to understand
the low empirical annuitization rates. We therefore also abstain from introducing a
consumption based model. Also, introducing risk preferences would lead to a pref-
erence for the annuity (for an EU-maximizer) and would make the annuities more
preferable in all cases (for exponential and hyperbolic decision makers). We base the
formal analysis on risk neutrality as we are primarily interested in the effect of time
preferences5. We regard fair annuities as it is already well known from prior studies
that unfair prices decrease the annuity demand (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1999; Finkelstein
and Poterba, 2004).
In the analysis two conditions are used: the first case is called the ”immediate
case” where we take a look at immediate annuities, meaning that a decision maker
has to decide between an annuity starting today and a lump sum also received today.
The second case is the ”future case”. In this scenario the person faces the decision
4Very recently a new procedure to elicit time preference has been proposed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
which caused ongoing debate about (see Epper and Fehr-Duda, 2014; Drichoutis and Nayga, 2013)
5In addition we elicit risk preferences in the survey and control for them in the empirical analysis.
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between an annuity starting at retirement age and a lump sum also received when
entering retirement. To be precise, the future case looks at an immediate annuity
starting at retirement age but being evaluated today by a x year old decision maker
with x being less than retirement age.
2.3.1 Discount functions
To derive the hypotheses we assume a specific form of the hyperbolic function.
In general, discount functions can be written as DF = (1 + i)−α(t) with i being an
interest rate and α(t) being a function that describes how time is perceived (see
Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997). For example, if time is weighted in a linear way and
α(t) = t we arrive at the exponential discount function. In the following two further
discount functions are considered. First, the Harvey (1986) discount function with
α(t) = r
ln (1+i)
ln (1 + t) leading to DFHarvey(t) = (1 + t)
−r. 6 Second, the quasi-
hyperbolic discount function proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson
(1997) with α(t) = t+
ln ( 1
β
)
ln (1+iQ)
and therefore DFQHB = β(1+iQ)
−t. Figure 2.1a graphs
the exponential function, the Harvey function and the quasi-hyperbolic function. In
this example an interest rate of iEXP = 4.5% is chosen
7. The parameter r is calculated
in such a way that the hyperbolic and exponential function assign the same weight
to period 15. For the quasi-hyperbolic function β = 0.7 and iQ = 2.04% are chosen to
also assign the same weight to period 15 (see Laibson et al., 2003). It can be seen that
both the Harvey and the quasi-hyperbolic function lead to stronger discounting in
earlier periods compared to the exponential function. Therefore, hyperbolic decision
makers are often described as present biased as they have a strong preference for
immediate outcomes.
Figure 2.1b presents the values for the functions α(t). Discounting exponentially
implies α(t) = t. Also, the quasi-hyperbolic function leads to a linear function α(t)
6Note that the Harvey function is a special case of the general hyperbolic function DF = (1 + γt)
−α
γ proposed
by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) with γ = 1 and α = r.
74.5% is used as this is the average return German insurance companies yielded on their assets in the last 10 years
(2002 - 2012).
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Figure 2.1: Discount functions. Figure 1a reports the exponential discount function DFEXP (t) = (1 + i)
−t with
i = 4.5%, the Harvey function DFHB(t) = (1 + t)
−r with r = 0.2381 and the quasi-hyperbolic discount function
with i = 2.04% and β = 0.7. Figure 1b reports the function α(t) for the three discount functions.
for t > 0. Only the Harvey function leads to a non-linear weighting of time as in
this case α(t) is a logarithmic function. This implies that, e.g., the time difference
between period 4 and 5 is weighted larger than the difference between periods 14
and 15. The quasi-hyperbolic function is designed for easy analytical tractability and
therefore, only introduces the hyperbolic feature between period 0 and 1. Afterwards
the quasi-hyperbolic and exponential function are identical. As the decision whether
to take a lump sum or an annuity also affects the very distant future the features
of the Harvey function are especially useful for our analysis. In addition, Abdellaoui
et al. (2010) test the validity of different discount functions and find that the Harvey
(1986) model fits their data best. Therefore, we use the Harvey (1986) approach with
DFHB(t) = (1 + t)
−r. The exponential function is defined as DFEXP (t) = (1 + i)−t
with i being the interest rate.
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2.3.2 Hypothesis 1: the age effect
Hypothesis 1a - immediate case
We consider an immediate annuity that pays a yearly amount of y and a deci-
sion maker who has to choose between this annuity and a lump sum L (paid out
immediately). Let p(x + t|x) be the probability of an x year old person being alive
after t additional years. Assuming for the purpose of simplicity that the maximum
age is 120 leads to p(x + t > 120|x) = 0, ∀ x. Discounting future annuity payments
exponentially with interest rate i leads to the following expected present value of the
immediate annuity:
EPVEXP (x) = y(x)
120−x∑
t=0
p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t (2.1)
If the annuity is fair the EPV of the annuity equals the lump sum8. Therefore:
yfair(x) =
L∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t
(2.2)
Now consider an investor who discounts future payments hyperbolically. The EPV
of the fair annuity is:
EPVHB(x) = L
∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + t)−r∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t
(2.3)
We compare the expected present value of the annuity, following hyperbolic dis-
counting, with the lump sum payment L. Figure 2.2 displays the difference D(x) =
EPVHB(x) − L for x ∈ [0, 1, . . . , 66], three hyperbolic parameters and a lump sum
payment of L = 100, 000 EUR. The maximum age x for which D(x) is calculated is
66.
8For the derivation of all hypotheses fair annuity payments y(x)fair are assumed. Using actuarial unfair monthly
payments ϕy(x)fair with ϕ ∈ (0; 1) only scales all annuity payments by the factor ϕ but does not change the
hypotheses.
2.3. HYPOTHESES 31
-20.000
0
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
D(x) for r=0.2381 
(intersection at 15 years)
D(x) for r=0.1836 
(intersection at 10 years)
D(x) for r=0.1228 
(intersection at 5 years)
66
Figure 2.2: Difference of EPV immediate annuity and lump sum. This figure reports the difference D(x)
of the expected present value of a fair immediate annuity and a lump sum payment of L = 100, 000EUR for a
hyperbolic decision maker. ”Intersection” indicates for which period the weight of the hyperbolic function equals the
weight of an exponential discount function with i = 4.5%.
The graph shows that for all parameters r, the relation between the decision
maker’s age and the difference of the EPVHB of the annuity and the lump sum is
negative. As the lump sum payment is constant, this implies a decreasing EPVHB
with age. For example, the difference between the EPVHB of the annuity and the
lump sum for a 20-year old hyperbolic decision maker is about 33,000 EUR (for
r = 0.2381), in favor of the annuity. If the same decision is made 46 years later at
the age of 66, the difference shrinks by 43,000 EUR to about -10,000 EUR, leading
the decision maker to now prefer the lump sum. Note that for exponential time
preferences D(x) = 0 for all x. Therefore, it follows for hypothesis 1a that:
H1a: The hyperbolic decision maker’s age has a negative effect on the at-
tractiveness of fair, immediate annuities.
The critical age at which the difference D(x) becomes negative depends on the pa-
rameter r. For larger parameters the critical age gets smaller (see figure 2.3). For
example, if r = 0.3841 it holds that D(0) = 0 and D(x) < 0 for all x > 0. Abdellaoui
et al. (2010) estimate different discount functions and find a hyperbolic parameter of
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r = 0.19. For this parameter the critical age is at about 64 years. This is important
in particulars, as most people face the annuitization decision at about that age.
The intuition behind this hypothesis is as follows: hyperbolic discounting leads to
undervaluation of earlier payments and overvaluation of later payments (compared
to exponential discounting). Older decision makers expect less later payments than
young decision makers, simply due to a shorter remaining lifetime. Therefore, older
hyperbolic decision makers overvalue fewer expected payments and the annuity seems
unattractive to them.
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Figure 2.3: Critical age dependent on hyperbolic discounting parameter r. This figure reports the critical
age for which D(x) = 0 dependent on the parameter r of the hyperbolic discount function DFHB = (1 + t)
−r.
Hypothesis 1b - future case
In the future case, the decision maker has to decide today between an annuity
starting at the age of 66 (retirement age) and the corresponding fair lump sum also
received at the age of 66. Using equation (2.2) the fair annuity payment conditional
on reaching the age of 66 is:
yfair(66) =
L∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−t
(2.4)
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For exponential discounting, the EPV of the annuity for an x-year old investor is:
EPVEXP (x) = y
(120−66)∑
t=0
p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−(t+66−x) (2.5)
Now consider a decision maker who follows hyperbolic discounting. The EPV of
the annuity is:
EPVHBa(x) = L
∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + (t+ 66− x))−r∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−t
(2.6)
To compare EPVHBa(x) with the lump sum, the EPV of the lump sum is calculated:
EPVHBL(x) =
L
(1 + (66− x))r (2.7)
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Figure 2.4: Difference of EPV future annuity and lump sum. This figure reports the difference D(x) of the
expected present value of a fair future annuity and a future lump sum payment of L = 100, 000EUR for a hyperbolic
decision maker. ”Intersection” indicates for which period the weight of the hyperbolic function equals the weight of
an exponential discount function with i = 4.5%.
Figure 2.4 displays the difference D(x) between the EPV of the annuity
(EPVHBa(x)) and the EPV of the lump sum (EPVHBL(x)) for x ∈ [0, 1, . . . , 66],
three hyperbolic parameters and a lump sum payment of L = 100, 000 EUR. With
increasing age, D(x) is also increasing until a critical age (depending on the paramter
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r) is reached. After that point D(x) strongly declines with age. Overall the relation
between age and the EPV of the annuity is negative:
H1b: The hyperbolic decision maker’s age has a negative effect on the
attractiveness of fair, future annuities.
2.3.3 Hypotheses 2-4: is the age effect driven by hyperbolic discounting?
We are aware that a possible negative effect of age on the annuity demand can
be driven by many factors and not only hyperbolic discounting. For example, the
uncertainty of ones lifespan is decreasing with age and therefore, an annuity could
be more attractive in younger years. In this case we control for the subjective life
expectancy in the analysis, however, it is not difficult to come up with other possible
explanations for an age effect. Therefore, three further hypothesis which are specific
to hyperbolic discounting are derived to empirically rule out other explanations.
Hypothesis 2 - immediate vs. future condition
When the immediate case is comapred to the future case it can be shown that
the effect of age should be different in the two cases: In the immediate case the EPV
of the annuity monotonically decreases with the decision makers age (figure 2.2). In
the future case however, we expect a structural break in the age gradient: if the age
effect is caused by hyperbolic discounting, no effect should be observed for younger
participants, whereas a negative effect should be present for participants with age
above 50 (figure 2.4)9. This leads to hypothesis 2:
H2: There will be a structural break in the age gradient only in the future
case.
9The exact age at which the structural break should be observed depends on the exact form of the hyperbolic
discount function. This is taken into account in the empirical analysis.
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Hypothesis 3 - time inconsistent vs. time consistent decision makers
According to the definition of the fair annuity, the age effect should only be
prevalent for participants that behave time inconsistent. This should be true for
both, the immediate and the future case:
H3: Decision maker’s age only has a negative effect for a sample con-
sisting of time inconsistent participants and no effect for time consistent
participants.
Hypothesis 4 - Harvey function parameter estimation
The last hypothesis takes into account the specific form of the Harvey (1986)
function with DFHarvey(t) = (1+ t)
−r. It is considered how changes in the hyperbolic
parameter r influence the expected present value of the annuity. For the immediate
case the first derivative of the difference between the expected present value of the
annuity and the lump sum payment, i.e. D(x) = EPVHB − L, with respect to r
is negative (see B.1). For higher values of r the annuity becomes less attractive.
However, in the future case the sign of the derivative depends on r itself. Therefore,
only the effect of changes in r in the immediate case are considered. In addition the
difference between D(x + 1) and D(x) is taken into account. B.2 shows that the
derivative of ∆D(x) = D(x+ 1)−D(x) with respect to r is positive indicating that
an increase in r results in an increase in ∆D(x). This also means that the (negative)
difference between D(x+1) and D(x) gets smaller. If the previous results are caused
by hyperbolic discounting a smaller difference between D(x + 1) and D(x) should
result in a weaker age effect.
H4: Higher values of the hyperbolic parameter r decrease the attractive-
ness of the annuity and weaken the age effect in the immediate case.
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2.4 Survey design and summary statistics
2.4.1 Survey design
To test the hypotheses developed in section 2.3 an online survey was conducted in
cooperation with the ”Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)”. The FAZ promoted
our survey in the print edition and posted a link on their online portal. To avoid
biasing potential participants, the FAZ agreed to only promote and post the link and
to write an article about the topic after the study was finished. 3,077 participants
with age ranging from 18 to 86 completed the survey in on average 11 minutes.
Participants were asked to make hypothetical choices about retirement planning and
to answer a set of questions regarding their time preferences, demographics and some
additional control questions. In particular, the survey asked participants to choose
between a monthly payment (annuity) and a lump sum in two different scenarios: in
the immediate case, subjects chose between a lump sum paid out today and a fair
annuity also starting today. In the future case, participants chose between an annuity
starting at retirement age and a lump sum also received when entering retirement.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the two scenarios. As a robustness
test a further question is introduced where he/she had to choose an annuitization
rate between 0% and 100% in steps of 10%.
Retirement scenario
The retirement scenario was designed to test the future case. Participants were
asked: ”Imagine you plan to retire at age 66 . At this time your retirement account
has a balance of EUR L to which you then have access to. There are two ways to
withdraw the money.” Option 1 was a lump sum payment and participants were told
that they will receive the whole account balance on retirement. Option 2 was a fair
annuity and participants were told that option 2 guarantees a monthly payment of
EUR y as long as they are alive. We randomly varied the amount L between subjects
from EUR 100,000 to EUR 1,000,000 in five steps and calculated EUR y as the
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fair monthly annuity at age 66 with respect to gender assuming a constant interest
rate of 4.5% . Table 2.1 shows the payout options for the five different amounts of
L. After participants made their decision we changed the possible payout options
in a consecutive question. Now participants could determine annuitization rates in
10% steps from 0% to 100%10. The amount L remained the same as in the previous
question and participants could always see to what payouts their decision would lead.
Lottery scenario
The lottery scenario tests the immediate case. Participants are asked the same two
questions as explained above with two important differences. 1) They are told that
they won an amount of L in the national lottery today and that they have to choose
the payout scheme. The major difference here is that the payments in this scenario
start immediately (and not at age 66). 2) To calculate the fair annuity gender, an
interest rate of 4.5% and the actual participants’ age is used. Therefore 83 different
fair annuities (for ages 18 to 100) per gender are calculated. Note that the lottery
and retirement scenario presented the same situation for participants at age 66. We
again varied L between subjects from EUR 100,000 to EUR 1,000,000 in 5 steps.
Fair monthly annuity Fair monthly annuity
Amount (L) in EUR male at age 66 female at age 66
100,000 763.76 649.08
300,000 2,291.28 1,947.24
500,000 3,818.80 3,245.40
700,000 5,346.32 4,543.56
1,000,000 7,637.60 6,490.80
Table 2.1: Annuity choices.Possible choices between a lump sum of L and the corresponding fair annuity. We
assumed a constant interest rate of 4.5% and used latest life tables for Germany. The objective life expectancy for a
66 year old male (female) was 82.74 (85.84).
Retirement vs. lottery scenario
The two scenarios differ in the point in time at which payments are received and in
the wording. In the immediate case the word ”lottery” is used, whereas in the future
case we use the word ”retirement”. To test the effect of differences in wording, we
10This implies that an annuitization rate of 60% corresponds to 60%·y paid out every month and 40%·L being
paid out as a lump sum.
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consider a subsample of participants with an age close to 66 (see section 2.5). Besides
wording, for these participants there is almost no difference between the immediate
and the future case as payments in the latter case start at age 66. A second concern
one could have regarding the lottery scenario is that winning a national lottery is a
very rare event and therefore not in participants mindset. However, a representative
study conducted by the Federal Centre for Health Education (BZgA) in 2011 shows
that about 65% of the 16 to 65 year old participants ever played the national lottery
and that more than 50% participated in the last year. Also the drawing of the
winning numbers is broadcasted live on television since 1965 each Saturday evening
and should therefore also be present in peoples mindset.
Time preferences
As stated earlier, there is no clear evidence which method of eliciting time pref-
erences leads to the best results. Therefore we choose a procedure that is as simple
as possible but allows to distinct between subjects that behave time consistent and
subjects that are time inconsistent (see Harrison et al., 2002; Ifcher and Zarghamee,
2011; Meier and Sprenger, 2013). In a choice-based task, participants had to decide
between a tax refund T that is obtained earlier and a refund T(1+i) that is obtained
later in time. In three questions the earlier payment is received immediately and the
later one is received in 10 months with i = 3.3%, 11.3% and 31.3%. The second set
of questions uses the same interest rates with the difference that all payments are
shifted 18 months into the future (earlier payment in 18 months, later in 28 months).
If participants have time consistent preferences only the difference between the two
payments (10 months for all questions) should matter and for each interest rate the
decision between the earlier or later payment should be the same. All six questions
are displayed on the same screen, put in a pair-wise manner together (paired by
interest rate) and participants are made aware of the fact that there are no right or
wrong answers.
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For the survey we used hypothetical choice questions. There are three reasons for
this: 1) using real money choices can lead participants do consider future payments
as uncertain and therefore a present-bias or hyperbolic discounting pattern can be
generated even for subjects with time consistent preferences (see for example Read,
2005; Sutter et al., 2013) 2) real stakes can also cause a self-selection problem. If real
money is paid it could be that subjects that are in need of immediate money are
attracted and results are biased in the direction of hyperbolic discount (see Noor,
2009; Sutter et al., 2013) and 3) there is no clear evidence that incentivized decisions
lead to better results (see Frederick et al., 2002).
Controls
We use participants self-reported loss and risk attitude to proxy for loss and risk
aversion. Earlier studies find that self-reported risk attitude on a Likert scale is a
good predictor of actual risk taking (see e.g. van Rooij et al., 2011; Nosic and Weber,
2010). On a seven-point Likert scale participants have to agree to the statements ”I’m
a risk averse person” as a measure for risk aversion and ”I’m very afraid of losses”
as a measure of loss aversion.
To elicit a financial literacy score, participants answer six questions (see appendix
C.1). We choose one of the basic questions from Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), three
advanced questions from van Rooij et al. (2011) and develop two more complicated
questions on our own. We do so because the FAZ newspaper has a focus on finan-
cial markets and previous studies find that subjects, with similar characteristics are
remarkable financially literate. (see Mueller and Weber, 2014).
One of the most important factors that influences the annuitization decision
should be individuals’ subjective life expectancy. The method of the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances and Mirowsky (1999) is adopted. Participants are asked (directly)
to think about their life expectancy and give an estimate thereof.
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In addition participants indicate at what age they plan to retire, if they own
private pension insurance and how they rate the certainty of social security benefits
guaranteed by the government today.
2.4.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics on subjects annuitization decision, demo-
graphics, time preferences and controls. We excluded subjects with age above 66 as
in the later analysis only participants up to that age are considered11. More than half
of the participants (57%) choose the annuity in the simple 0/1 framework and the
average person chooses an annuitization rate of 56%. The option to partially annu-
itize makes annuities more attractive as for this question almost 80% of participants
choose to annuitize at least to some extend, confirming Beshears et al. (2012). The
average age is about 42 years (median 43) and participants are between 18 and 66
years old. Men are overrepresented in our study (83% male) reflecting the fact that
the majority of FAZ readers are male (62%) and that men are more likely to partic-
ipate in online surveys of our kind (see Mueller and Weber, 2014). Subjects report
a relatively high after tax income of about EUR 3,400 (median 3,000) per month
(compared to a German average after tax income of about EUR 1,470 in 201112)
and are well educated with 91% having received the German equivalent to a high
school diploma and 66% having graduated from a university. Half of the participants
are married. Also, in section 2.5.3 we analyze if our results are driven by this high
income - high education dataset.
Given a fixed interest rate, peoples’ choices are defined as inconsistent if they
choose the earlier payment in the today-setting and the later payment in the 18-
month-setting. Depending on the interest rate (3%, 11% or 31%), between 18% and
25% of participants made an inconsistent decision of which about 7% of participants
always chose inconsistently.
11Also 2 participants which were younger than 66 but have already been retired are excluded.
12Source: German Federal Statistical Office 2012
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Variable Mean (Median) Std. Dev.
Annuity Choice
Annuity 0/1 0.57 0.50
Annuitization Rate 0.56 0.37
Demographics
Age 41.77 (43.00) 13.16
Gender 0.83 0.37
Income 3,443.41 (3,000.00) 3,162.56
Number of Children 0.84 1.19
High School Degree 0.91 0.28
University Degree 0.66 0.47
Married 0.51 0.50
Time Preferences
Time Inconsistent i=3% 0.20 0.40
Time Inconsistent i=11% 0.25 0.44
Time Inconsistent i=31% 0.18 0.39
Always inconsistent 0.07 0.26
Controls
Risk Aversion (1-7) 3.90 1.47
Loss Aversion (1-7) 4.30 1.60
Financial Literacy Score van Rooij (0-4) 3.49 0.73
Financial Literacy Score Extra (0-2) 0.59 0.73
Life Expectancy (Males) 83.29 8.02
Life Expectancy (Females) 83.87 7.43
Planed Retirement Age 64.70 4.53
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.63 0.48
Certainty of Social Security (1-7) 3.05 1.82
Table 2.2: Online survey summary statistics. Included are participants with age below 67. Number of observa-
tions vary between 2672 (income) and 2944.
Asking participants about their risk- and loss aversion on a 1 to 7 Likert scale
leads to an average of 3.90 and 4.30 respectively. As expected, participants did ex-
tremely well in standard financial literacy questions with on average 3.49 / 4 correct
answers. Introducing the two more difficult questions helped to separate the sample
as subjects answered only 0.59 / 2 questions correctly. Directly asking participants
about their subjective life expectancy leads to estimates which, with an average of
83.29 years for male participants, are above the objective life expectancy for an av-
erage German male and, with 83.87 for female participants, are close to the average
objective life expectancy13. However, as the life expectancy increases with wealth
and education, we can not conclude whether participants overestimate or underes-
13The average male participant in our sample is 43.61 years old, the average female participant is aged 40.14 years
old. Using the latest German life tables a 43.61 year old German male on average lives until the age of 78.76 and a
40.14 year old German female on average lives until the age of 83.19.
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timate their personal objective life expectancy. The average planned retirement age
of about 65 is close to the actual retirement age in Germany.
2.5 Results and robustness
The empirical results are presented in three steps: 1) results regarding the effect
of age on the annuitization decision are presented. 2) three tests of whether the age
effect is indeed driven by participants time preferences are presented. 3) the section
closes with two robustness tests.
2.5.1 Results - Hypothesis 1: the age effect
In the following analysis we investigate the immediate case (lottery scenario) as
well as the future case (retirement scenario). One might be concerned that possible
differences arise as a consequence of the different wording in the two scenarios (”lot-
tery” vs. ”retirement”). For participants with an age close to 66 the only difference
between the two cases is the wording (”lottery” or ”retirement”). Table 2.3 presents
results of a logistic regression with participants choice in the 0/1 framework (1=an-
nuity, 0=lump sum) as dependent variable and age(c), a scenario dummy (0=lottery,
1=retirement) and the interaction between age(c) and scenario as explanatory vari-
ables. The analysis is restricted to participants with an age between 61 and 66. The
variable age(c) is the mean-centered age of participants in this subsample. Centering
the age variable is necessary as otherwise the null effect of the scenario dummy would
be the effect for age equal to zero (see Irwin and McClelland, 2001; Spiller et al.,
2013). The interaction coefficient and t-value are calculated based on Norton et al.
(2004). Neither the scenario nor the interaction of age and scenario have a significant
effect on the annuitization decision in this subsample.
Table 2.4 presents results of two logistic regressions where the dependent variable
again is a dummy that equals 1 if subjects chose the annuity and 0 if they chose
the lump sum in the 0/1 framework. Column 2 and 3 present results for participants
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Variable Coeff. Std. Error
Age(c) -0.245** 0.116
Scenario -0.366 0.258
Interaction Age(c)-Scenario 0.029 0.037
N=254
Table 2.3: Lottery vs. retirement: results of logistic regression. Dependent variable is annuity0/1, an indicator
variable that equals 1 if participants choose the annuity and 0 if they choose the lump sum. ***, ** and * indicate
significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level. Sample consisting only of participants aged between 61 and 66. Age(c) is
the mean-centered age variable for this subsample.
in the lottery scenario (immediate case) and columns 4 and 5 present results for
the retirement scenario (future case). For both scenarios coefficients and odds ratios
are reported. An odds ratio above one can be interpreted as the factor by which
the odds of choosing the annuity increases for any person14. In both scenarios the
negative effect of age is highly significant and economically strong with coefficients
of -0.024 and -0.020, respectively. To understand the magnitude of this effect the
odds ratio of the age coefficient in the lottery scenario is taken into account. A
value of 0.976 implies, that the odds of choosing the annuity decrease by 2.40% per
year. Note that this effect is constant and not dependent on values of the other
explanatory variables. In the retirement case the effect is slightly weaker with an
odds ratio of 0.980 translating to an decrease in odds of choosing the annuity by
2.00% per year. In both scenarios older participants tend to choose the lump sum
whereas younger participants prefer the annuity. Therefore, the main hypotheses 1(a)
and 1(b) are confirmed. This finding is in line with previous studies which analyzed
the annuitization decision: Brown et al. (2013) find a negative age effect using real
decisions from Croatian retirees who had to choose between an immediate pension
payment or a larger stream of delayed payments. Hurd and Panis (2006) study data
form the health and retirement study and find that the probability of cashing out a
defined contribution plan increases with age. In addition, Beshears et al. (2012) and
14For example, if person X is 40 years old and has a 30% probability of choosing the annuity, the odds of choosing
the annuity for this person are 30%
70%
= 0.43. An odds ratio now gives the change in the odds of choosing the annuity
if age is increased by one unit. To be precise, the odds ratio in this example reports the ratio between the odds of
choosing the annuity for a 41 year old and a 40 year old person. An odds ratio of 1.1 for example translates to odds
of choosing the annuity of 0.43 · 1.1 = 0.473, resulting in a new probability of choosing the annuity of 32%. The odds
ratio can range from 0 to ∞ with an odds ratio of 1 implying no effect of the explanatory variable.
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Shu et al. (2013) also find a negative effect of age on the attractiveness of annuities
using a hypothetical questionnaire study.
Annuity 0/1 Lottery Scenario Retirement Scenario
(immediate case) (future case)
Variable Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Demographics
Age -0.0243*** 0.9760 -0.0202*** 0.9800
Gender 0.0038 1.0038 -0.1580 0.8538
Income (log) 0.0912 1.0955 0.1001 1.1053
Number of Children -0.0157 0.9844 -0.0852 0.9184
High School Degree -0.3998 0.6704 0.1440 1.1549
University Degree 0.0489 1.0501 0.2038 1.2260
Married -0.1380 0.8711 -0.0919 0.9122
Controls
Risk aversion (1-7) 0.1309** 1.1399 0.0749 1.0777
Loss aversion (1-7) -0.0442 0.9568 -0.0412 0.9596
Financial Literacy Score (0-6) 0.0332 1.0337 0.0490 1.0502
Life Expectancy 0.0442*** 1.0452 0.0563*** 1.0579
Planed Retirement Age 0.0010 1.0010 -0.0012 0.9988
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.1495 1.1613 0.5719*** 1.7717
Certainty of Social Security 0.0501 1.0514 0.0655 1.0677
Magnitude Controls
Magnitude2 (lump sum = 300k) 0.1481 1.1596 -0.1890 0.8278
Magnitude3 (lump sum = 500k) -0.3348 0.7155 -0.0211 0.9791
Magnitude4 (lump sum = 700k) -0.2401 0.7865 -0.4242* 0.6543
Magnitude5 (lump sum = 1,000k) -0.0386 0.9621 -0.4711** 0.6243
Magnitude Relatively Low -0.4130 0.6617 -0.4422 0.6426
Time Sum 0.0003 1.0003 0.0008** 1.0008
Constant -3.4181*** 0.0328 -5.4382*** 0.0043
Number of Obs 1113 1103
Correctly Classified 64.15% 65.46%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6413 0.6842
Table 2.4: Hypotheses 1a and 1b: Results of logistic regression. Dependent variable is annuity0/1, an indicator
variable that equals 1 if participants choose the annuity and 0 for the lump sum. The sample is split by scenario
(lottery vs. retirement). ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
In the lottery scenario 2 out of 9 controls are significant. The more risk averse
participants are, the more likely they are to insure against longevity risk by choosing
the annuity. Also, Brown (2007) states that loss aversion could be a reason for low
annuitization rates if people see the annuity as a risky gamble. The effect for loss
aversion is negative but not significant. The effect of the subjective life expectancy is
highly significant. Participants who expect to live longer choose the annuity. With an
odds ratio of 1.045, meaning the odds of choosing the annuity increases by 4.5% per
additional year the participant expects to live longer, this finding is also economically
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meaningful. In contrast to the lottery scenario, risk aversion proves not to be sig-
nificant in the retirement scenario. However, owning private pension insurance leads
to the tendency to favor the annuity. One could expect that demand for annuities
decreases because in this case the annuity could be crowded out by already existing
private annuitization (see for the crowding out argument Mitchell and Moore, 1998;
Dushi and Webb, 2004; Purcal and Piggott, 2008). Nevertheless, owning private pen-
sion insurance seems to proxy more for participants who have a general preference
for insurance against longevity risk.
The magnitude of payments only seems to matter in the retirement scenario. For
high payments (lump sum = EUR 750,000 or EUR 1,000,000) participants indicate
that they would prefer the lump sum when they retire15. Other studies find that an
increase in magnitude leads to a decrease of exponential discount rates of partici-
pants (see for example Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Baucells and Heukamp, 2012).
Therefore, one could expect a positive influence on the probability of choosing the
annuity. However, it is not clear in what way an increase of magnitude influences
discount rates of hyperbolic decision makers. Future research is needed to answer
this question.
Relatively low payments (lump sum and annuity) compared to participants
monthly income ( income
lumpsum
> 5%) and the time needed to answer the survey have
no significant or economically strong effect.
15Taking into account the question about the annuitization rate we find that the absolute annuity payment increases
in magnitude, even if the annuitization rate decreases. We find that the relation between the magnitude of the lump
sum and the absolute magnitude of the annuity is positive yet decreasing (concave) in magnitude. Therefore, it could
be that in the 0/1 framework higher magnitudes lead to a preference for the lump sum as partial annuitization is
not possible (see section 2.5.3 Robustness).
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2.5.2 Results - Hypotheses 2-4: is the age effect driven by hyperbolic
discounting?
Hypothesis 2 - immediate vs. future case
Hypothesis 2 refers to the difference between the retirement and lottery scenario.
It is hypothesized that there will be a structural break for the age gradient at an age
of about 50 in the retirement scenario only (compare figures 2.2 and 2.4). However,
the exact age after which we should observe a negative effect of age depends on the
exact form of the hyperbolic discount function. Therefore 10 tests are conducted for
a critical age between 45 - 54. For each age we test whether the slope of the age
coefficient for participants with age smaller than the critical age differs from the age
coefficient for participants older or equal to the critical age. Table 2.5 presents the
results.
Columns 2 - 4 show the results for the lottery scenario (immediate case). The
difference in age coefficients for the younger (age < critical age) and older (age ≥
critical age) subsample is between 0.0012 and 0.0177. Since this difference is never
significant a structural break in the age gradient is not observed. For the retirement
scenario (future case), in contrast, a structural break can be observed (columns 4 - 7).
The difference between the age coefficients is about five to ten times higher (between
0.0174 and 0.0599) and significant on a 10% level for a critical age of 47, 48 and
49 respectively. In addition, figure 2.5 shows the distribution of the difference in age
coefficients for critical ages between 45 and 54. In the lottery scenario (rectangles) the
difference is distributed around zero with no clear pattern. Thereby, the difference is
sometimes positive and sometimes negative. On average it is close to zero (average:
0.0045). For the retirement scenario (rhombuses), however, the average is about 10
times higher (average: 0.0441) and an inverse U-shaped pattern can be observed.
The data shows that there is a difference between younger and older participants in
the retirement scenario as predicted by the calculations in section 2.3. This provides
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evidence that the age effect is indeed driven by hyperbolic discounting and not by
other factors.
-0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 a
ge
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
e
n
ts
 
critical age 
Lottery Scenario Retirement Scenario Avg. Lottery Scenario Avg. Retirement Scenario 
Average: 0.0441 
Average: 0.0045 
Figure 2.5: Distribution of the difference in age coefficients. This figure reports the difference in age coefficients
for critical ages between 45 and 54. Thereby, the sample is split by scenario (lottery vs. retirement) and by critical
age. As shown in table 2.5, the difference in age coefficients is significant (structural break)
Hypothesis 3 - time inconsistent vs. time consistent decision makers
Hypothesis 3 states that there is an age effect on the annuitization decision for
time inconsistent participants and no effect for participants who behave time con-
sistent. To test this hypothesis the sample is split into time consistent and time
inconsistent participants and it is analyzed whether the age effect is present in only
the time inconsistent subsample. Thereby, the sample is split according to the an-
swers participants gave regarding six tax refund questions. Subsample one includes
only participants who chose in a time inconsistent manner in at least two of the three
cases (time inconsistent group). The second subsample consists of participants who
gave consistent answers in at least two of the three cases (time consistent group).
For this analysis both scenarios (lottery and retirement) are pooled. We do so as a
negative age effect is observed in both scenarios (see table 2.4). Hypothesis 3 refers to
the difference between time consistent and time inconsistent participants. Columns 2
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and 3 of table 2.6 present coefficients and odds ratios for the time inconsistent group
and columns 4 and 5 for the time consistent group, respectively.
Annuity 0/1 Time inconsistent Time consistent
Variable Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Demographics
Age -0.0292*** 0.9712 -0.0181*** 0.9820
Gender 0.3122 1.3664 -0.1463 0.8639
Income (log) -0.0039 0.9961 0.0379* 1.0386
Number of Children 0.2218* 1.2483 -0.0980** 0.9067
High School Degree 0.4719 1.6031 -0.2727 0.7613
University Degree -0.3669 0.6929 0.2476** 1.2809
Married -0.7262** 0.4838 0.0098 1.0098
Constant -5.4311** 0.0044 -3.2497*** 0.0388
Controls yes yes
Magnitude Controls yes yes
Number of Obs 392 1845
Correctly Classified 65.56% 65.37%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6939 0.6573
Table 2.6: Hypothesis 3: Results of logistic regression for a subsample of time inconsistent and consistent
participants. Dependent variable is annuity0/1, an indicator variable that equals 1 if participants choose the annuity
and 0 for the lump sum. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
In both subsamples we find a negative and significant effect of age. However, the
coefficient for the inconsistent group is, in absolute terms, about two times stronger.
The effect measured by the odds ratio for the inconsistent subsample is also almost
two times as strong compared to the consistent subsample (odds ratio of 0.969,
resulting in a 3.31% decrease of the odds of choosing the annuity vs. 0.983, decreasing
the odds by 1.7%.). In summary, a strong and significant negative age effect on the
probability of choosing the annuity is obtained (table 2.4), with this effect becoming
stronger for ”hyperbolic” participants and weaker for ”less hyperbolic” ones (table
2.6).
Hypothesis 4 - Harvey function parameter estimation
To test hypothesis 4 the hyperbolic parameter r of the function DFHarvey(t) =
(1 + t)−r has to be determined. Thereby, we are only able to calculate a range of
r for each participant using the tax refund questions. For example answering the
first pair of tax refund questions inconsistently means that the participant prefers
a tax refund of EUR 1,100 today over a refund of EUR 1,130 in ten months, but
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she also prefers a refund of 1,130 in 28 months over a refund of 1,110 in 18 month.
Therefore 1, 100 ≥ 1,130
(1+ 10
12
)r
and 1,100
(1+ 18
12
)r
≤ 1,130
(1+ 28
12
)r
. This results in 0.0444 < r < 0.0935.
Answering the second (third) pair of tax refund questions inconsistently results in
0.1436 < r < 0.3025 (0.3741 < r < 0.7883). A problem of this method is that
only participants that answer exactly one pair of tax questions inconsistently can
be taken into account. Answering more than one question inconsistently results in
multiple, incompatible conditions for the parameter r.16. This problem arises due to
our survey design which was intended to separate time inconsistent participants
from time consistent ones. Overall 595 participants answer exactly one question
inconsistently.
Hypothesis 4 states that an increase in r has two effects: 1) it decreases the
attractivness of the annuity (see B.1) and 2) it also weakens the age effect (see B.2).
However, this predicition is only true in the lottery scenario as in the retirement
scenario the effect depends on r itself. Therefore, the effect of changes in r is tested
in a subsample consisting of participants assigned to the lottery scenario (immediate
case) that answered exactly one tax refund question inconsistently. This results in
N=292 observations.
Column 2 of table 2.7 presents results of a logistic regression with the annuity
choice in the 0/1 framework as the dependent variable. Due to limited degrees of
freedom in all regressions presented in table 2.7, only control variables that have
been significant in earlier regressions (see table 2.4) are included. Table 2.7 shows a
significant age effect in the (full) subsample with a coefficient of -0.0349 (column full
sample). Two dummy variables (parameter r medium, parameter r large) indicate a
medium (large) parameter r (equals one if the answer to the second (third) pair of
tax refund questions is inconsistent). Both coefficients of the dummy variables have
the expected sign. The larger the parameter r, the lower the probability of choosing
the annuity. The effect is significant at the 10%-level for large parameters.
16To our surprise this issue receives not much attention in the literature using the choice approach. Note that the
incompatibility also arises for quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
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Annuity 0/1 full subsample r=small r=medium r=large
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age -0.0349*** -0.0614*** -0.0375*** -0.0216
Parameter r medium -0.3188
Parameter r large -0.6524*
Constant -1.4499 -2.1276 -3.4075 -0.1238
Other Demographics only if significant in previous regressions
Controls only if significant in previous regressions
Magnitude Controls only if significant in previous regressions
Number of Obs 292 96 125 71
Correctly Classified 71.92% 72.92% 71.20% 59.15%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6849 0.7532 0.6966 0.6404
Table 2.7: Hypothesis 4: Results of logistic regressions for four subsamples of participants in the lottery
scenario with different time preferences (measured by parameter r). Dependent variable is annuity0/1, an indicator
variable that equals 1 if participants choose the annuity and 0 for the lump sum. ***, ** and * indicate significance
on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
To test the second prediction, the subsample of 292 participants is split into three
smaller subsamples using the size of parameter r. Columns 3, 4 and 5 of table 2.7
present logistic regression results for a subsample of participants with r being small
(column 3), medium (column 4) and large (column 5). A significant negative effect
of age is present in the first two subsamples. As predicted, the coefficient of the
age variable gets less negative and less significant for an increase in r (coefficient of
-0.061∗∗∗ for r=small, compared to -0.038∗∗∗ for r=medium and -0.022 for r=large),
confirming the idea that the previous results are driven by hyperbolic discounting.
2.5.3 Robustness
Annuitization rate
To test robustness of the results presented above, the annuitization rate question
is used as the dependent variable. Participants indicate which fraction of the lump
sum they want to annuitize (in steps of 10%). Figure 2.6 shows that in both scenarios
more than 50% of participants either choose full annuitization (25.96% in the lottery
scenario = immediate case, 18.84% in the retirement scenario = future case), the
50/50 choice (12.81% in the lottery scenario, 13.77% in the retirement scenario) or
zero annuitization (22.52% in the lottery scenario, 20.14% in the retirement scenario).
In between, annuitization rates of more than 50% are popular. This could indicate
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that people have some immediate use for a larger sum (e.g., repaying debt or buying
a new car) but still want to annuitize most of the lump sum.
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
Lotter Scenario Retirement Scenario 
Figure 2.6: Fraction of participants for each possible annuitization rate. This figure reports the fraction of
participants for each possible annuitization rate.
We repeat the analysis regarding hypotheses 1 - 4 using the annuitization rate as
dependent variable. For all hypothesis a OLS regression is conducted. Demographic
variables, controls and magnitude controls presented in table 2.4 are included. Table
2.8 presents a summary of the results and reports the age coefficient for different
subsamples. Thereby, the results of four out of the five hypotheses are robust to the
use of the annuitization rate: A significant and negative effect of age on the annu-
itzation rate is obtained in both scenarios, confirming hypotheses 1a and 1b (column
2 and 3). The effect becomes stronger and more significant for a subsample of time
inconsistent participants (hypothesis 3, column 5). Also, the hyperbolic parameter
r has the predicted effect (hypothesis 4, column 6). Solely hypothesis 2 cannot be
confirmed. Column 4 presents the difference in age coefficents between a younger
and older subsample (critical age=48) for both scenarios. Neither of the differences
is significant. There proofs to be no structural break in the age gradient in the lottery
and retirement scenario.
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Variance analysis
As a second robustness check the variance of the annuitization rate by age is taken
into account. As the exact form of the hyperbolic discount function for each person
is unknown, the exact critical age at which the lump sum becomes more attractive
than the annuity cannot be calculated. Consequently, the impact of a hyperbolic
discount function should be clear for old and young participants. Young individuals
should prefer the annuity; old individuals should prefer the lump sum, (more or less)
independent of the exact form of the discount function. For middle aged people the
effect is not that clear, as it depends on the exact form of the discount function.
This also means that younger and older people as a group should act more uniformly
in their decision regarding the annuitization rate. Young people choose a high rate,
whereas old people prefer a low rate. Middle aged participants decisions, however,
should vary more strongly as someone might have a strong hyperbolic function,
while others may only have weak hyperbolic functions. Therefore, the variance of the
annuitization rate by age should have an inverted U-form. In particular, this should
be true for the lottery scenario as here the expected present value monotonically
decreases with age. For the retirement scenario the effect should be weaker as there
should be no influence of age on the annuitization decision for participants below
an age of about 50. Figure 2.7 shows the variance of the annuitization rate for all
age groups from 18 to 66, for both scenarios. The solid line represents fitted values
from a linear regression model with age and age squared as explanatory variables.
An inverse U-shape can be seen in both scenarios. Also, the effect is stronger in
the lottery scenario. Coefficients for age and age squared are highly significant (not
reported) with R2 of 0.2451 in the lottery scenario and only 0.0340 in the retirement
scenario. This pattern supports the idea of hyperbolic discounting leading to the
observed effects.
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Figure 2.7: Variance of annuitization rate by age. This figure reports the variance of the annuitization rate by
age (18-66) for the lottery and retirement scenario. Solid line represents fitted values from an OLS regression with
age and age squared as explanatory variables.
Representativeness of the dataset
An important issue for the policy implications discussed in the next section is
external validity of our results. We are aware that our dataset is not representative
for Germany and therefore it has to be analyzed whether the results are driven by
this non-representativeness. When comparing summary statistics in table 2.2 with
a representative sample of German households17 two major deviations have to be
noted: 1) the average monthly income in the FAZ survey data is more than two
times higher compared to an average German household and 2) more than 65% of
our participants obtained a university degree whereas this is only true for about
11% of the population. To test whether the results are driven by these high income -
high education participants we repeat the analysis presented in table 2.4 for different
subsamples. The upper part of table 2.9 presents results for a median income split.
Participants with an income higher the median income (median = 3,000 EUR) are
assigned to the high income group whereas the low income group represents partic-
ipants with an income smaller than or equal to the median income18. The average
17We use the SAVE 2010 survey to compare our dataset with. SAVE is a representative panel study of German
households conducted since 2001 by the Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA). For additional information
about SAVE see Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2009).
18The median split results in overall 1412 participants in the low income group vs. 804 participants in the high
income group. The difference occurs because participants could choose to directly enter their income or choose an
income range. Therefore, 656 participants indicated an income of 3,000. However, results are unchanged if these
participants are assigned to the low income group.
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income in the low income group is EUR 1,355.47 which is comparable to the average
income in Germany of EUR 1,470. In the lottery scenario (columns 2 and 3) both age
coefficients are negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficients (-0.022 in
the low income group and -0.036 in the high income group) is comparable to the full
sample effect of -0.024 presented in table 2.4. In the retirement scenario (columns
4 and 5) only the age coefficient in the low income group is significant. In addition
the magnitude of the effect in the low income group is with -0.026 about 30% higher
compared to the full sample coefficient of -0.020. Therefore, our main effect seems
not to be driven by the fact that our sample over-represents wealthy households as, if
anything, the effect gets stronger for low income households. The lower part of table
2.9 presents a similar analysis but now the sample is split by whether a participant
obtained a university degree or not. Now in both, the lottery scenario and retirement
scenario, the age coefficients are significant and negative. Also the magnitude of the
effect in all subsamples is comparable to the full sample effect in table 2.4. Therefore,
we conclude that our results are not driven by a non-representative dataset.
2.6 Commitment and policy implications
The findings in section 2.5 of this paper provide evidence on the usefulness of a
commitment device to increase real life annuitization. For considerations that speak
in favor of commitment devices the results of the future case (retirement scenario)
are particular interesting: Here participants seem to make the optimal decision (ac-
cording to expected utility theory) by choosing the annuity when thinking about
what they would do in the future but reverse that decision once the day of the ac-
tual decision has arrived. This reversal can be the result of a decision maker with
a self-control problem. Self-control problems can be overcome if the decision maker
is aware of the problem (sophisticated hyperbolic discounter) and if a commitment
device exists that allows him or her to bind future behavior. There is evidence that
in a financial context sophisticated hyperbolic discounters are willing to use com-
mitment devices in order to increase savings by constraining withdrawals from their
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Sample Split by Median Income (Low vs. High)
Lottery Scenario Retirement Scenario
Low High Low High
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age -0.022*** -0.036*** -0.026*** -0.021
Other Demographics yes yes yes yes
Time Preferences yes yes yes yes
Other Controls yes yes yes yes
Scenario Controls yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 727 386 685 418
Correctly classified 62.91% 61.85% 64.53% 71.05%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6447 0.6787 0.6808 0.7390
Sample Split by Education (University Degree)
Lottery Scenario Retirement Scenario
Degree=0 Degree=1 Degree=0 Degree=1
Variable Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Age -0.028** -0.022*** -0.026** -0.019**
Other Demographics yes yes yes yes
Time Preferences yes yes yes yes
Other Controls yes yes yes yes
Scenario Controls yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 372 741 331 772
Correctly classified 68.82% 64.37% 66.47% 65.80%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6831 0.6317 0.7129 0.6854
Table 2.9: Robustness representativeness of the dataset: Results of logistic regression for four subsamples
of participants in each scenario. Column 2 and 3 present results for a sample split by median income and columns
4 and 5 present results for a sample split by whether or not a participant has obtained a university degree. ***, **
and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
saving account (see Ashraf et al., 2006; Beshears et al., 2011). In our study we do
not discriminate between naive and sophisticated decision makers as we are pri-
mary interested in what drives the low annuitization demand. The introduction of
a commitment device in the annuity context would be the second step to overcome
the problem. However, combining our results of time inconsistent preferences as a
driver for low annuity demand with the empirical evidence of Ashraf et al. (2006)
and Beshears et al. (2011) suggest that commitment devices could be one way to
increase real life annuitization. Therefore, if policy makers are interested in increas-
ing real life annuitization rates they could implement a simple commitment device,
which allows people to undertake a binding annuitization decision earlier in life. This
could also result in the reduction of adverse selection problems. Real life annuities
pay only about 80% - 90% of the fair annuity value (see Mitchell et al., 1999; Murthi
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et al., 2000). Part of this deduction is due to adverse selection in the annuity market
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). If potential annuity buyers have more information
about their own life expectancy (e.g. strong smoker, medical history of family mem-
bers, etc.) the annuity seller cannot use standard life tables to calculate prices. This
information asymmetry is higher if the annuitization decision is made close to retire-
ment and therefore close to the start of annuity payments. However, if people would
be able to make a binding decision earlier in life the information asymmetry would
be reduced because the annuity buyer would have less information about his/her
future condition. Therefore the annuity seller could offer annuities closer to the fair
value. This creates an incentive for people to bind their behavior and stick to their
decision.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper relates the effect of inconsistent time preferences to the choice between
a lump sum payment and a monthly payment. Conducting a large online survey in
cooperation with a major German newspaper, this study shows that young individ-
uals have a preference for annuities whereas older individuals tend to prefer lump
sum payments. In this study participants are assigned to two different conditions.
In the immediate case participants choose between a fair immediate annuity and
the corresponding lump sum. In the future case participants choose between a fair
annuity starting at retirement age and a lump sum also received when entering re-
tirement. In both cases subjects are asked in a consecutive question to choose an
annuitization rate between 0% and 100% in steps of 10%. The probability of choos-
ing an annuity over a lump sum increases in both cases by almost 20% from the
oldest to the youngest 10% of the sample, whereas the annuitization rate increases
by about 12%. Hyperbolic discounting, compared to exponential time discounting,
should lead to an undervaluation of payments in the near future and an overvalua-
tion of later payments. In the annuity context, this means for young people, because
of their high survival probabilities, that only relatively few (expected) payments are
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undervalued and most payments are overvalued resulting in an overvaluation of the
annuity. The opposite is true for older individuals. By splitting the sample into a
group of subjects who answered simple time preference questions inconsistently and
a group that gave time consistent answers it is shown that this effect indeed is driven
by the time preferences of participants. The finding is robust to the inclusion of var-
ious control variables. Additional important factors are subjective life expectancy,
financial literacy and risk aversion. Expecting a long life results in high annuitization
rates. Also, participants who are more financially literate and more risk averse prefer
annuities over lump sums and choose higher annuitization rates. These findings not
only help to better understand the annuity puzzle but might also be used to increase
real life annuitization rates. In the future case the switch of preferences over time
can be seen as a self-control problem. Therefore, introducing a commitment device
allowing people to bind or precommit their behavior could help to increase real life
annuitization.
Chapter 3
The Willingness to Pay, Accept
and Retire
3.1 Introduction
40 years ago the time spent in retirement for an average German employee was
about 10 years, whereas this number almost doubled until today. The lifespan after
retirement steadily increases due to an increasing life expectancy and a decreasing
effective retirement age. The decision when to retire and claim social security benefits
therefore becomes more and more important as it influences a person’s well-being
for many years. The German social security system allows people to claim benefits
when they first reach the age of 63. However, similar to the US social security system,
retiring before the full retirement age (FRA) results in a constant decrease of pension
benefits for the rest of one’s life. For example, retiring at age 63 instead of 67 reduces
monthly benefits by about 22%, making the retirement decision one of the most
economically important decisions in general1. Despite the financial incentive to delay
retirement and claiming benefits, the majority of workers in most developed countries
1The reduction of 22% is calculated as the reduction due to retiring earlier than the FRA (−4 · 3.6% = 14.4%)
and the reduction due to less accumulated earning points (≈ 7.6%). See section 2 for a detailed description.
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choose to retire early (see for example Behaghel and Blau, 2012; Gruber and Wise,
2004; Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2000). In Germany, for example, more than 65% of employees
retiring in 2011 did so before reaching their full retirement age2. This implies that,
among other factors, the reduction in monthly social security payments provides not
enough incentive to postpone retirement. The price for early retirement therefore is
smaller than the reservation price of those individuals.
In this paper, we focus on the reservation price for early retirement. The reserva-
tion price for a good can be elicited as the minimum price at which someone would
be willing to accept selling the good. Also, the maximum price someone would be
willing to pay can be regarded as the reservation price. Standard economic theory
predicts that the willingness-to-accept (WTA) and willingness-to-pay (WTP) should
not differ if there are no income effects and transaction costs (Willig, 1976). How-
ever, there is striking evidence that the WTA can be between 2 and about 100 times
larger than the WTP, depending on the good for which reservation prices are elicited
(for a detailed overview of the WTA/WTP literature see Horowitz and McConnell,
2002). For example, endowing participants with a coffee mug and eliciting selling
prices (WTA) leads to reservation prices about twice as high as when participants
are asked for a buying price (WTP) for the same mug (Kahneman et al., 1990).
This difference is too big to be explained by an income effect, suggesting that the
elicitation method of reservation prices directly influences the outcome.
Every worker is naturally endowed with a full and an earliest possible retirement
age, where early retirement in this study is considered as tradeable. The price for
early retirement is measured in the change in monthly social security benefits. The
“market price” in the German social security system for retiring 1 month earlier than
the FRA is c.p. 0.3% of monthly benefits3. Depending on whether the full retirement
age or an earlier retirement age is used as a reference point, the decision can be seen
2Source: Statistik der deutschen Rentenversicherung 2012. The FRA for employes retiring in 2011 was 65. However,
in 2007 the pension system was reformed and a stepwise increase of the FRA from 65 to 67 was resolved. We use the
new FRA in our survey.
3Section 2 of this paper provides an overview on how social security benefits are calculated.
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as a willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept problem. The official information by
the German government about social security payments includes both, information
about payments at the full and the earliest retirement age. This is therefore one of
few economically meaningful problems that is naturally presented in a WTA and
WTP framework.
To study the WTA/WTP difference in a retirement context, a large online survey
in cooperation with one of the biggest German newspapers, “Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung” (FAZ), has been conducted (FAZ-survey). Participants answered a set of
demographic and retirement related questions. They were randomly assigned to one
of two different treatments (between subjects). In the willingness-to-pay treatment
subjects indicated the maximum amount of monthly benefits they would be willing
to give up in order to retire at the earliest age possible (63) instead of the full
retirement age (67). In the willingness-to-accept treatment, in contrast, the minimum
increase of monthly payments in order to delay retirement from age 63 to age 67 was
elicited. Thereby, in both treatments, participants were given hypothetical monthly
benefits as a reference point amounting to 65% of their current income (level 1).
In a consecutive question (within subjects) participants answered the same question
again but for a hypothetical pension value of 110% of their current income (level 2).
Our data shows that the reservation price for early retirement in the WTA treat-
ment is about two times higher than in the WTP treatment. Most important, when
compared to the fair price (according to the social security system) the WTA on
average lies above the fair price whereas the average WTP is below the fair price
indicating that early retirement is attractive only in the WTA treatment. Using lo-
gistic regression, we find that the probability of retiring early is on average increased
by about 30 percentage points in the WTA treatment. The result is robust to the
inclusion of various control variables including risk aversion, loss aversion, financial
literacy and planned retirement age. Also results are confirmed using a representative
panel survey dataset for Germany (SAVE panel).
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In a second step, the cause of the WTA/WTP disparity is analyzed. In most stud-
ies, the disparity is attributed to loss aversion (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Kahneman et al.,
1990; Bateman et al., 1997). We compare participants self reported loss aversion with
their WTA and WTP, respectively. The WTA/WTP ratio indeed increases strongly
with loss aversion, however, this increase is caused by a decreasing WTP, the WTA is
not influenced by loss aversion. Participants seem to perceive the exchange of money
for early retirement as a loss and therefore are willing to pay less the more loss averse
they are.
This study contributes to two strands of literature. We show that the WTA/WTP
disparity also exists in a retirement context for the good of early retirement. Also,
so far there is no study that directly relates an empirical measure of loss aversion
to a measure of WTA and WTP. The most important contribution concerns the
literature on retirement planing. The majority of past research focuses on economic,
socio-economic and health considerations when explaining the retirement decision
(e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2000; Lund et al., 2001; Decshryvere, 2006). Other factors be-
yond economical considerations are often neglected. It seems plausible, however, that
behavioral factors, which proof to have a strong influence on retirement saving and
planning (see for example Benartzi and Thaler, 2007) also affect the decision when to
retire. Thereby, the WTA/WTP disparity is of particular interest for two reasons: 1)
policy makers can easily change the presentation format of the retirement decision.
For example, in Germany the government provides information about social security
benefits by a yearly information letter. Small changes to that letter could change the
way people think about the retirement decision (WTA vs. WTP). The same holds
for the US Social Security Administration (SSA), which provides information on the
impact of different claiming ages. 2) The presentation format has a strong impact. In
our study, on average, participants in the WTA scenario implicitly decide to retire
early. In contrast, WTP participants implicitly choose to postpone retirement. This
effect is significant and survives various robustness tests. Our findings are also in line
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with related studies, which use the planned retirement age as variable of interest.
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) show, that presenting the retirement decision in a
loss frame results in significantly higher planned retirement ages. Also Brown et al.
(2013) elicit a hypothetical retirement age and find that especially a gain vs. loss
frame and different reference ages significantly influence the planned retirement age.
3.2 Social Security in Germany
The German pension system, dating back to 1891, was the first formal pen-
sion systems in the world (Coppola and Wilke, 2010). The pay-as-you-go system
is based on earnings points (EP) where the accumulated points determine the
monthly social security payments after claiming. For each year a person is em-
ployed he or she earns points in relation to his or her yearly gross income (EPt
= gross incomet
average gross income in Germanyt
)4. When claiming social security the sum over all earn-
ings points is multiplied by the current pension value in Germany and an entry
coefficient, depending on the persons claiming age5. The pension value is determined
on the 1st of July each year and amounts to EUR 28.14 (28.61) for 2013 (2014). The
entry coefficient equals 1 for people who claim at their full retirement age (FRA)
and is decreased by 0.003 for each month a person claims before the FRA. Delaying
claiming, however, increases the entry coefficient by 0.005 per month delay. In 2007
the pension system was reformed and a stepwise increase of the FRA from 65 to
67 was resolved. The increase started 2012 for people born after 1946. The FRA is
increased from 65 to 66 in steps of one month per year of birth for people being
born from 1947 - 1958 and from 66 to 67 in steps of two month per year of birth for
people being born from 1959 - 1964. For cohorts born after 1963 the new FRA of
67 is effective6. Similar to the German system, claiming social security and leaving
the workforce in the US has not to happen at the same time. However, in Germany
as well as in the US most people claim social security when leaving the workforce
4The EP per year are capped at 2.1066.
5The pension formula is explained in detail in the following legal text: §64, SGB VI.
6For a more detailed view on the German pension system and the 2007 reform see Wilke (2009)
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(Greenwald et al., 2010). Therefore, we follow Brown et al. (2013) and keep the sur-
vey as simple as possible and do not distinguish between retiring and claiming social
security.
3.3 Hypotheses
3.3.1 WTA/WTP
WTA/WTP Disparity
In general, a reservation price for a given good can be defined in two ways: 1) as
the maximum price a person would be willing to pay for this good or 2) the minimum
price a person would demand in order to sell the good. In both cases, the economic
rent for the person who buys or sells the good would be zero. Standard theory
implies that for most goods the willingness-to-accept should equal the willingness-
to-pay (Willig, 1976). Experimental studies, however, report a significant difference
(see Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). For example Kahneman et al. (1990) conduct
an experiment where half of the subjects are endowed with a Cornell University
coffee mug and participants are allowed to trade the mugs among each other. The
average minimum selling price (WTA) was more than two times greater than the
average maximum buying price (WTP), resulting in a very low trading volume. This
effect of high WTA/WTP ratios has been widely observed and on average cannot
be explained by an income effect. Horowitz and McConnell (2002) conduct a meta-
analysis including 45 studies which all report WTA/WTP ratios significantly greater
than one. They find that the high WTA/WTP ratio is not significantly different for
real money experiments and hypothetical questions, that the effect is not the result
of experimental design features that would be suspect and that for “ordinary market
goods” the effect gets weaker7.
7see Horowitz and McConnell (2002) p. 427ff.
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WTA/WTP and Social Security
The importance of the WTA/WTP difference is mostly discussed in the context
of property rights and environmental policy (see e.g. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002;
Knetsch, 1990). However, the retirement context provides an interesting framework
as every worker is naturally endowed with a full and earliest possible retirement age.
Depending on how retirement information is provided, the decision is framed as a
WTA or WTP problem. Assume early retirement is the good of interest for which
a reservation price, in form of reduction of monthly payments compared to regular
retirement, is considered. If the information on how the retirement age will influence
benefits takes the full retirement age as a starting point, people are automatically
put in a WTP framework. The reference point then would be the full retirement age
and the good early retirement would not be “in possession” of the decision maker.
Thinking about early retirement, the decision maker has to ask him- or herself “what
amount of monthly benefits am I willing to give up in order to retire early”. On the
other hand, if the earliest possible retirement age is used as a starting point the
question would be “what amount of monthly benefits would compensate me for
retiring later (working longer)” and the decision would be a WTA problem.
In Germany, the official information about social security payments is provided
by the government. It provides information about the current account value, the
current monthly benefits and an estimate of monthly benefits at full retirement age.
Also the earliest possible date to claim social security and resulting benefits are
mentioned and the calculation of benefits is explained (see D). Depending on which
part people put most attention the full or earliest retirement age is salient. Therefore,
the retirement decision in Germany is naturally presented in both, a willingness-to-
accept and willingness-to-pay frame.
In the US the Social Security Administration (SSA) provides information on the
impact of different claiming ages. Until 2008 the approach used by the SSA was the
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so called “break-even analysis”. People were given the amount of monthly benefits
they would receive if they claim at the earliest age possible. This is then compared
to different later claiming ages with higher monthly benefits and it is calculated
how long one has to live to break even (see Brown et al., 2013). This approach
puts individuals in a willingness-to-accept frame as the starting or reference point
of the analysis is the earliest claiming age possible. Delaying claiming (selling early
retirement) increases monthly benefits by some fixed amount (selling price). Since
2009 the SSA uses a more neutral way of presenting information about the social
security system. However, according to Brown et al. (2013) the break even analysis
is still widely used not only by SSA filed offices but also by private financial advisers.
3.3.2 Hypothesis 1
The WTA/WTP difference has been reported for numerous goods including public
or non-market goods (e.g. density of trees, Brookshire and Coursey, 1987), health and
safety goods (e.g. health risk of insecticides, Viscusi et al., 1987), ordinary private
goods (e.g. coffee mugs, Kahneman et al., 1990), risky and ambiguous lotteries (e.g.
Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Harless, 1989) and intangible goods (e.g. travel time,
Ramjerdi and Dilln, 2007). In all these studies the WTA/WTP-ratio has been found
to be significantly greater than one. Nevertheless, to our knowledge the relation
between WTA/WTP has not been studied in a retirement context. It is difficult to
assign the good of early retirement to one of the categories mentioned above. On the
one hand deciding when to retire has features of a lottery, as it is an intertemporal
decision under uncertainty where one does not know how long one will live (and
therefore also the time spend in retirement is unknown). On the other hand it also
could be considered as a good which affects individuals health status (depending
on the kind of employment) which falls in the category of an intangible assets. As
the WTA
WTP
ratio depends on the kind of good considered, it is difficult to hypothesize
about the exact magnitude of the ratio for early retirement. That is why we keep
hypothesis 1 as simple as possible and state:
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H1a: The reservation price for early retirement in the willingness-to-
accept treatment will be significantly higher than the reservation price in
the willingness-to-pay treatment.
The difference of our study to the studies of Fetherstonhaugh and Ross (1999) and
Brown et al. (2013), who investigate framing effects on the retirement decision, is
that we do not ask for a planned or expected retirement age but for a willingness-to-
accept or willingness-to-pay for early retirement. This procedure allows us to compare
subjects reservation prices with the actuarial fair price. In both treatments (WTA and
WTP) a reservation price greater than the fair price indicates that the participant
would choose to retire early.
H1b: Participants in the willingness-to-accept treatment are more likely
to choose early retirement than participants in the willingness-to-pay treat-
ment.
3.3.3 Hypothesis 2
Even if the WTA/WTP disparity has been studied for almost forty years, the
source of the disparity is not well understood. Several explanations have been put
forward. Randall and Stoll (1980) and Brookshire et al. (1980) suggest that transac-
tion costs can cause the maximum amount someone would be willing to pay to be
smaller than the amount he or she would be willing to accept. They argue that when
someone builds a price for a good in a WTA treatment, he or she adds the trans-
action or search costs associated with replacing that good to the reservation price.
Other economic explanations that are suggested by Hanemann (1991) are income
effects and substitution effects. If the value of the considered good is high, owning
the good (WTA) causes an income effect which leads to a higher reservation price.
However, WTA/WTP disparity is also found for low value goods like coffee mugs
(see Kahneman et al., 1990). Also Horowitz and McConnell (2003) study the income
3.3. HYPOTHESES 69
effect as possible explanation and conclude that “[. . . ] the ratio WTA/WTP is too
high to be consistent with neoclassical preferences”.
As economic reasons lack to fully explain the huge differences between WTA and
WTP, also psychological and methodological reasons are studied. Plott and Zeiler
(2005) suggest subjects misconception as an alternative explanation. They conduct
an experiment, where they simultaneously control for all dimensions of concern over
possible subject misconceptions found in the literature and find no difference between
elicited WTA and WTP. On the other hand, Loomes and Sugden (1982) argue that
ambiguity can cause the WTA/WTP disparity. A risk averse person might increase
the selling price of a good if he or she is not sure about its value. Additionally the
experiment design itself can possibly cause the effect. In Bateman and Willis (2002)
several explanations are put forward. They argue that, among other reasons, an open
end question design can cause the observed effect.
The most prominent explanation put forward for the WTA/WTP disparity, how-
ever, is an endowment effect in combination with loss aversion. Thaler (1980) called
the WTA/WTP disparity an endowment effect stemming from loss aversion. People
have a higher reservation price for a good that is in their possession because giv-
ing up this good is perceived as a loss. This interpretation is put forward by most
WTA/WTP studies (e.g. Thaler, 1980; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Coursey et al.,
1987; Borges and Knetsch, 1998; Knetsch et al., 2001; Brown, 2005). Surprisingly,
to our knowledge, there is no study that relates the WTA/WTP-ratio to a direct
measure of loss aversion.
The basic idea is simple: the more loss averse a person is, the less willing he or she
is to give up a good in his or her possession. For the WTA/WTP ratio, we therefore
hypothesize the following:
H2a: The more loss averse participants are, the higher the WTA/WTP
ratio.
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In a second step we focus on the effect of loss aversion on the WTA and WTP
separately. The argument put forward by most former studies implies that selling a
good creates a loss and buying creates a gain (see Brown, 2005). However, there is
an ongoing debate, whether money outlays are also perceived as a loss. Kahneman
et al. (1990) and Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) argue that giving up goods, which
are intended to be exchanged (e.g. money) are not evaluated as losses. Following this
argument loss aversion should only influence the WTA decision. In contrast, Bate-
man et al. (1997) and Bateman et al. (2005) find that the WTA/WTP disparity is
caused by both, loss aversion in the good (WTA) and in money (WTP). To introduce
hypothesis 2b we follow the argument of Bateman et al. (1997) and Bateman et al.
(2005). Table 3.1 gives an overview about the hypothesized influence of loss aversion
on WTA and WTP.
good in possession can be traded for loss aversion will
WTA early retirement money increase WTA
WTP money early retirement decrease WTP
Table 3.1: Hypothesized influence of loss aversion on the willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay
H2b: The increase of the WTA/WTP ratio in loss aversion is caused by
both, an increase of WTA and a decrease of WTP.
3.4 Survey Design and Summary Statistics
3.4.1 Survey Design
Subject Recruitment and General Procedure
An online survey was conducted from October 14th to November 5th 2012 in co-
operation with the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ). The survey covered
the field of retirement savings and planing. Summary statistics and control vari-
ables are also presented in 2. Therefore, this section gives a detailed overview of the
WTA/WTP related questions and only a brief overview of the summary statistics
and control variables.
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Subjects were recruited through a link on the newspapers homepage and two
announcements (on October 14th and 28th) in the print edition. 3,077 participants
completed the survey in on average eleven minutes. Participants answered hypo-
thetical questions about retirement planning and time preferences, and also data on
demographics, risk preferences, financial literacy and some additional controls were
collected. In particular, the survey asked for a reservation price regarding early re-
tirement in a willingness-to-pay and a willingness-to-accept treatment. We choose
hypothetical, non incentivized questions for three reasons: 1) this design allows us
to corporate with the FAZ newspaper and recruit a large subject pool. 2) Rubin-
stein (2001) replicated more than 40 experiments without monetary rewards and in
almost all cases there were no qualitative differences in results compared to incen-
tivized experiments. 3) and more specific to our research question Ku¨hberger et al.
(2002) find that framing effects in hypothetical and real decisions do not substan-
tially differ and also Horowitz and McConnell (2002) state that this is also true for
the willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay difference in particular.
Willingness-To-Accept treatment
In experimental economics, one has to distinguish between choice based and
matching based approaches (see for example Hardisty et al., 2013). Choice methods
ask participants to choose between two outcomes. Thereby, one of the outcomes is
constantly increased (or decreased) to find participants switching point. The match-
ing approach, in contrast, directly asks for indifference points. Participants have to
state which outcome would make them indifferent to a second outcome. In our sur-
vey we choose the matching based approach. In the WTA treatment participants are
asked to state an amount of money by which their monthly pension payment would
have to increase (reservation price) for them to retire 4 years later:
Suppose you have the opportunity to retire at age 63. At this time you
would receive a pension of EUR y per month. Please imagine that you
would be able to delay retirement by four years and retire at age 67. This
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would lead to an increase in monthly pension payments. What would the
minimum monthly increase have to be, so that you would be willing to delay
retirement from age 63 to age 67?
Thereby, the given monthly pension of y depends on participants income. In a
first scenario y amounted to 65% (=level 1) and in a consecutive scenario (within
subjects) y was increased to 110% (=level 2) of participants income. Subjects then
entered the amount they additionally demanded. We choose these numbers for two
reasons: 1) the average monthly social security benefits for an individual, who has
been employed for 40 years with an income of 1.5 times the average income for
Germany, amounts to about 65% of his or her monthly income8. We choose a higher
than average income as a starting point, as the readers of the FAZ typically earn a
higher than average income (see Mueller and Weber, 2014). 2) Simply multiplying
subjects current income by 0.65 has the disadvantage that real income growth until
retirement is neglected and younger participants will face a decision problem with
a very low hypothetical pension. Therefore the second question within subjects is
introduced for robustness.
Willingness-To-Pay treatment
In the WTP treatment participants are asked to state an amount of monthly
pension payments they would be willing to give up in order to retire 4 years earlier:
Suppose you have the opportunity to retire at age 67. At this time you
would receive a pension of EUR y per month. Please imagine that you would
be able to speed up retirement by four years and retire at age 63. This would
lead to a decrease in monthly pension payments. What maximum amount
of monthly pension payments would you be willing to give up in order to be
able to retire at age 63 instead of age 67?
8Monthly benefits are calculated according to the pension formula presented in section 2. This calculation is
sensitive to assumptions regarding tax payments, martial status, number of kids and other demographic factors.
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Thereby, the monthly pension of y was calculated in the same way as for the WTA
scenario. In the level 1 (level 2) question y amounted to 65% (110%) of participants
income. Subjects then entered the amount they would be willing to give up.
Loss aversion
We use participants self-reported loss attitude to proxy for loss aversion. Earlier
studies find that self-reported risk attitude on a Likert scale is a good predictor
of actual risk taking (see e.g. van Rooij et al., 2011; Nosic and Weber, 2010). On
a seven-point Likert scale participants have to indicate whether they agree to the
statement “I’m very afraid of losses” as a measure of loss aversion.
Controls
Participants risk aversion is elicited similar to loss aversion on a seven-point Likert
scale. Participants indicate whether they agree to the statement “I’m a risk averse
person”. In addition, the planned retirement age is elicited directly, and participants
are asked “at what age do you plan to retire?” Participants also answer six financial
literacy questions consisting of one of the basic questions from Lusardi and Mitchell
(2007), three advanced questions from van Rooij et al. (2011) and two more com-
plicated questions developed by us (see appendix C.1). We do so because the FAZ
newspaper has a focus on financial markets and previous studies find that subjects
with similar characteristics are remarkably financially literate (see Mueller and We-
ber, 2014). Additional controls are participants subjective life expectancy (elicited
directly) and participants indicate if they own private pension insurance as well as
how they rate the certainty of social security benefits guaranteed by the government
today.
3.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics. Numer of observations range from 2,142
to 2,297. The following observations were excluded: Participants who were already
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retired, participants with zero or missing income9 and participants with age below
18.
The average reservation price for early retirement is about EUR 550 per month
in the 65% treatment (level 1) and about EUR 970 in the 110% treatment (level
2). In both cases the median is considerably lower, indicating a positive skewness
(skewness: 5.30 for level 1 and 4.32 for level 2). Also the increase from level 1 to
level 2 is almost linear with the mean being 1.77 times greater for level 2 and the
hypothetical monthly pension being 110%
65%
= 1.69 times greater. The average planned
retirement age of about 64.58 years is close to the former full retirement age in
Germany (65). The average age is about 40 years. Men are overrepresented (84%
Variable Mean (Median) Std. Dev.
Reservation Price
Reservation Price - Level 1 (65%) 549.07 (300.00) 835.95
Reservation Price - Level 2 (110%) 973.84 (500.00) 1544.45
Demographics
Age 40.37 (40.00) 12.34
Gender 0.84 0.36
Income 3,436.92(3,000.00) 3,118.14
Number of Children 0.79 1.19
High School Degree 0.92 0.27
University Degree 0.68 0.47
Married 0.47 0.50
Controls
Risk Aversion (1-7) 3.87 1.47
Loss Aversion (1-7) 4.23 1.60
Financial Literacy Standard (0-4) 3.51 0.71
Financial Literacy Extra (0-2) 0.62 0.74
Life Expectancy (Males) 83.33 (84.00) 8.12
Life Expectancy (Females) 84.33 (85.00) 6.95
Planed Retirement Age (in month) 777.14 (780.00) 50.77
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.64 0.48
Certainty of Social Security (1-7) 2.97 1.78
Table 3.2: Online survey summary statistics
male) reflecting the fact that the majority of FAZ readers are male (62%) and that
men are more likely to participate in online surveys of our kind (see Mueller and
Weber, 2014). Subjects report a relatively high after tax income of about EUR 3,400
(median 3,000) per month (compared to a German average after tax income of about
9This was necessary as the income was used to calculate a hypothetical pension value, see section 4.1.
3.5. SURVEY RESULTS 75
EUR 1,470 in 201110) and are well educated with 92% having received the German
equivalent to a high school diploma and 68% having graduated from a university.
Half of the participants are married.
Asking participants about their risk- and loss aversion on a 1 to 7 Likert scale leads
to an average of 3.87 and 4.32 respectively. As expected, participants did extremely
well in standard financial literacy questions with on average 3.51 / 4 correct answers.
However, only 0.61 / 2 answers of the additional questions are correct. Directly asking
participants about their subjective life expectancy leads to estimates which, with an
average of 83.33 years for male participants, are above the average life expectancy
in Germany and, with 84.33 for female participants, are close to the average life
expectancy. Given the on average wealthier and more educated sample, a self reported
life expectancy above the population average is a realistic estimate11.
3.5 Survey Results
3.5.1 The fair price of early retirement and the fair WTA/WTP disparity
Analyzing the WTA/WTP disparity in a retirement context has the advantage,
that reservation prices can be compared to a market price provided by the social
security system. However, this also makes things more complicated, as in our sur-
vey design the fair price depends on the treatment (WTA vs. WTP). This is best
illustrated by a simple example: assume two participants with an income of W =
EUR 1, 000, whereof one is assigned to the WTA treatment an the other one to
the WTP treatment. Both participants are given a hypothetical pension value of
y = 0.65 ·W = 0.65 · 1000 = 650 for the level 1 question. According to the German
social security formula (§64, SGB VI; presented in section 2), it is implicitly assumed
that for both participants 650 = EP · EC · CPV with EP being the accumulated
earning points, EC being the entry coefficient and CPV being the current pension
10Source: German Federal Statistical Office 2012.
11For a more detailed description of summary statistics of this survey see 2.
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value. To calculate the fair price, three assumptions have to be made: 1) We assume
for each participant that he or she has been employed for 40 years when reaching
an age of 63. 2) it is assumed that the relation between participants income and the
average income in Germany is constant. Therefore, an additional year of employment
increases the earning points by 1/40. 3) A full retirement age of 67 is assumed.
In the WTA treatment the fair price for delaying retirement by four years has to
be calculated. The entry coefficient now increases from 0.856 to 1 and the earning
points increase by 10%. The fair increase in monthly benefits therefore would be
1
0.856
· 1.1 − 1 = 28.50%, resulting in EUR 185.3. Correspondingly, the fair decrease
in the WTP treatment is calculated as 1 − 0.856 · 1
1.1
= 22.18% resulting in EUR
144.2. Therefore, the fair WTA/WTP ratio would be 185.3
144.2
= 1.285. This is true for
all income levels W . We account for this in two ways: 1) the empirically obtained
WTA/WTP ratio is compared to the fair ratio of 1.285 and not to a ratio of one.
2) the fair price is included in the regression analysis to test, whether the treatment
affects the reservation price beyond the fair price.
3.5.2 Hypothesis 1a - the WTA/WTP difference
Figure 3.1 presents the reservation price for early retirement of participants in the
willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay treatment as well as the WTA/WTP ra-
tio and the fair ratio of 1.285. The average monthly amount participants additionally
demand to retire at age 67 instead of age 63 (WTA) is EUR 763.56 if the hypothetical
pension value y amounts to 65% of participants income (Level 1). On the other hand,
the monthly amount participants are willing to give up in order to retire at age 63
instead of age 67 (WTP) only amounts to EUR 327.09 at level 1. This difference is
highly significant (t-value of -12.68). The WTA
WTP
-ratio is 2.33. The p-value of a Wald
test, comparing the WTA/WTP ratio to a ratio of 1.285, is smaller than 0.0001.
Almost the same picture emerges for the level 2 question where the hypothetical
pension value y is increased to 110% of participants income. The reservation price
in the WTA treatment (1275.38) is about 1.9 times higher compared to the WTP
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treatment (668.66). Again the difference is significant on the 1%-level (t-value: -9.33,
not reported) and the ratio of 1.9 is also significantly higher than 1.285 (Wald test
p-value: < 0.0001). The small decrease in WTA
WTP
-ratio from level 1 to level 2 is caused
by a disproportional increase of the WTP compared to the increase of y. From level 1
to level 2 y is increased by 1.1
0.65
−1 = 69.23%. The WTA increases almost proportional
(+67.03%). However, the WTP increases more strongly from EUR 327.09 to 668.66
(+104.43%) causing the WTA
WTP
-ratio to decline from 2.33 to 1.91. Results are similar
for the median reservation price. For the level 1 treatment a median WTA/WTP
ratio of 2.5 is obtained. Also, the ratio declines in the level 2 treatment to 1.5. A
ratio of about two is on average observed for lotteries (see table IIIA in Horowitz and
McConnell, 2002), whereas health and safety goods exhibit a much higher average
ratio of about 10. As the good early retirement has features of a lottery our result
is in line with the previous literature. The WTA/WTP difference is further tested
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Figure 3.1: WTA/WTP ratio and average reservation price for early retirement depending on the treatment (WTA
vs. WTP) and level (65% or 110%)
in a regression framework. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the reservation price
for the full sample (not separated by WTA and WTP) as well as of logarithmized
reservation prices for level 1 and 2. The distribution of the reservation price (upper
row) resembles the log-normal distribution. Therefore, the logarithmized reservation
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prices (bottom row) are used in all further regressions12. Columns 2 and 4 of table
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the dependent variable, reservation price in EUR and logarithmized reservation price in
EUR, by level.
3.3 present coefficients of an OLS regression with the logarithmized reservation price
as dependent variable, columns 3 and 5 the corresponding t-values. In addition to
the treatment dummy demographic (including the logarithmized fair price) and con-
trol variables are included13. The main result from figure 3.1 can be confirmed. For
both, level 1 and level 2, the reservation price is significantly higher in the WTA
treatment (significant on 1%-level). This WTA/WTP effect therefore survives the
inclusion of the fair price. The interpretation of the magnitude of the effect is not
straightforward. For a continuous variable, the coefficient multiplied by 100 gives the
percentage effect of that variable on the dependent variable. However, this is not
12Participants who indicated a reservation price of 0 EUR are treated as if they indicated a price of 1 EUR and the
logarithmized reservation price is set to zero. In section 6 we repeat the analysis without participants who indicate
a reservation price of zero.
13Participants income is not included in this regression as the fair price by construction is highly correlated
(correlation of 0.9899) with income.
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true for dummy variables. Therefore, we calculate effects according to Halvorsen and
Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981)14. For the level 1 regression (columns 2 and
3) this leads to a reservation price for early retirement in the WTA treatment that
is 313.55% higher compared to the WTP treatment15. For level 2 (columns 4 and
5) the reservation price increases by 110.29%. Therefore, the WTA/WTP effect is
not only robust to the inclusion of additional variables but also gets stronger in the
level 1 regression, as the percentage increase of the reservation price for level 1 is
233% when only the mean reservation price is taken into account (see figure 3.1).
The treatment influences participants reservation prices beyond the effect it has on
the fair price. In summary hypothesis 1a can be confirmed.
Reservation Price (log) Level 1 Level 2
65% 110%
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age 0.004 0.86 0.005 1.05
Gender 0.131 1.15 0.196 1.61
Fair Price (log) 0.512*** 9.58 0.451*** 7.87
Number of Children -0.077** -2.02 -0.032 -0.80
High School Degree -0.054 -0.33 -0.151 -0.87
University Degree 0.119** 1.23 0.169* 1.65
Married 0.274*** 2.88 0.266*** 2.63
Treatment
WTA treatment 1.423*** 18.39 0.747*** 9.11
Controls
Risk Aversion 0.044 1.29 -0.011 -0.32
Loss Aversion -0.038 -1.21 0.013 0.41
Financial Literacy Score 0.033 0.92 0.029 0.75
Life Expectancy -0.006 -1.15 -0.008 -1.62
Planed Retirement Age -0.064*** -8.76 -0.056*** -7.16
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.058 0.72 0.115 1.35
Certainty of Social Security 0.017 0.77 0.001 0.05
Constant 5.376*** 7.19 5.957*** 7.41
Number of Obs. 2123 2093
Adj. R2 0.2471 0.1418
Table 3.3: Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized reservation price as dependent variable.
The WTA treatment dummy indicates whether participants where assigned to the WTA or WTP treatment. ***,
** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
14The effect is calculated as exp(d̂ − 1
2
V (d̂)) − 1. With d̂ being the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable
and V (d̂) being the variance of the estimate.
15exp(1.4226− 1
2
0.0773442)− 1 = 313.55%. For all following regressions, with a logarithmized dependent variable,
the effect of dummy variables are calculated similarly.
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Besides the treatment, the fair price for early retirement influences participants
reservation price. The fair price is calculated depending on participants income. A
1% increase in the fair price (corresponding to a 1% increase in income) will increase
the reservation price on average by 0.51% for level 1 and by EUR 0.45% for level 2.
As for a 1% increase in income the reservation price increases less strongly (< 1%),
the relative reservation price (reservation price in relation to participants income)
decreases with an increase of income. For robustness, we also repeat the analysis
with the relative reservation price calculated as reservationprice
income
and obtain the same
results as presented in table 3.3 (results not reported).
Also, participants who graduated from university indicate a reservation price that
is on average 12.13% (level 1) or 17.84% (level 2) higher, compared to participants
with no university degree. In both regressions being married increases the reservation
price. This is in line with Lund et al. (2001) who find that having a partner is a
significant predictor of transition to early retirement. In our analysis being married
(dummy variable) increases the reservation price for early retirement by 30.94% (level
1) and 29.78% (level 2), respectively.
Additionally, only one of the eight control variables proofs to be significant. Partic-
ipants planned retirement age has a significant and negative effect on the reservation
price. For each year a person plans to retire later, the reservation price is decreased
by 6.4% and 5.6%. This effect makes intuitively sense: Participants who have already
planned to retire late should have a weaker preference for early retirement compared
to a person who plans to retire early and therefore should have a lower reservation
price. The effect of loss aversion is not significant in both regressions. However, as
it is stated by hypothesis 2b that loss aversion influences the WTA and WTP dif-
ferently, this is not surprising as participants in the WTA and WTP scenario are
pooled in these regressions.
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3.5.3 Hypothesis 1b - probability of early retirement
Whether or not the WTA/WTP disparity can induce early retirement depends
on the reservation price in relation to the fair price. If the fair price is smaller than
the reservation price people are willing to buy the good. The fair price for early
retirement can be measured in reduction of monthly social security benefits due to
early retirement. Figure 3.3 shows the average WTA, WTP and the average fair price
in both treatments. As the average sample income is high, also high fair prices of
631.22 and 500.05 (level 1) and 1068.23 and 846.24 (level 2) are obtained. The av-
erage reservation price in the WTA scenario is for both levels above the average fair
price, indicating that under the WTA treatment early retirement seems attractive.
In contrast, the average reservation price in the WTP treatment is below the fair
price for both scenarios. This gives a first impression on how the WTA/WTP dispar-
ity can induce early retirement. To test hypothesis 1b in a regression framework an
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Figure 3.3: Fair price and average reservation price for early retirement depending on the treatment (WTA vs. WTP)
and level (65% or 110%)
indicator variable, late retirement, is constructed. For each participant the fair price
of early retirement is calculated and compared to his or her reservation price. The
indicator equals one if the reservation price is smaller than the fair price, indicating
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that early retirement is not desirable. For a reservation price higher than the fair
price the indicator equals zero. Columns 2 and 4 of table 3.4 now present coefficients
of a logistic regression of late retirement as dependent variable on demographics, the
WTA dummy and additional control variables. Columns 3 and 5 present the corre-
sponding z-values. The WTA treatment dummy is highly significant (1%-level) and
negative, indicating that the probability of late retirement decreases if the decision
is presented in the WTA treatment. Also in terms of magnitude the effect is strong.
The average marginal effect (over all observations) of a change in the WTA dummy
is -29.46% (level 1) and -17.84% (level 2), respectively. The probability for retiring
late therefore decreases on average by 29.46 (17.84) percentage points in the WTA
scenario.
Income and having graduated from university are two out of seven demographic
variables with a significant effect in both regressions. Even though income (indirectly
measured by the fair price for early retirement) increases the reservation price for
early retirement (see table 3.3), it also increases the probability of late retirement. To
understand this effect the calculation of the fair price has to be considered. The fair
price according to the German pension formula, increases linearly with income. The
reservation price also increases with income, however, less strongly. Therefore, the
positive effect of income on the probability of late retirement is obtained. Previous
research also finds that wages are inversely correlated with the acceptance of early
retirement (Ruhm, 1989; Kim and Feldman, 1998). The effect of having a university
degree on the probability of late retirement is in line with its effect on the reservation
price. Participants with a university degree have a higher reservation price for early
retirement and are therefore also more likely to retire early. Also, for the planned
retirement age the effect is unchanged. The higher the planned retirement age the
higher is the probability of late retirement.
In summary hypothesis 1b can be confirmed. The probability of late retirement
is significantly reduced when the decision problem is presented in a willingness-to-
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Late Retirement Level 1 Level 2
65% 110%
Variable Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value
Demographics
Age 0.003 0.51 -0.009* -1.69
Gender 0.004 0.02 -0.079 -0.54
Income (log) 0.742*** 8.94 0.597*** 7.71
Number of Children -0.076 -1.41 -0.033 -0.65
High School Degree -0.370 -1.60 -0.093 -0.43
University Degree -0.242* -1.80 -0.325** -2.53
Married 0.112 0.84 -0.054 -0.43
Treatment
WTA treatment -1.717*** -15.08 -0.908*** -9.00
Controls
Risk Aversion -0.046 -0.98 -0.055 -1.24
Loss Aversion 0.030 0.68 0.023 0.57
Financial Literacy Score 0.075 1.52 0.042 0.91
Life Expectancy 0.007 0.96 0.011* 1.67
Planed Retirement Age 0.083*** 7.08 0.070*** 6.42
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.249** 2.25 0.134 1.28
Certainty of Social Security 0.030 0.98 0.023 0.80
Constant -9.867*** -8.08 -8.184*** -7.19
Number of Obs. 2123 2093
Correctly classified 0.7373 0.6946
Area under ROC Curve 0.7698 0.6865
Table 3.4: Hypothesis 1b: results of logistic regressions with an indicator variable for late retirement as dependent
variable. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
accept treatment compared to a willingness-to-pay treatment. Combined with the
fact that in Germany as well as in the US information regarding retirement often
is presented with the earliest retirement age as a starting point, the WTA/WTP
disparity (among many other factors) can help to better understand why people
retire on average before the full retirement age.
3.5.4 Hypothesis 2a - WTA/WTP ratio and loss aversion
To analyze the effect of loss aversion on the WTA/WTP ratio, an average reser-
vation price per participant is calculated. As each participant indicates a reservation
price in the level 1 question (y=65% of participants income) and a second reservation
price in the level 2 question (y=110% of participants income) the average reservation
price is calculated as 1
2
(pricelevel1
0.65
+ pricelevel2
1.1
), labeled WTA and WTP respectively.
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Participants are then sorted according to their self reported loss aversion. The
WTA/WTP ratio can be calculated as the average WTA divided by the average
WTP . Figure 3.4 graphs the average WTA/WTP ratio for each of the seven loss
aversion categories. Also p-values of a Wald test with the null-hypothesis of the
WTA/WTP ratio being equal to 1.285 are reported. Observations in the seven cate-
gories range from 60 (loss aversion of 1) to 501 (loss aversion of 5). The WTA/WTP
ratio increases almost monotonically with loss aversion. The lowest ratio of 1.39 is
obtained for participants who indicate to be “not at all” loss averse, where the dif-
ference between the WTA and WTP is not statistically significant (t-value of -1.11,
not reported) and also the WTA/WTP ratio is not significantly different from 1.285
(p-value of 0.7827). The WTA/WTP ratio increases then to 1.87 and 2.32 for par-
ticipants who indicate a loss aversion of 2 or 3, respectively. The WTA/WTP ratio is
now significantly greater than 1.285 on a 10% and 1% level. The ratio drops to 1.83
for participants with a loss aversion of 4, to increase monotonically afterwards. The
highest WTA/WTP ratio is observed for the most loss averse participants (ratio of
2.70). Also the ratio of 2.70 is significantly greater than the lowest ratio of 1.39 (5%
level, Wald test). Overall, hypothesis 2a is supported as.
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Figure 3.4: Average WTA/WTP ratio by loss aversion
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3.5.5 Hypothesis 2b - WTA, WTP and loss aversion
According to hypothesis 2b, the increase in the average WTA/WTP ratio by
loss aversion should be caused by both, an increase in WTA and a decrease in
WTP . To get a first impression, figure 3.5 now displays the average WTA and
WTP separately for each of the seven loss aversion categories. There does not seem
to be a relation between loss aversion and the WTA. Therefore, the first part of
hypothesis 2a cannot be confirmed by this descriptive analysis. The second part,
however, can be confirmed. The average WTP strongly decreases with loss aversion.
Participants who are “not at all” loss averse indicate on average the highest WTP of
EUR 1,695. The WTP decreases by almost 50% to EUR 904 for the most loss averse
participants. Table 3.5 presents results of two OLS regressions, analyzing the WTA
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Figure 3.5: Average WTA and WTP by loss aversion
and WTP separately. The dependent variable is the logarithmized WTA (Columns
2 and 3) or WTP (Columns 4 and 5) per participant, respectively.
First, the logarithmized WTA is considered. The coefficient for loss aversion is
positive, indicating an increase inWTA of about 2% per unit increase in loss aversion.
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WTA (log) WTP (log)
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Loss Aversion
Loss Aversion (1-7) 0.021 0.85 -0.101*** -3.44
Demographics
Age 0.001 -0.31 0.011*** 2.84
Gender 0.005 0.05 0.262** 2.30
Income (log) 0.403*** 9.45 0.603*** 11.99
Number of Children -0.046 -1.22 -0.012 -0.41
High School Degree 0.127 0.99 -0.142 -0.93
University Degree 0.102 1.36 0.396*** 4.36
Married 0.159** 2.01 0.286*** 3.29
Controls
Risk Aversion (1-7) -0.010 -0.34 0.073** 2.28
Financial Literacy Score (0-6) 0.038 1.34 -0.026 -0.77
Life Expectancy [years] -0.001 -0.22 -0.010** -2.54
Planned Retirement Age [years] -0.045*** -7.52 -0.013** -1.97
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.042 0.65 0.003 0.04
Certainty of Social Security 0.004 0.24 -0.004 -0.18
Constant 6.276*** 9.90 3.007*** 4.11
Number of Obs. 1046 930
Adj. R2 0.0834 0.3153
Table 3.5: Hypothesis 2b: results of OLS a regressions with the logarithmized WTA and WTP as dependent
variable. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
However, the coefficient is insignificant. As suggested by figure 3.5, loss aversion,
therefore, seems to have no effect on the WTA.
Only one of the six control variables proofs to be significant. The WTA decreases
by about 5% for each year a participant plans to retire later. This negative effect is of
the same magnitude and significance as for the pooled regressions in table 3.3. Neither
risk aversion, financial literacy, the subjective life expectancy nor owning private
pension insurance have a significant effect on the WTA. Also only two demographic
variables significantly influence the WTA. Per 1% increase of income, the WTA is
increased by about 0.4%. As the income effect in the pooled regression (table 3.3)
is stronger, income seems to effect the WTA less than it influences the WTP . This
makes sense, as the income is a upper bound for the WTP (you cannot give up
more than all monthly benefits) but not for the WTA. Additionally, being married
(dummy) increases the WTA by 16.83%.
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The second part of table 3.5 presents OLS regression results for the WTP . Loss
aversion has a highly significant and economically meaningful effect. On average the
WTP for early retirement decreases by 10.10% for a one unit increase in self re-
ported loss aversion. The effect is robust to the inclusion of control variables and
demographics. Therefore, hypothesis 2b can partly be confirmed. Loss aversion in-
creases the WTA/WTP ratio by significantly decreasing the WTP . The WTA,
however, is not affected by participants loss aversion. Three out of seven control
variables have significant effects on the WTP . Participants life expectancy as well as
their planned retirement age decreases the reservation price in the WTP scenario by
about 1% per additional year. The effect of risk aversion is also significant. More risk
averse participants have a higher reservation price for early retirement. This result is
in contrast with Coile et al. (2002) who theoretically show that delaying retirement
is more attractive with risk aversion.
In contrast to the WTA, the WTP depends highly on participants demographics.
Per year of age the WTP increases by 1.1%. The closer participants are to retirement,
the more they are willing to pay to retire early. The WTP increases by about 0.6%
per 1% increase in income. This effect is about 50% stronger than for the WTA.
Also being male, being married and having obtained a university degree increases
theWTP . All three effects are economically strong with an increase of 29.15% (male),
32.62% (married) and 47.94% (university degree), respectively.
The explanatory power of the WTP regression is more than 3 times as high as
for the WTA regression (adjusted R2 of 31.53% vs. 8.34%). This is driven by the
demographic variables. Even if the income is not included, the adjusted R2 remains by
about 20% (not reported). It seems that the WTP highly depends on demographics,
whereas the WTA seems to be driven by factors that are not captured in our study.
In summary, hypothesis 2b can be confirmed only partially. We observe the pre-
dicted effect of loss aversion only on the WTP but not on the WTA. In a narrow
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focus this can partly be treated as evidence for the Bateman et al. (1997) and Bate-
man et al. (2005) argument as we find loss aversion in money. On the other hand,
participants may not see the decision as a classic money vs. good problem. The
WTP decision could be interpreted as an exchange of distant future consumption
for near future leisure. Therefore, as loss aversion clearly exists in consumption (see
e.g. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002), our results can also be treated as evidence for
the Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) argument. This view can explain why we do
not find any loss aversion in the WTA case. The exchange of near future leisure for
distant future consumption seems to be perceived as a gain of future consumption.
Therefore, loss aversion does not effect the decision.
3.6 Robustness
The robustness of the previous results is analyzed using two datasets. First, the
FAZ-survey is used to test robustness regarding the hypothesis 1a. As already stated
in section 3.5.1, the market price for early retirement depends on the treatment
(WTA vs. WTP). This leads to a fair WTA/WTP ratio of 1.285. Therefore, a relative
measure of the reservation price and an inflated WTP is constructed. In addition,
the analysis is repeated with reduced samples, where first participants who indicated
a WTP of zero are excluded, second, participants who indicated a WTA larger than
the hypothetical pension payment are excluded and third, only participants who are
close to retirement are taken into account.
The second dataset comes from a representative panel survey for Germany. The
German SAVE panel is conducted since 2001 by the Munich Center for the Economics
of Aging (MEA) to understand savings and retirement decisions of German house-
holds. The panel focuses on savings behavior, financial assets and old-age provision
and includes numerous demographic, economic and psychological characteristics of
participating households. Two waves are used: 1) the cross-section of the 2009 wave
of the SAVE study where 2,222 households participated and 2) the cross-section of
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the 2011/2012 wave with 1,660 participants. Two different waves are used as in the
2011/2012 wave some of the control variables are not elicited and therefore, the two
waves are merged to get a complete dataset. We are only able to test robustness of
hypothesis 1a and 1b, as in the SAVE study 2009 and 2011/2012 no information
about participants loss aversion is provided. For a detailed description of the survey
methodology (e.g. imputation of missing values) see Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2009).
3.6.1 FAZ-survey
Relative reservation price
The relative reservation price used in the following analysis is based on the social
security benefits at age 63. To understand the relative measure we go back to the
example in section 5.1, where two participants with an income of EUR 1,000 are
assigned to the two different treatments. Both participants are given a hypothetical
pension value of EUR 650 per month. Assume both participants have the same
relative reservation price of for example +50% based on benefits at age 63. This
would lead to a absolute reservation price of 650 · 1.5 − 650 = 325 in the WTA
treatment and to 650− 650 · 1
1.5
= 217 in the WTP treatment. A WTA/WTP ratio
of 325
217
= 1.5 would be observed, even if relative reservation prices are equal.
Table 3.6 presents results of an OLS regression with the logarithmized relative
reservation price (based on benefits at age 63) as dependent variable. Columns 2 and
4 present regression coefficients, columns 3 and 5 the respective t-values. Besides the
treatment dummy, demographics (including the fair price) and control variables are
included. The treatment dummy is highly significant and negative, confirming the
results of section 5.2. However, the magnitude of the effect is weaker, compared to
the original analysis. The relative reservation price increases by 69.56% (level 1) and
63.36% (level 2) in the WTA treatment. In addition, the negative effect of the fair
price is in line with the previous analysis. An increasing income leads to an increasing
fair price. Participants seem to increase their reservation price less strongly, leading
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to a negative effect of the fair price on the relative reservation price. The absolute
reservation price, however, increases with the fair price (see table 3.3).
Relative Reservation Price (log) Level 1 Level 2
65% 110%
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age 0.004 1.49 -0.001 -0.39
Gender -0.007 -0.09 0.071 0.92
Fair Price (log) -0.473*** -13.23 -0.341*** -8.71
Number of Children 0.068*** 2.84 -0.015 -0.57
High School Degree 0.199* 1.96 0.045 0.41
University Degree 0.065 1.06 0.166** 2.55
Married -0.062 -1.05 0.160** 2.52
Treatment
WTA treatment 0.529*** 10.97 0.492*** 9.58
Controls Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 2101 2056
Adj. R2 0.1247 0.0751
Table 3.6: Robustness Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized relative reservation
price, based on pensions at age 63, as dependent variable. The relative reservation price is defined as WTA
income
and
WTP
income−WTP , respectively. The WTA treatment dummy indicates whether participants where assigned to the WTA
or WTP treatment. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
Inflated WTP
A second robustness test regarding hypothesis 1a is conducted using an inflated
measure of the willingness-to-pay. In the previous analysis it is shown, that the fair
WTA/WTP ratio in our survey design is about 1.285. Therefore, the first inflated
measure of the WTP is constructed as WTP ·1.285. However, comparing the average
WTP in the level 1 and level 2 question in figure 3.1, it can be seen that the WTP
increase more strongly than the hypothetical pension value. The WTP increases by
+104.43% whereas the hypothetical value only increases by 1.1
0.65
− 1 = 69.23%. To
account for this “overreaction” a second inflated measure of the WTP is constructed
as WTP · 2.0443
1.6923
· 1.285 = WTP · 1.552.
Table 3.7 presents results of four OLS regressions with the logarithmized reserva-
tion price as dependent variable. Thereby the WTP is inflated by 1.285 (columns 2 -
5) and 1.552 (columns 6 - 9) respectively. In all cases the treatment dummy is posi-
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tive and remains significant to the 1% level, confirming the robustness of hypothesis
1a.
Reduced sample: WTP of zero
Indicating a WTP of zero implies that someone would not even be willing to
forgo one Euro of monthly pension benefits in order to retire four years earlier. This
could for example be due to a high job satisfaction or a really constrained budget.
A third reason could be that participants did not want to answer the question and
therefore, simply typed in a value of zero. However, since we did not force participants
to indicate a reservation price at all (they could also leave the field blank) this
explanation seems unlikely. In our sample, 175 (level 1) and 92 (level 2) participants
indicated a zero WTP. In contrast, only 27 (level 1) and 47 (level 2) participants
indicated a WTA of zero. To analyze whether our results are driven by this difference,
the analysis from section 5.2 is repeated without the participants that indicate a
WTP of zero. Thereby the average WTP increases from 327.09 to 394.18 (level 1)
and from 668.66 to 733.90 (level 2). Table 3.8 presents the reduced sample regression
results. The treatment dummy is significant in both regressions, level 1 and level
2. The overall effect of an increasing reservation price in the WTA treatment is
confirmed. However, excluding participants with a WTP of zero weakens the results
in two ways: 1) the t-value of the treatment dummy decreases from about 18 to
10 (level 1) and from 9.5 to 3.5 (level 2), respectively. 2) Also the magnitude of
the effect decreases strongly. In the level 1 (level 2) regression, being assigned to
the WTA treatment now increases the reservation price by only 75.80% (26.04%),
compared to 313.55% (110.29%) for the analysis presented in table 3.3. In summary,
parts of the significance and magnitude of the WTA/WTP effect in the original
analysis is driven by participants which indicate a WTP of zero. However, the main
effect remains robust to the exclusion of these participants.
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Reservation Price (log) Level 1 Level 2
65% 110%
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age 0.006* 1.95 0.003 0.76
Gender 0.103 1.29 0.226** 2.28
Fair Price (log) 0.431*** 11.48 0.430*** 9.27
Number of Children 0.013 0.44 -0.010 -0.31
High School Degree 0.200* 1.80 -0.088 -0.63
University Degree 0.029 0.43 0.239*** 2.87
Married 0.065 0.98 0.225*** 2.74
Treatment
WTA treatment 0.566*** 10.51 0.234*** 3.50
Controls Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 1948 2001
Adj. R2 0.1906 0.1288
Table 3.8: Robustness Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized reservation price as
dependent variable. Participants who indicated a WTP of zero are excluded from the sample. The WTA treatment
dummy indicates whether participants where assigned to the WTA or WTP treatment. ***, ** and * indicate
significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
Reduced sample: WTA > retirement income
In an open end survey design the WTA/WTP disparity could be driven by the
fact that the WTA is not subject to a budget constraint. In our case, for example,
the maximum amount of pension payments someone is willing to give up (WTP) can
not exceed total pension payments. That is, someone cannot give up more than he or
she has. However, the WTA does not underlie that constraint as someone can easily
demand an increase in pension payments that is higher than the total retirement
income. To test whether the results are driven by participants who indicate a WTA
> retirement income, the analysis is repeated for a subsample that excludes these
participants. Table 3.9 presents OLS regression results for the reduced sample. The
treatment dummy is significant in both regressions, level 1 and level 2. Also, the
magnitude of the effect is almost not affected by the reduced sample. On average the
reservation price increases by 223.69% (level 1) and 65.19% (level 2), respectively.
The main result, therefore, remains robust.
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Reservation Price (log) Level 1 Level 2
65% 110%
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age -0.004 -0.95 -0.006 -1.33
Gender 0.031 0.27 0.054 0.44
Fair Price (log) 0.930*** 14.63 0.851*** 12.39
Number of Children -0.101*** -2.65 -0.047 -1.17
High School Degree -0.128 -0.78 -0.129 -0.74
University Degree 0.022 0.22 0.019 0.18
Married 0.157 1.64 0.134 1.32
Treatment
WTA treatment 1.178*** 14.95 0.505*** 6.09
Controls Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 1974 1960
Adj. R2 0.2806 0.1647
Table 3.9: Robustness Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized reservation price as
dependent variable. Participants who indicate a WTA greater than the hypothetical pension value (y) are excluded.
***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
Reduced sample: participants close to retirement
In this last robustness test it is analyzed whether participants with age close
to their planned retirement behave different from the rest of the sample. Possible
reasons could be that this particular subsample is more informed about the social
security system and the fair price. Also it could be that they already spent some time
thinking about the retirement decision and therefore are less likely to be influenced
by the treatment effect. Therefore the analysis is repeated with participants who
have less than ten years to their planned retirement age. Table 3.10 shows that also
for this subsample the treatment effect is significant and economically strong. In
the level 1 (level 2) regression being assigned to the WTA treatment increases the
reservation price by 179.57% (57.19%). However, compared to the full sample effect
presented in table 3.3 the magnitude of the treatment effect is reduced by about 40%
and 50% in the level 1 and level 2 regression, respectively. Participants closer to their
planned retirement age are less strongly influenced by the treatment.
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Reservation Price (log) Level 1 Level 2
65% 110%
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age 0.022 0.62 -0.010 -0.25
Gender 0.181 0.59 0.326 0.89
Fair Price (log) 0.410*** 3.88 0.289** 2.26
Number of Children -0.040 -0.47 -0.032 -0.33
High School Degree -0.333 -1.02 -0.058 -0.15
University Degree 0.229 0.90 -0.035 -0.12
Married 0.557** 2.48 0.610** 2.37
Treatment
WTA treatment 1.046*** 5.58 0.475** 2.24
Controls Yes Yes
Number of Obs. 359 346
Adj. R2 0.1722 0.0408
Table 3.10: Robustness Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized reservation price as
dependent variable. Only participants who have less than ten years to their planned retirement age are taken into
account. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
3.6.2 SAVE Panel
Robustness SAVE - hypothesis 1a
Using the SAVE panel for robustness comes with the advantage of a representative
sample of the German population. We are able to test whether the results obtained
in the previous analysis are driven by the fact that FAZ readers present a high
income - high education sample. Nevertheless, there are also two drawbacks: 1) the
WTA/WTP questions in SAVE are not identical to our questions as they refer to
working one year longer or one year shorter compared to a planned retirement age.
2) The questions were not mandatory and therefore, only few participants answered
them. However, even if the questions are not identical to our survey, they give a good
impression of the robustness of our results.
In the 2011 wave of the SAVE panel the following question for participants who
will receive social security benefits in the future was included: “in order to retire one
year earlier, would you be willing to give up a part of your monthly benefits?” Par-
ticipants could then indicate a percentage of their monthly benefits they would be
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willing to give up or answer with “no” or “I don’t know”. Of the 1,660 participants
835 were already retired (775) or indicated that they will not receive social security
benefits in the future (60). Of the remaining 825 participants, 148 gave a percentage
value, 345 indicated that they would not be willing to give up any monthly benefits
and 332 answered with “I don’t know”. We treat this question as a willingness-to-
pay scenario as participants indicate a reservation price for early retirement from
a perspective where they have to retire later. Only the 148 observations of partici-
pants indicating a percentage value are used. A second question, within subjects, in
the 2011/2012 SAVE survey is used as willingness-to-accept scenario: “would you be
willing to retire one year later if your social security benefits would be increased?”
Again participants could indicate a percentage, or answer with “no” and “I don’t
know”. Here 87 participants gave a percentage value, 459 indicated that they would
not be willing to work longer, 279 “did not know”. Again, only the 87 participants
indicating a percentage value enter the analysis. Robustness therefore is tested us-
ing the reservation price in percent decrease or increase of monthly social security
benefits. Similar to our survey, the SAVE survey includes a set of financial literacy
questions (9 questions, see appendix C.2), the subjective life expectancy, the planned
retirement age and whether or not participants own private pension insurance.
Since the sample presents only a small selection of the whole SAVE dataset, we
test whether participants in our sample systematically differ from participants which
answered “no” or “I don’t know”. A logistic regression with an indicator variable
that equals one if a participant indicated a percentage value and zero otherwise
shows that gender, subjective life expectancy and financial literacy are significant
predictors for indicating a percentage value (regression results not reported). A mean
comparison test confirms these results. There are 54.22% male participants in the
sample indicating a percentage value, whereas only 40.45% of participants in the “no
or I don’t know sample” are male. The significant difference in life expectancy and
financial literacy is economically weak. Participants who enter a percentage value
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indicate a life expectancy that is on average only 1.66% higher compared to the “no
or I don’t know sample”. Also, the average financial literacy is only 6.11% higher.
The small sample does not differ strongly from the representative SAVE dataset and
therefore is used to test the robustness of our results.
Figure 3.6 present the reservation price for early retirement in the SAVE panel
under the WTA and WTP treatment as well as the WTA
WTP
ratio and the t-statistic
of a difference in means test. The average reservation price in the WTA treatment
(23.31%) is about 3.3 times larger than in the WTP treatment (7.11%). This dif-
ference is highly significant with a t-statistic of -7.05. The ratio of 3.3 is higher
compared to the results in our survey presented in figure 3.1. Table 3.11 presents
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Figure 3.6: WTA/WTP ratio and average reservation price (in per cent of monthly social security benefits)) for early
retirement depending on the treatment (WTA vs. WTP). Data used for robustness is from the German SAVE panel,
waves 2009 and 2011/2012.
results of an OLS regression with the logarithmized reservation price as dependent
variable and demographic and controls as independent variables16. As in the main
analysis, the effect of the WTA dummy is positive and highly significant. The reser-
vation price increases on average by exp(1.1604 − 1
2
0.12712) − 1 = 216.55% in the
WTA treatment. The magnitude of the effect is also comparable to the effect in the
16Similar to the absolute EUR values in the FAZ-survey, the percentage values follow a log-normal distribution.
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Reservation Price [%]
Variable Coeff. t-value
Demographics
Age -0.004 -0.60
Gender -0.271** -2.19
Income (log) 0.008 0.06
Number of Children -0.031 -0.45
High School Degree -0.185 -1.18
University Degree -0.267 -1.42
Married -0.130 -0.86
Treatment
WTA treatment 1.160*** 9.13
Controls
Financial Literacy Score (0-9) -0.042 -0.66
Life Expectancy -0.013 -1.63
Planned Retirement Age (years) -0.048*** -2.67
Owns Private Pension Insurance -0.092 -0.76
Constant 6.437*** 4.29
Avg. Number of Obs. 240
Avg. Number of Clusters 225
Avg. Adj. R2 0.3489
Table 3.11: Robustness - Hypothesis 1a: results of OLS regressions with the logarithmized reservation price
for early retirement as dependent variable. The reservation price is measured in per cent of expected social security
benefits per month. Data used for robustness is from the German SAVE panel, waves 2009 and 2011/2012. ***, **
and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level. The SAVE data is multiply imputed with five different
implicates. All five implicates are used. Coefficients and standard errors are calculated according to Rubin (1987).
main analysis for the level 1 regression (increase of 313% in the WTA treatment;
see table 3.3). The main result therefore is confirmed using the representative SAVE
dataset. In addition, the gender dummy is now significant. 45% of SAVE partici-
pants who indicated a percentage value in the WTA/WTP question are female. In
the main analysis (FAZ-survey), this is only true for 16%. The higher variation in
the gender dummy may explain the now significant effect. Women seem to have a
stronger preference for early retirement and therefore indicate a higher reservation
price. This result is in line with Munnell et al. (2004) and Moen and Flood (2013)
who report that women are more likely to retire early.
Robustness SAVE - hypothesis 1b
In the German pension system, the percentage increase of social security benefits
for an additional year of employment depends on 2 factors: 1) the age of the employee
compared to his full retirement age determines whether the benefits are increased
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by 3.6% (if the age is at least one year below the full retirement age) or 6.0% (if the
age is equal or greater than the full retirement age). 2) The income in the additional
year determines the additional earning points added to the social security account
of the employee. The question in the SAVE survey refers to working one year longer
or shorter than planned. Therefore, to calculate an indicator for late retirement the
planned retirement age and the full retirement age of each participant is taken into
account. In the WTA question, participants are asked for a percentage change
in social security benefits for working one year longer than planned. If the planned
retirement age is equal or greater than the full retirement age the fair price would
be 6.0% + the percentage increase in earning points. For a planned retirement age
smaller than the full retirement age the fair price would be 3.6% + the percentage
increase in earning points. The WTP question refers to working one year shorter.
Therefore the fair price is 6.0% + the percentage decrease in earning points if the
planned retirement age is greater than the full retirement age and 3.6% + the per-
centage decrease in earning points if planned retirement age is smaller or equal to
the full retirement age. It is assumed that all participants are employed since the
age of 25 and that the income in the additional/deducting year equals the average
income. Therefore, the percentage change in earning points is calculated as 1
PRA−25 ,
with PRA being the planned retirement age. The indicator variable late retirement
equals 1 if a participant’s reservation price is smaller than his or her fair price and 0
otherwise. This indicator equals 1 for 121 of the 239 observations (50.63%).
Table 3.12 presents result of a logistic regression with late retirement as depen-
dent variable. Asking participants for an WTA significantly decreases the likelihood
of late retirement. The coefficient of -2.690 is significant on the 1%-level. With an
average marginal effect over all observations of -47.43% percentage points, the effect
is also economically strong. The gender dummy has a significant and positive effect.
Being male increases the probability for late retirement on average by 11.80 percent-
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age points. The effects of the planned retirement age and owning a private pension
insurance are also positive, however, only marginal significant.
In summary, both hypotheses, 1a and 1b, can be confirmed using the SAVE
dataset. The results therefore, seem not to be driven by more wealthy and highly
educated participants in the FAZ survey.
Late Retirement
Variable Coeff. z-value
Demographics
Age -0.019 -1.02
Gender 0.646* 1.82
Income (log) 0.385 0.81
Number of Children 0.037 0.20
High School Degree -0.170 -0.37
University Degree 0.741 1.35
Married 0.128 0.30
Treatment
WTA treatment -2.300*** -6.01
Controls
Financial Literacy Score (0-9) 0.030 0.17
Life Expectancy -0.001 -0.03
Planned Retirement Age (years) 0.102* 1.89
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.574* 1.73
Constant -9.141* -1.81
Avg. Number of Obs. 240
Avg. Number of Clusters 225
Avg. Correctly classified 0.7114
Avg. Area under ROC Curve 0.7905
Table 3.12: Robustness - Hypothesis 1b: results of logistic regressions with an indicator variable for late re-
tirement as dependent variable. Data used for robustness is from the German SAVE panel, waves 2009 and 2011/2012.
***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level. The SAVE data is multiply imputed with five dif-
ferent implicates. All five implicates are used. Coefficients and standard errors are calculated according to Rubin
(1987).
3.7 Policy Implications
Pay-as-you-go pension systems of many developed countries are put under pres-
sure through increasing life expectancy, decreasing birthrates and the baby boomers
generation entering retirement. As a result, the ratio of working people to retirees
is constantly decreasing. Governments of Germany, the US, U.K, France and many
other European countries reacted to this development by increasing the full retire-
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ment age. This step was necessary as in most countries people retire significant earlier
than the full retirement age (see for example Behaghel and Blau, 2012; Bo¨rsch-Supan,
2000). Therefore, it is important to understand what drives peoples retirement deci-
sion besides the full retirement age.
Before we get to possible policy implications, it has to be analyzed who will be
affected by the different treatments of the decision problem. If a participant’s WTA is
smaller than the price of early retirement, we can assume that his or her decision will
not be affected by a different presentation of the problem. This is because a reduction
in his or her reservation price would not lead to a different decision and, in general,
the WTA is greater than the WTP. The same holds for participants who indicate a
WTP that is already greater than the fair price. A participant, therefore, is classified
as possibly affected by the presentation of decision problem if the WTA > fair price
or WTP < fair price. Following this classification, in the level 1 scenario of the FAZ-
survey 1,538 (64.65%) and in the level 2 scenario 1,469 (59.25%) participants are
possibly affected. Therefore, implications are relevant for the majority of participants.
A second important issue is the external validity of our results. The income in our
sample is significantly higher than the average income in Germany. Therefore it is
tested, whether there is a relation between being possibly affected and participants
income. A simple mean comparison test shows that the average income of the 1,538
participants who are classified as possibly affected (level 1) is significantly (1%-level)
lower (- 410.62 EUR per month) compared to the not affected group. This result
is also confirmed in a logistic regression with demographic and control variables
(not reported). A second indication towards the external validity comes from the
representative SAVE data. Here the number of participants who are possibly affected
is with 70.29% even bigger compared to the FAZ-survey. Therefore, we conclude that
our results have implications for the majority of the population.
The results of this study have two important implications: 1) we find that the
WTA/WTP disparity also exists in a retirement context. People on average indicate
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a reservation price for early retirement which is lower than the fair price if the
decision is presented in a WTP context. The opposite is true for the presentation in
a WTA context. Policy makers, therefore, should pay massive attention on how they
present information about social security payments. 2) As stated above, one way
to increase the retirement age is to increase the full retirement age. However, also
the social security information letter that is provided by the government represents
a powerful tool to increase the effective retirement age. Former studies show that
already small changes in a presentation format can lead to different decisions (e.g.
Choi et al., 2013). Combined with the results of this study, policy makers should
consider changes in the information letter as a second device, next to increasing the
full retirement age.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper relates the retirement decision with the willingness-to-
accept/willingness-to-pay disparity. In an online survey participants indicate
their reservation price for early retirement as their WTA or WTP, respectively.
In line with the WTA/WTP literature, we find that the WTA is about two times
greater than the WTP. When comparing the market price for early retirement,
measured as reduction of monthly social security benefits according to the German
pension system, with participants reservation price, we find that early retirement
seems especially attractive for participants answering the WTA question. The
average probability of early retirement is about 28-37 percentage points higher when
the reservation price is elicited as a WTA compared to a WTP. Additionally, we
analyze the cause of the high WTA/WTP ratio. Loss aversion significantly increases
the ratio, however, not by increasing the WTA but by decreasing the WTP. This
finding is in contrast with the most prominent explanation for the WTA/WTP
disparity, namely an endowment effect caused by loss aversion. Participants seem
to perceive the exchange of money for early retirement as a loss and therefore are
willing to pay less the more loss averse they are. Giving up early retirement in
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exchange for money, however, is not perceived as a loss and loss aversion has no
significant effect on the WTA.
Chapter 4
Inconsistent Retirement
4.1 Introduction
“The question isn’t at what age I want to retire, it’s at what income”
∼ George Foreman
When to stop working and enter retirement is one of the most important deci-
sions that almost everybody will face at one point in his or her life. Thereby, income
during retirement highly depends on the timing of retirement since in most countries
social security benefits are payed according to the number of years one has been
employed. Also, the decision becomes more and more important since the lifespan
after retirement is constantly increasing due to an increasing life expectancy. Most
studies analyzing the retirement decision focus on health and economic status (see
e.g. Kim and Feldman, 1998; Blau and Gilleskie, 2001; Coile et al., 2002; Munnell
et al., 2004; Li et al., 2008). They have found that bad health conditions (unsur-
prisingly) are an important driver for early retirement and that individuals with a
higher socioeconomic status tend to retire later. Besides these (clearly important)
rational considerations also behavioral factors influence the retirement decision (e.g.
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Knoll, 2011). This study focuses on one of these behavioral factors, namely peoples
time preferences.
The retirement decision presents an intertemporal consumption decision under
uncertainty. In this context, time preferences play an important role. They can be
interpreted as individuals’ valuation of a good at an earlier date compared to its valu-
ation on a later date. This paper empirically analyzes the relation between hyperbolic
discounting and the decision when to retire. A decision maker with hyperbolic time
preferences exhibits stronger discount rates in the near future and weaker ones in the
more distant future. This behavior can lead to the problem of dynamic inconsistent
decisions. A dynamic inconsistent decision maker will evaluate an optimal plan at
some point in time, but reevaluate that plan at a later point in time and not neces-
sarily stick to it (e.g. Strotz, 1955). In the retirement context, a dynamic inconsistent
decision maker could, for example, evaluate an optimal retirement age during work
life. However, when the actual decision comes closer, he or she may reevaluate the
planned retirement age and chose to retire earlier or later.
Time preferences are described using a discount function. Thereby, the exponential
discount function and the hyperbolic discount function are the two most prominent
ones. The former assumes that the discount rate between two periods only depends
on the time distance between these two periods and not on how far they are away
from today. This assumption of stationarity leads to a constant discount rate be-
tween two consecutive periods. However, the majority of empirical studies finds that
most individuals exhibit non-constant discount rates (see for example Thaler, 1981;
Frederick et al., 2002). This behavior can be described by a hyperbolic discount
function.
The question how hyperbolic discounting affects the retirement decision has been
addressed by recent theoretical work (see Diamond and Ko¨szegi, 2003; Holmes, 2010;
Zhang, 2013; Findley and Caliendo, 2013; Findley and Feigenbaum, 2013). Thereby,
these models focus on the savings decision of hyperbolic agents when retirement is
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endogenous. Therefore, predictions about the retirement decision which can be tested
empirically are made: In a theoretical context, hyperbolic discounting compared to
exponential discounting leads c.p. to early retirement. The decision maker puts too
much weight on the near future and is therefore tempted to trade immediate leisure
against future consumption. However, hyperbolic discounting can also lead to under-
saving. The decision maker might not have accumulated sufficient wealth to finance
early retirement and is therefore forced to retire later (e.g. Diamond and Ko¨szegi,
2003). Since, in Germany, contribution to the social security system is mandatory
and relatively high pension benefits are provided, we focus on the former effect of
hyperbolic discounting and hypothesize that it will lead to early retirement.
We contribute to the literature by addressing this question empirically and testing
predictions made by the theoretical models. In the analysis, two sources of data are
used: 1) For the main analysis, an online survey in cooperation with the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) was conducted. The FAZ is one of Germany’s largest daily
newspapers. They promoted the survey in the print edition and posted a link on their
website, which redirected people directly to the survey. Participants answered a set
of questions regarding their retirement plans and expectations. In addition, different
proxies for participants time preferences were elicited. The survey also included ques-
tions regarding risk preferences, loss aversion, financial literacy and the subjective
life expectancy. 2) Data from a representative panel survey in Germany is used to
test robustness (SAVE panel).
To study dynamic inconsistency in the retirement context, first, the effect of age on
the planned retirement age is taken into account. Following the theoretical literature,
dynamic inconsistent decision makers will decrease their planned retirement age with
increasing age, since they are more and more tempted to retire early. The data shows
that this prediction can be confirmed: we find a highly significant and economically
strong negative effect of age on the planned retirement age. On average, participants
plan to retire about 0.7 month earlier by each year that they get older. This effect is
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robust to the inclusion of numerous demographic and control variables. To rule out
other explanations besides time preferences, two more specific predictions are tested.
We find that the age effect is between 3 and 10 times stronger for participants that
can be classified as “more time inconsistent”. Also, participants closer to retirement
exhibit a stronger negative effect of age. In addition, the panel structure of the SAVE
dataset allows to rule out possible cohort effects. The analysis of participants who
participated in at least two of the SAVE waves from 2008, 2009 and 2010 shows that
they indeed significantly decrease their planned retirement age with ongoing time.1
In a second step, it is analyzed whether time inconsistent decision makers follow
their plans. Therefore, participants who are already retired are taken into account.
In the FAZ dataset as well as in SAVE, retirees who can be classified as more time
inconsistent retired about 2.5 years earlier. This result is robust to the inclusion
of demographic and control variables as well as variables related to health. It shows
that “time inconsistent” decision makers not only reduce their planned retirement age
with ongoing time, but also actually retire significantly earlier than “time consistent”
decision makers.
This behavior has serious consequences for the financial well-being during retire-
ment. The German pension system allows people to retire earlier than their full
retirement age. However, this will result in a constant decrease of monthly benefits.
We find that participants who plan to retire early beforehand, compensate the re-
duction in social security benefits by private pension insurance. However, hyperbolic
discounting leads to early retirement but does not increase the likelihood of owning
private pension insurance. Therefore, the reduction in social security benefits is not
compensated. Even after controlling for demographics (e.g. income, marital status,
number of children, etc.) and personal characteristics such as risk and loss aversion,
financial literacy and subjective life expectancy, time inconsistent participants re-
tire about 2.5 years earlier than consistent ones. This 2.5 year difference in actual
1Thereby, waves before 2007 are not included, since with the reform of the German pension system in 2007, the
full retirement age was increased to 67. This change would present a structural break in longer panel datasets.
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retirement age results in a decrease of retirement benefits of about 15% for the in-
consistent group. The results indicate that simply the fact of exhibiting a different
discount function strongly influences a person’s financial budget in retirement.
This paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses the connection between hyper-
bolic discounting and the retirement decision. In section 3, the data and methodology
is introduced. Section 4 presents results and robustness tests. Before section 6 con-
cludes, we discuss financial implications in section 5.
4.2 Hyperbolic discounting and the retirement decision
4.2.1 Hyperbolic Discounting
Time preferences can be described as the relative preference of a good at an earlier
date compared to its preference on a later date (e.g. Frederick et al., 2002). Thereby,
the good of interest can be very concrete, e.g. a chocolate bar or money, or more
abstract like leisure time or personal health. In all cases, a discount function tries
to describe how individuals weight an earlier outcome compared to a later outcome,
i.e. describe individuals’ time preferences. Since Samuelson (1937) introduced the
discounted-utility model, a standard assumption regarding discount functions has
been stationarity. The only discount function that fulfills this assumption is the ex-
ponential discount function. Stationarity leads to a constant discount rate between
two consecutive time periods. This implies that the difference between an outcome to-
day and tomorrow weighs the same as the difference between this outcome in e.g. 100
and 101 days. However, when scientists began to elicit discount rates in experiments,
concerns about the descriptive validity of the model have been expressed. Many stud-
ies find that discount rates are not constant and individuals exhibit stronger discount
rates for outcomes in the near future and weaker discount rates for more distant ones
(see for example Thaler, 1981; Laibson, 1997; Frederick et al., 2002). This behavior
can lead to dynamic inconsistent decisions. For example, as stated by Laibson et al.
(1998), a person might prefer a 30 minutes work-break in 101 days over a 15 minutes
4.2. HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING AND THE RETIREMENT DECISION 109
break in one hundred days, however, if time passes she might reverse that decision
and take a 15 minutes break today instead of a 30 minutes break tomorrow. This
impatient behavior in the short run and patient behavior in the long run can be
described by a hyperbolic discount function.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) presented an axiomatic foundation of the hyper-
bolic discount function DFhb(t) = (1 + αt)
− γ
α . Figure 4.1 graphs the general hyper-
bolic function and the exponential function DFEXP (t) = (1 + i)
t with the values
proposed by Laibson (1997) (α = 25 · 104, γ = 104) and i = 5%. Compared to the
exponential function, the hyperbolic function leads to stronger discounting in the
beginning and to weaker discounting in later periods. This feature can predict dy-
namic inconsistency (see e.g. Ainslie, 1975; Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Ahlbrecht
and Weber, 1997; Frederick et al., 2002).
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Figure 4.1: Discount functions: this figure reports the exponential discount function DFEXP (t) = (1 + i)
t with i
= 5% and the general hyperbolic function DFhb(t) = (1 + αt)
− γ
α , with α = 25 · 104 and γ = 104.
A dynamic inconsistent decision maker will evaluate an optimal plan at some point
in time t, but reevaluate that plan at a later point in time t + 1 and therefore, not
necessarily stick to it (e.g. Strotz, 1955). Typical examples for inconsistent behavior
can be found in the literature regarding self-control problems. A person who today
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(t=0) conceives the plan to stop smoking next month may reevaluate that plan one
month later (t=1) and decide to stop smoking next month. Thereby, it is important
whether the decision maker is aware of his hyperbolic preferences or not (sophisti-
cated vs. naive hyperbolic decision maker; see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).). The
naive hyperbolic decision maker thinks at t=0 that he will stick to his optimal plan.
Therefore, he does not foresee the possibility that he will change his optimal plan in
later periods (and e.g. will never be able to quit smoking). The sophisticated deci-
sion maker, however, already anticipates his lack of self-control and therefore tries to
bind or precommit his behavior (e.g. by telling others the plan to quit and remove all
tobacco) (e.g. Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981; Sorger, 2007). In the following subsection,
a brief overview of the theoretical literature dealing with dynamic inconsistency in
the retirement context is given and 4 hypotheses are derived.
4.2.2 Retirement Decision
The decision when to retire and claim social security benefits is one of the econom-
ically most important decisions in one’s life. For example, in Germany, retiring at the
earliest age possible (63) instead of the full retirement age (67) results in a constant
decrease of about 22% in social security benefits (see chapter 2). In addition, due to
an increasing life expectancy and a decreasing or constant effective retirement age,
the average time spent in retirement steadily increases.
The question addressed in this section is how hyperbolic preferences influence re-
tirement plans. Following the argumentation of Zhang (2013), a hyperbolic decision
maker puts too much attention on the near future. In the retirement context this
has two consequences: first, the hyperbolic decision maker prefers instantaneous con-
sumption, thereby neglecting the long term costs of undersaving. As a consequence,
he or she will not be able to save enough for retirement and thus has to work longer
compared to an exponential decision maker (e.g. Laibson, 1997). The first predic-
tion, therefore, would be that hyperbolic preferences lead to late retirement due
to financial constraints. The second prediction takes into account that the decision
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to retire early represents a tradeoff between future consumption against immediate
leisure time. The hyperbolic decision maker is tempted to retire early since he puts
too much weight on the utility gained from immediate leisure but too less weight on
the utility loss due to reduced future consumption. Therefore, for any given level of
accumulated wealth, the hyperbolic decision maker is c.p. more likely to retire early.
There are three models and two extensions to them, which study savings decisions
when retirement is endogenous in the context of hyperbolic discounting, and which
model these two conflicting arguments.
The model by Diamond and Ko¨szegi (2003)
Diamond and Ko¨szegi (2003) study the effect of endogenous retirement decisions
on savings behavior in a model with sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic decision makers2.
In a three-period setting, the decision maker has to work in period −1. In period
0, he or she can decide whether to work or retire; and in period 1, he or she has to
retire. Working in period −1 gives an income which the decision maker can (partly)
consume and save. Therefore, in period 0, he or she holds wealth of W0 ≥ 0. Working
in period 0 gives additional wealth of ∆ and costs effort of e > 0. The remaining
wealth for periods 0 and 1 will be W0, if the decision maker retires, and W0 + ∆
otherwise. It is shown, that there are wealth levels W0, for which the decision maker
would not work in period 0, but would like to work from the perspective of period
−1. This means, that there are wealth levels for which the decision maker initially (in
period −1) plans to retire late (in period 1) but, with ongoing time, reevaluates that
plan and chooses to retire early (in period 0) – displaying a dynamic inconsistency.
Since the sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic decision maker will foresee the behavior of
the future-self, he or she can incorporate it into the initial plan. This can lead to two
outcomes: either the savings in period −1 can be reduced such that W0 is sufficiently
low to force the period-0-self to work (“strategic undersaving”) or savings can be
2The concept of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is adopted from Laibson (1997). The quasi-hyperbolic discount
function is a discrete time function with values {1, βδ, βδ2, βδ3, · · · }, with δ = 1
1+i
and β ≤ 1. It combines most
features of the general hyperbolic function with a good analytical tractability.
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increased such that both, the self in period −1 and 0 prefer to retire early. Whether
or not hyperbolic discounting leads to early retirement, therefore depends on the
level of accumulated wealth.
There are two extensions to the Diamond and Ko¨szegi (2003) model. First, Holmes
(2010) shows that, in such a three-period model, dynamic inconsistency in the re-
tirement decision will never occur, since the level of saving required to cause it is
too high. A decision maker with hyperbolic time preferences would never save an
amount sufficiently high to cause unplanned early retirement. However, in a second
extension, Findley and Feigenbaum (2013) show that time-inconsistent retirement
can exist in a three-period setting with a slight generalization of the underlying as-
sumptions. Again, depending on the level of wealth, hyperbolic discounting leads to
planned late retirement but actual early retirement.
The models by Zhang (2013) and Findley and Caliendo (2013)
Zhang (2013) argues that, empirically both, undersaving and early retirement
can be observed. In the US, for example, the majority of workers choose to retire
early (e.g. Behaghel and Blau, 2012; Gruber and Wise, 2004). Also, the aggregated
savings rate has been declining since the 1980s (e.g. Laibson, 1997). She studies a
three-period model which differs from the Diamond and Ko¨szegi (2003) model in
three ways: 1) The decision maker chooses an amount of labor supply l in period
0. Therefore, the decision whether to work or to retire is continuous. 2) Both, naive
and sophisticated hyperbolic decision makers are taken into account and 3) early
retirement and undersaving is defined relative to a decision maker who discounts
the future exponentially. As a result, she shows that hyperbolic discounting can
lead to parallel undersaving and early retirement. This holds for naive as well as
sophisticated decision makers.
Findley and Caliendo (2013) also study the effect of hyperbolic discounting on sav-
ing behavior in a continuous-time model with endogenous retirement. Thereby, they
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focus on naive decision makers and compare them to exponential discounters. They
find that, in their setting, hyperbolic discounters plan to retire early but then delay
retirement. This is caused by insufficient savings. The hyperbolic decision maker fails
to stick to previous saving plans, and therefore, has to increase the actual retirement
age.
4.2.3 Hypotheses
Summarizing the theoretical literature, it can be seen that hyperbolic discounting
can have a direct and indirect effect on retirement timing. On the one hand, hyper-
bolic decision makers are c.p. tempted to retire early and trade immediate leisure
against future consumption. On the other hand, they might not have sufficient sav-
ings to finance early retirement and therefore, retire late. This paper studies the
empirical relationship between hyperbolic discounting and the retirement decision in
Germany. The social security system in Germany provides relatively high pension
benefits (see e.g. Bassi, 2008). In addition, contribution to the system is manda-
tory for almost every employee in Germany. Therefore, a certain amount of pension
benefits is guaranteed. We argue that for this reason, the direct effect of hyperbolic
discounting on the retirement decision should be stronger and focus on the time in-
consistency that can arise due to hyperbolic discounting. In theory, an individuals’
retirement decision is defined as time inconsistent if he or she plans on working until
a certain period t, and then reverses his original plan by actually retiring earlier.
Empirically, this behavior would lead to a reduction in the planned retirement age
with increasing age of the hyperbolic decision maker. Our first hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 1a: time inconsistent decision makers will decrease their planned
retirement age with increasing age.
Thereby, the magnitude of the effect should depend on the level of hyperbolic dis-
counting:
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Hypothesis 1b: the negative effect of age on the planned retirement age
will be stronger for decision makers that can be classified as “more time
inconsistent”.
The idea of inconsistent retirement is also supported by a finding of Bidewell et al.
(2006) who conduct an experiment, in which participants choose between early and
late retirement depending on hypothetical savings, enjoyment of retirement and
chances of good health during retirement. They find that participants who are closer
to their planned or expected retirement age are more impatient towards early re-
tirement as they are willing to give up more future retirement income in order to
retire early. However, they do not attribute their finding to hyperbolic discounting.
Following their result, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1c: the negative effect of age on the planned retirement age
will be stronger for decision makers closer to retirement.
According to the theoretical literature (e.g. Zhang, 2013; Findley and Feigenbaum,
2013), the quasi-hyperbolic discounter not only plans to retire early but also sticks
to that plan. To analyze the outcome of the retirement plan, the actual retirement
age is taken into account:
Hypothesis 2: time inconsistent decision makers will retire earlier than
time consistent decision makers.
4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Data
In this study, two sources of data are used: first, for the main analysis, an online
survey was conducted in cooperation with a large German newspaper, the “Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ-Survey). Second, to test robustness of the main
results, we use a representative panel survey for Germany. The German SAVE panel
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has been conducted since 2001 by the Munich Center for the Economics of Aging
(MEA) in order to understand savings and retirement decisions of German house-
holds. The panel focuses on savings behavior, financial assets and old-age provision
and includes numerous demographic, economic and psychological characteristics of
participating households (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2009).
Main analysis - FAZ Data3
The survey was conducted from October 14th to November 5th 2012. The FAZ
posted a link on their website and announced the survey two times in its print
edition (on October 14th and 28th). Overall, 3,077 participants completed the survey.
They answered several questions regarding retirement savings and planing. In the
FAZ survey, the planned and actual retirement age was elicited directly. Participants
indicated whether they were already retired or not and depending on their answer
they were asked for their planned or actual retirement age (see Table 4.1). Both, the
planned and actual retirement age is used as dependent variable in the analysis.
To distinguish between time inconsistent and time consistent participants, two
questions according time preferences were introduced: 1) Quasi-hyperbolic or present-
biased decision makers are impatient regarding near future consumption. To proxy for
discounting, participants had to agree on a seven-point Likert scale to the statement:
”I’m an impatient person”. 2) In a choice-based task, participants had to decide
between a tax refund T that would be obtained earlier and a refund T (1 + i) that
would be obtained later in time. In three questions the earlier payment would received
immediately and the later one would be received in 10 months with i = 3.3%, 11.3%
and 31.3%. For the second set of questions, all payments were shifted 18 months into
the future (earlier payment in 18 months, later in 28 months). If participants have
time consistent preferences only the difference between the two payments (10 months
for all questions) should matter and for each interest rate the decision between the
3Data from the FAZ survey is also used in chapter 2. They focus on another part of the survey where the main
questions are about choices between an annuity and a lump sum.
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earlier or later payment should be the same. The second proxy for time preferences
therefore measures the number of inconsistent answers from 0 to 3.
The set of control variables starts with risk and loss aversion. Both are self-
assessed and elicited directly on a 1-7 Likert scale. Participants also answered a set
of 6 financial literacy questions. Since the FAZ newspaper has a focus on financial
markets, only one of the basic questions from Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) was used.
In addition, three of the advanced questions (van Rooij et al., 2011) and two more
complicated questions were introduced (see appendix C.1). Additional controls are
participants’ subjective life expectancy (elicited directly), a dummy that equals one
if participants own private pension insurance, and an indication about how save the
German social security system is perceived. Also demographics (age, gender, income,
number of children, education and martial status) were elicited and the time needed
to complete the survey was recorded.
Robustness - SAVE panel
From SAVE the waves of 2008, 2009 and 2010 are used in the analysis. Thereby,
we take advantage of the panel structure and the cross section of the wave 2010. The
dependent variables (planned retirement age and actual retirement age) as well as
demographics are the same as in the FAZ survey (see Table 4.1). However, neither
the waves of 2008, 2009 and 2010 nor any other wave of the SAVE panel allows
to explicitly control for hyperbolic discounting. A variable that is related to time
preferences is participants’ smoking habit. Smokers are found to be more impulsive
and impatient than non-smokers, which is also true for tasks not related to smoking
(e.g. Bickel et al., 1999; Baker et al., 2003; Reynolds and Fields, 2012). Therefore,
a common approach is to use smoking-habits as a proxy for time preferences in
general, or hyperbolic discounting in particular (see for example Munasinghe and
Sicherman, 2006; Kan, 2007; Khwajaa et al., 2007; Grignon, 2009). All waves provide
information about the smoking behavior of participants which is used as a proxy for
time preferences. Since smoking and early retirement can also be related due to
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health issues, three variables regarding participants health status are included. 1)
Participants self-assess their health status on a 1-5 Likert scale, 2) they indicate how
happy they are with their current health status on a 1-10 scale and 3) they indicate
whether they suffer or suffered from a prolonged disease.
The control variables in SAVE include a financial literacy score, the subjective life
expectancy of participants and whether or not a private pension insurance is owned.
Financial literacy, thereby, includes 9 questions from Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)
and van Rooij et al. (2011) (see appendix C.2). The subjective life expectancy is
elicited in a two step procedure: first, participants make a best guess on the average
life expectancy of a person of their age and gender. Second, they indicate by how
many years they expect to live longer or shorter than the average person.
Variable FAZ Survey SAVE Panel
Dependent variable
Planned retirement age planned retirement age in month planned retirement age in month
(at what age do you plan to retire?). (at what age do you plan to retire?).
Actual retirement age actual retirement age in years actual retirement age in years
(at what age did you retire?). (at what age did you retire?).
Demographics
Age year of the survey - year of birth. year of the survey - year of birth.
Gender 0=female, 1=male. 0=female, 1=male.
Income net income. net income.
Number of Children number of children. number of children.
High School Degree 0=no, 1=yes. 0=no, 1=yes.
University Degree 0=no, 1=yes. 0=no, 1=yes.
Married 0=no, 1=yes. 0=no, 1=yes.
Proxy for time preferences
Impatience Scale Impatience from 1-7 -
(are you an impatient person?
1=not at all, 7=very impatient).
Number of inconsistent answers number of inconsistent answers from 0-3 -
answers to 3 pairs of questions regarding
a tax refund.
smoker - 0=no, 1=yes
(are you a smoker?).
Table 4.1: Overview of variables used in the analysis.
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Variable FAZ Survey SAVE Panel
Controls
Risk Aversion Risk aversion from 1-7 -
(are you a risk averse person?
1=not at all, 7=very risk averse).
Loss Aversion Loss aversion from 1-7 -
(are you a loss averse person?
1=not at all, 7=very risk averse).
Financial Literacy Score 6 financial literacy questions. 6 financial literacy questions.
Scale goes from 0-6. Scale goes from 0-10.
(see appendix C.1) (see appendix C.2)
Life Expectancy subjective life expectancy subjective life expectancy
elicited directly. elicited indirectly
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0=no, 1=yes 0=no, 1=yes
(do you own (do you own
private pension insurance?). private pension insurance?).
Certainty of Social Security indication about how save the social -
security system is percived from 1-7
(1=not save at all, 7=very save).
Time Sum Time needed to complete the survey.-
Full Retirement Age Full retirement age. Full retirement age.
Health
Health status - health status on a scale from 1-5
(1=very good, 5=very poor).
Happiness health status - happiness with health status (0-10)
(0=very unhappy, 10=very happy).
prolonged disease - 0=no, 1=yes
(any prolonged diseases?).
Overview of variables used in the analysis continued.
4.3.2 Summary statistics
FAZ and SAVE
Table 4.2 displays summary statistics on subjects planned and actual retirement
age, demographics, time preferences and control variables. The average planned re-
tirement age is similar in both studies and ranges from ranges from 775 month (FAZ)
to 779 month (SAVE). The actual retirement age of retirees in the FAZ survey (61.5)
is about 2.7 years higher compared to the SAVE survey (58.9). This difference, how-
ever, is not statistically significant.
A stronger variation between the surveys can be observed for demographic vari-
ables. Compared to the representative SAVE survey, where about 50% of participants
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are female, women are underrepresented in the FAZ survey (85.3% males). Moreover,
the FAZ sample can be classified as a high education - high income sample. The aver-
age income in the FAZ survey (EUR 3.2k) is about 3.5 times higher than the average
income in the SAVE panel. Education is measured by the fraction of participants
that obtained a high school and/or university degree. In the FAZ sample, about 85%
obtained the former and 63% the latter, compared to 19% and 11% in the SAVE
survey. Concerning the average age and the fraction of married participants, there
are no significant differences between the datasets.
All in all, three different proxies for time preferences are used. In the FAZ survey,
participants indicated impatience on a Likert scale. Participants indicated an average
of 3.9 (measured on a 1-7 scale). The average, thereby, is slightly below the center
of the scale (4). The average number of inconsistent answers in the FAZ survey
is 0.7. Thereby, about 40% of participants answerd at least one of the tax refund
questions inconsistently. The third proxy is the smoker dummy in the SAVE 2010
survey. About 23% of participants indicated that they are smokers.
The FAZ survey includes 7 control variables. Asking participants about their
risk- and loss aversion on a 1 to 7 Likert scale led to an average of 3.90 and 4.5
respectively. As expected, participants did extremely well in the financial literacy
task. On average, 4.0 / 6 answers were correct. In contrast, out of the 9 financial
literacy questions in the SAVE survey, participants gave only 2.9 correct answers on
average. Directly asking participants about their subjective life expectancy led to an
average of 83.8 years (FAZ). In SAVE, the subjective life expectancy is only 79.5
on average. However, as the life expectancy increases with wealth and education, a
higher average in the FAZ survey seems reasonable. Therefore, it cannot be concluded
whether participants in the FAZ survey overestimate their personal objective life
expectancy or not. About one quarter of the SAVE participants own private pension
insurance whereas this is true for about half of the FAZ participants. Participants
completed the FAZ survey in 11 minutes (683.6 seconds) on average.
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Variable FAZ Survey SAVE 2010
Dependent variable
Planned retirement age 774.551 779.147
(62.465) (35.713)
Actual retirement age 61.486 58.880
(4.484) (6.903)
Demographics
Age 53.687 57.839
(9.069) (9.438)
Gender 0.853 0.486
(0.355) (0.499)
Income 3.202 0.900
(3.590) (1.037)
Number of Children 1.188 0.543
(1.170) (0.773)
High School Degree 0.849 0.191
(0.343) (0.391)
University Degree 0.630 0.110
(0.481) (0.313)
Married 0.634 0.619
(0.452) (0.486)
Proxy for time preferences
Impatience Scale 3.898 -
(1.705)
Number of inconsistent answers 0.706 -
(0.992)
smoker - 0.232
(0.408)
Controls
Risk Aversion 3.931 -
(1.496)
Loss Aversion 4.465 -
(1.606)
Financial Literacy Score 3.995 2.945
(1.114) (1.055)
Life Expectancy 83.849 79.472
(7.565) (7.755)
Owns Private Pension Insurance 0.491 0.265
(0.477) (0.388)
Certainty of Social Security 3.574 -
(1.893)
Time Sum 683.643 -
(169.817)
Health
Health status - 2.630
(0.816)
Happiness health status - 5.975
(2.382)
prolonged disease - 0.559
(0.479)
Number of Obs 2551 2023
Table 4.2: Summary statistics: This table presents summary statistics for the FAZ survey and the SAVE Survey
2010. Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. The number of observations indicates the maximum number
of observations per survey and variable.
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4.3.3 Methodology
Dependent variable: ∆ PFRA
To test the hypothesis 1a-1c, the planned retirement age is used as dependent
variable. However, the full retirement age (FRA) in Germany depends on the year
of birth. A stepwise increase of the FRA was decided within the 2007 reform of
the pension system. Individuals being born before 1947 could claim full retirement
benefits at age 65 and for individuals born after 1963 the FRA was raised to 67. In
between the FRA is raised in steps of one or two months. Figure 4.2 shows the FRA
depending on the year of birth.
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Figure 4.2: Full retirement age (FRA) in Germany depending on year of birth.
The difference in the FRA causes the following problem: assume that two indi-
viduals, A and B, plan to retire one year prior to their FRA. Thereby, A is 30 years
old and his FRA is 67. B is 60 years old and therefore, her FRA is 65. The planned
retirement age of A would be 66 whereas it would be 64 for B. Regressing the planned
retirement age on age would now lead to a negative effect of age even if both, A and
B, have the same retirement plan (retire 1 year prior to the FRA). To account for
this, the difference between the full retirement age and the planned retirement age
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(∆PFRA) is used as dependent variable. Thereby, negative values indicate that a
participant plans to retire earlier than his or her full retirement age and vice versa.
In the analysis, only participants who are not yet retired are taken into account.
This results in a conservative estimate of the negative effect, since the planned re-
tirement age of all participants in the sample has to be greater than their actual age.
Therefore, for example, someone who is of age 63 and retired, but actually planned
to retire at 65 would potentially strengthen our results but is not taken into account.
Main analysis
The main analysis is carried out with the FAZ dataset. In the base specification,
the general effect of age on ∆PFRA is tested. The following regression is estimated:
∆PFRAi = β0 + βage · agei + βD ·Di + βTP · TPi + βC · Ci + i (4.1)
with D being a vector of demographic variables (except age), TP being a proxy
for time preferences and C being a vector of additional control variables presented
in table 4.1. This specification allows to assess the general effect of age and time
preferences on ∆PFRAi, i.e. test hypothesis 1a.
In a second specification, hypotheses 1b and 1c are tested. In addition to the vari-
ables in the base specification, two interaction terms are included in the regression:
∆PFRAi=β0+βage·agei+ βage2 · age(c)2i + βAT · agei · TPi +βTP ·TPi+βD·Di+βC ·Ci+i (4.2)
The term agei ·TPi allows the age effect to depend on participants time preferences.
Hypothesis 1b states that the magnitude of the negative age effect should increase
with increasing hyperbolic discounting. Therefore, we expect the interaction to be
negative. The second term that is added is age(c)2i = (agei−age)2, the squared mean
centered age. To avoid a high correlation between age and age2, the age variable has
to be centered. Following hypothesis 1c, the second non-linear term is expected to
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be significantly negative and therefore increase the magnitude of the age effect for
participants closer to retirement.
At last, hypothesis 2 aims at the actual retirement age (ARA) of participants.
The FAZ survey provides information about the retirement status and the actual
retirement age. The following regression model is estimated:
ARAi = β0 + βD ·Di + βTP · TPi + βC · Ci + i (4.3)
Thereby, the variable of interest is the time preference proxy. Following hypothesis
2, we expect time inconsistent participants to retire earlier than time consistent
participants.
Robustness
The data used for robustness comes from the waves 2008, 2009 and 2010 from
the SAVE panel. The cross section used in the main analysis allows to estimate an
age effect on ∆PFRA. However, a possible effect could also be driven by the birth
cohort and should therefore not be attributed to participants time preferences. The
panel structure of SAVE allows to rule out such an explanation. Thereby, using the
time preference proxy, the sample is split in a subsample of participants that can be
classified as time inconsistent and a time consistent. In a second step, the following
panel regression model is estimated for both subsamples:
∆PFRAi,j = β0 + βyear · yeari,j + βD ·Di,j + βTP · TPi,j + βC · Ci,j + i,j (4.4)
with year capturing the time effect, D being a vector of demographic variables, TP
being a proxy for time preferences and C being a vector of additional control vari-
ables. The demographic variables do not include participants age since it is perfectly
correlated with the year variable. This specification allows to test whether or not
participants decrease the planned retirement age with ongoing time or whether the
cross section effect is driven by the birth cohort.
124 CHAPTER 4. INCONSISTENT RETIREMENT
In addition to the panel analysis, the analysis regarding hypothesis 2 is repeated
with the SAVE 2010 cross section since only about 200 participants in the FAZ
dataset are already retired. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the regressions and pre-
dicted outcomes for each dataset.
FAZ SAVE Prediction
Equation (4.1) X - βage < 0
(Hypothesis 1a)
Equation (4.2) X - βage < 0, βage2 < 0, βAT < 0
(Hypotheses 1b, 1c)
Equation (4.3) X X βTP < 0
(Hypothesis 2)
Equation (4.4) - X βyear < 0
(Hypothesis 1a - panel)
Table 4.3: Overview of regressions and predicted outcomes.
4.4 Results and Robustness
4.4.1 Main analysis
The age effect
Table 4.4 shows results of two OLS regressions presented in equation (4.1). In
both regressions, a significant negative effect of age on ∆PFRA is obtained. The
dependent variable measures the difference between the planned and full retirement
age. Therefore, a decrease in ∆PFRA can be driven by a decrease in the planned
retirement age or an increase in the full retirement age. However, the full retirement
age is the same for the majority of participants (everyone born after 1963). Fur-
thermore, the negative effect of age would imply an increase in the full retirement
age with age. The full retirement age is increased for younger generations, though.
Therefore, the decrease in ∆PFRA is clearly driven by a reduction in the planned
retirement age. The age effect is economically strong: participants on average de-
crease the planned retirement age by about 0.72 months per year they get older.
This implies a reduction by one year for every 17 years increase of age4.
4If the planned retirement age is used without the correction for the full retirement age, results are stronger and
more significant. This is nor surprising, since the full retirement age is smaller for older participants. Therefore, if
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In addition, 4 out of 7 demographic variables are significant. Income reduces the
planned retirement age. This result is in line with Munnell et al. (2004) and Li
et al. (2008), who also find a negative relationship between wealth or income and
retirement age. The number of children on average increases the planned retirement
age by about 2.8 months per child. Being married, however, reduces the planned
retirement age by about 5.0 months. Participants with university degree plan to
retire later. This could, on the one hand, be driven by a higher job satisfaction due
to more responsibility (see e.g. Helman et al., 2008) or, on the other hand, due to a
better understanding of how retirement age influences monthly benefits (e.g. Coile
et al., 2002).
The regressions differ by the variable that is used as a proxy for time prefer-
ences. Column 1 shows results for the self-assessed impatience on a 1-7 scale and
column 2 for the number of inconsistent answers. Thereby, participants self assessed
impatience has a highly significant effect on the planned retirement age. For each
unit increase on the 1 to 7 scale, the planned retirement age decreases by about 1.6
months. This indicates that time inconsistent participants plan to retire remarkably
earlier than time consistent participants. On the other hand, however, the second
proxy, the number of inconsistent answers regarding three pairs of tax refund ques-
tions (column 2), is insignificant. Moreover, including both, the impatience scale and
the number of inconsistent answers shows that only the impatience scale predicts
∆PFRA (not reported in table 4.4). Therefore, in the following analysis we focus
on the specification presented in column 1.
Regarding the control variables, financial literacy, the subjective life expectancy
and owning private pension insurance significantly predict the planned retirement
age. More financial literate participants plan to retire about 2 months earlier per
correct answer. However, one has to keep in mind that the sample is already highly
financially literate and therefore, the effect is driven by a few participants who answer
we would not correct the planned retirement age for the different full retirement ages we would overestimate the age
effect.
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each out of the six questions correctly. Participants that indicate a high subjective
life expectancy plan to retire later, which is maybe due to the fact that they expect
to spend a long time in retirement anyway. Furthermore, retiring later increases
social security benefits and participants who expect to live longer need to finance
their consumption for a longer time period. In addition, the full retirement age has
a negative effect. The effect is significant, even if the dependent variable already
accounts for the fact that the full retirement age has been increased for participants
born after 1947. This implies that participants do not fully adjust their planned
retirement age to the new full retirement age. Surprisingly, risk aversion has no
effect on ∆PFRA. Coile et al. (2002) predict an increase of retirement age for more
risk averse individuals, however this can not be confirmed by the FAZ survey.
In summary, we find a negative effect of age and impatience on the planned
retirement age. therefore, hypothesis 1a can be confirmed.
The age effect and time preferences
The second specification focuses on how the age effect depends on time prefer-
ences (hypothesis 1b) and whether or not the effect is linear (hypothesis 1c). To
answer these questions, first, the model presented in equation (4.2) is estimated and
second, the analysis presented in equation (4.1) is repeated with subsamples of time
inconsistent and time consistent participants. To split the sample, the self-assessed
impatience is used. Participants who indicate an impatience equal or greater the
median (=4) are classified as time inconsistent, whereas the other group is classified
as time consistent. The median split results in 1,192 inconsistent and 936 consistent
participants5.
Table 4.5 presents results of three OLS regressions. Column 1 shows results for the
full sample with interaction terms. The age effect is robust to the inclusion of the two
nonlinear terms. With a coefficient of -0.88∗∗∗ the effect is slightly stronger compared
5The different number of observations comes from participants who indicated the median impatience of four.
Results are robust if these participants are assigned to the time consistent group.
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∆PFRA
(1) (2)
Demographics
Age (years) -0.721*** -0.723***
(0.138) (0.142)
Gender 2.097 2.738
(2.636) (2.688)
Income (log) -3.817*** -3.811***
(1.263) (1.304)
Number of Children 2.738*** 2.696***
(0.909) (0.927)
High School Degree 2.160 2.748
(3.753) (3.878)
University Degree 7.294*** 7.732***
(2.266) (2.308)
Married -5.361** -5.091**
(2.219) (2.260)
Proxy for time preferences
Impatience Scale -1.597*** -
(0.550)
Number of inconsistent answers - 0.098
(1.030)
Controls
Risk Aversion 1.001 1.073
(0.789) (0.809)
Loss Aversion -1.366* -1.373*
(0.725) (0.741)
Financial Literacy Score -2.030** -1.980**
(0.839) (0.862)
Life Expectancy 0.496*** 0.541***
(0.117) (0.119)
Owns Private Pension Insurance -6.430*** -6.415***
(1.875) (1.917)
Certainty of Social Security -0.633 -0.590
(0.506) (0.516)
Time Sum -0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Full retirement age -1.790*** -1.784***
(0.238) (0.244)
constant 1443.833*** 1424.942***
(194.364) (199.819)
Number of Obs 2128 2060
Adj. R2 0.0654 0.0624
Table 4.4: Hypothesis 1a: results of two OLS regressions with ∆PFRA as dependent variable. Standard errors are
displayed in parentheses. Data used for the analysis comes from the FAZ survey. Column (1) and (2) differ in the
proxy used for time preferences. Column (1) presents results for the impatience scale (1-7) and column (2) presents
results for the number of inconsistent answers. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
to the baseline specification. The interaction terms have the predicted effects: the
more impatient participants are (hypothesis 1b) and the closer participants are to
retirement (hypothesis 1c), the stronger is the negative age effect. Both interaction
terms are significant on the 5%-level. Their magnitude is best illustrated by an
example. Assume two participants who only differ in age and self-assessed impatience.
Participant A is 10 years older than the average participant (age-centered=10) and
rates himself as very impatient (imaptience=7). Person B on the other side, is as old
as the average participant (age-centered=0) and not impatient at all (imaptience=1).
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For Person A, a one year increase in age would on average result in a decrease of
the planned retirement age of βage · ∆age + βage2 · ∆age2 + βAT · ∆age · TP . With
∆age = 1, ∆age2 = 112 − 102 = 21 and TP = 7 the average effect would be
−0.880 · 1 +−0.029 · 21 +−0.030 · 1 · 7 = −1.699. For Person B, however, the overall
effect of an one year increase in age would be only−0.880·1+−0.029·1+−0.030·1·1 =
−0.939. Both results confirm the idea that the age effect is driven by time preferences
since it becomes stronger for older and “more” time inconsistent participants.
In columns 2a and 2b results of a sample split are presented. We do so to allow
all other variables to vary with time preferences6. Column 2a presents results for the
time inconsistent subsample and 2b for the time consistent one, respectively. The
negative effect of age for time inconsistent participants is more than 3 times stronger
compared to the time consistent group (coefficients of -1.87∗∗∗ vs. -0.50). In addition,
the effect is highly significant for the former group, whereas it is insignificant for the
latter. A chow test rejects the null hypothesis that both coefficients are equal on the
5%-level (p-value of 0.0406).
For most of the additional demographic variables, no significant difference between
the two groups is obtained. Two exceptions are the university degree dummy and
the being-married dummy. Having a university degree is only significant in the time
consistent subsample. Moreover, compared to the base regression in table 4.4, the
effect gets stronger. On average, time consistent participants with a university degree
plan to retire about 11 months later than time consistent participants without a
university degree. In contrast, being married only affects the time inconsistent group.
The planned retirement age is decreased by about 6.5 month for married participants
in the time inconsistent subsample.
6A second way to allow all variables to vary with time preferences would be to interact all demographic and control
variables with time preferences. Results are robust to this method (not reported), however, it has two drawbacks: 1)
Some of the interaction terms are highly correlated which causes a multicollinearity problem. 2) The interpretation
of the time-preference-effect would be difficult since it would depend on the values of all other variables. Therefore,
only the additional results for the sample split are reported.
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Delta PFRA Full Sample Sample split by time preference proxy
(1) (2a) (2b)
Demographics
Age (years) -0.880*** -1.874*** -0.506
(0.200) (0.557) (0.417)
Age (c) squared -0.029** - -
(0.015)
Interaction age-TP -0.030** - -
(0.013)
Gender 2.170 2.349 2.148
(2.634) (3.509) (4.063)
Income -4.494*** -2.408 -5.571***
(1.298) (1.736) (1.856)
Number of Children 2.889*** 3.085*** 1.638
(0.911) (1.135) (1.536)
High School Degree 3.064 1.846 3.017
(3.780) (5.117) (5.571)
University Degree 6.172*** 4.544 10.374***
(2.336) (3.034) (3.422)
Married -5.564** -6.703** -3.525
(2.221) (2.955) (3.398)
constant 2170.167*** 1529.315*** 1280.638***
(417.937) (264.702) (291.336)
Controls yes yes yes
Number of Obs 2128 1192 936
Adj. R2 0.0655 0.0472 0.0865
Table 4.5: Hypothesis 1b and 1c: results of three OLS regressions with ∆PFRA as dependent variable. Standard
errors are displayed in parentheses. Data used for the analysis comes from the FAZ survey. The sample is split by
the self-assessed impatience (1-7 scale). Participants who indicate an impatience ≥ median (=4) are classified as
time inconsistent (column 2a) and vice versa (column 2b). ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and
10%-level.
Time preferences and the actual retirement age
Hypothesis 2 refers to the actual retirement age of retirees. In the following analy-
sis, only participants who are already retired are included. The actual retirement age
(ARA in years) is used as dependent variable to estimate model (4.3) from section
4.3.3. In the FAZ survey, the mean retirement age is about 61.72 years. In 2012, the
average retirement age in Germany was 62.1 for males and 61.6 for females7. Since
in the FAZ data 85% of participants are male, an average close to 62 makes sense.
Table 4.6 presents results from three OLS regressions with the actual retirement
age as dependent variable. In column 1, only the time preference proxy is included.
In columns 2 and 3, we subsequently add demographic and control variables. In
all three regressions, the time preference proxy significantly (1%-level) predicts the
actual retirement age of retirees. The magnitude of the effect is robust to the inclusion
7source: OECD statistic.
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of demographic and control variables. On average, a one unit increase of self-assessed
impatience decreases the actual retirement age by 0.47 years (column 3). This implies
an average difference of about 2.82 years between the least and the most impatience
participants in our sample and confirms hypothesis 2.
Adding demographic and control variables (columns 2 and 3) shows that education
and financial literacy have the same effects on the actual retirement age as they have
on the planned retirement age. On average, participants who obtained a high school
degree retire 1.8 years later. Financial literacy, on the other side, reduces the actual
retirement age by about one year per correct answer. This effect is driven by retirees
who answered only one or two of the questions correctly. They retired on average
about one year later compared to participants answering more than two questions
correct. Both results are in line with the previous analysis (see table 4.4). In addition,
the gender dummy is also significant in column 3. Males on average retire 2.5 years
later than women.
Interestingly, the number of children seems not to affect the actual retirement age.
In a theoretical model, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) compare family insurance with
perfect market insurance and find that family insurance can substitute a considerable
proportion of the market insurance. Having children, therefore, could have the same
effect as owning private pension insurance. However, empirically we neither find a
significant effect for the number of children nor for owning private pension insurance.
In all regressions, the age variable is excluded from the vector of demographic
variables. We do so because participants age is per definition highly correlated with
the actual retirement age for two reasons: 1) a person that retired at an age of X
has to be at least X years old and 2) in the FAZ dataset the majority of retirees is
between 60 and 70 years old, which leads to a small variation in age. Including age
in the analysis weakens some of the effects of other demographic variables. However,
the main result is robust to the inclusion of the age variable.
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ARA (years)
(1) (2) (3)
Proxy for time preferences
Impatience Scale -0.435*** -0.433*** -0.469***
(0.158) (0.164) (0.171)
Demographics
Gender 1.216 2.481**
(0.928) (1.000)
Income (log) -0.341 -0.318
(0.222) (0.224)
Number of Children 0.073 0.057
(0.265) (0.277)
High School Degree 1.866** 1.953**
(0.914) (0.944)
University Degree -0.234 -0.531
(0.755) (0.799)
Married 0.119 0.001
(0.797) (0.858)
Controls
Risk Aversion -0.361
(0.247)
Loss Aversion 0.069
(0.229)
Financial Literacy Score -1.229***
(0.320)
Life Expectancy 0.025
(0.045)
Owns Private Pension Insurance -0.645
(0.645)
Certainty of Social Security 0.219
(0.154)
Time Sum 0.003
(0.002)
constant 63.161*** 63.208*** 63.348***
(0.680) (1.896) (4.836)
Number of Obs 248 230 212
Adj. R2 0.026 0.0465 0.1254
Table 4.6: Hypothesis 2: results of three OLS regressions with the actual retirement age (ARA) as dependent
variable. Subjects are retirees. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Data used for the analysis comes from
the FAZ survey. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
Satisfaction with the retirement decision
An important question is whether time inconsistent decision makers are ex post
satisfied with their decision. One could argue, that a decision made out of impul-
sivity or impatience will be regretted afterwards. In the case of the decision when
to retire e.g., a time inconsistent decision maker may ex post wish that he or she
had retired later. The FAZ survey allows to analyze this questions. Participants who
indicated that they are already retired, answered some extra questions about their
retirement decision. Thereby, they indicated whether they would make the same de-
cision again or prefer retiring earlier or later. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of
answers for the group of impatient and patient participants, respectively. Again, we
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use the self-assessed impatience to split the sample of retirees in these two groups.
Thereby, participants who indicate an impatience equal or greater the median (=4)
are classified as time inconsistent, whereas the other group is classified as time con-
sistent.
6.29% 
70.63% 
23.08% 
7.41% 
73.15% 
19.44% 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
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80% 
I would now retire: earlier I would now retire: same age I would now retire: later 
inconsistent subsample consistent subsample 
Figure 4.3: Ex post satisfaction with the retirement decision.
In both groups, the majority of participants would choose to retire at the same age
again (70.6% in the inconsistent subsample vs. 73.15% in the consistent subsample).
In addition, only a small fraction of participants would now choose to retire earlier
than they actual did (6.3% vs. 7.4%). The category of interest is the one where
participants indicated that they would now choose to retire later. Since the hypothesis
that time inconsistent participants retire significantly earlier than consistent ones
was confirmed (table 4.6), we would hypothesize that time inconsistent participants
are more likely to regret their decision and therefore wish that they had retired
later. Figure 4.3 provides only weak evidence for this hypothesis. The proportion
of retirees who indicated that they would now chose to retire later is 23.1% in the
inconsistent group and 19.4% in the consistent group. The difference of 3.7% points
is not statistically significant. Therefore, even if retirees that can be classified as time
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inconsistent retire significantly earlier than time consistent participants, they do not
seem to regret their early retirement decision ex post.
4.4.2 Robustness
The age effect - panel analysis
The first robustness test makes use of the panel structure of the SAVE data. The
analysis is restricted to participants who participated in at least two of the SAVE
waves from 2008, 2009 and 2010. We use these three years for two reasons: 1) waves
before 2007 are not included since, with the reform of the German pension system,
the full retirement age was increased to 67. In line with Behaghel and Blau (2012), we
find that people use the full retirement age as an anchor for the planned retirement
age. Therefore, the change of the full retirement age presents a structural break in
the data. 2) In the wave of 2011/2012, the planned retirement age is not elicited.
Control variables presented in table 4.1 are not included as they are not elicited
in all of the three waves. Following the previous analysis, the sample is split in a
group of time inconsistent and time consistent participants. However, the SAVE
survey does not provide specific information about time preferences. Therefore, the
question regarding smoking habits is used. Participants who classified themselves as
smokers in all of the three waves, are assigned to the time inconsistent group. All
other participants are assigned to the time consistent subsample. This results in 357
observations in the time inconsistent group and 759 in the time consistent group.
Thereby, it is important that we control for participants health status as possible
effects in the smoker subsample could be driven by health issues.
Table 4.7 presents results of three OLS fixed effects panel regression with ∆PFRA
as dependent variable. The SAVE data is multiply imputed and all five imputations
are used. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients esti-
mated by the random effects estimator are not different from the ones estimated by
the fixed effects estimator. Therefore, fixed effects are used in all three regressions.
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The main explanatory variable, therefore, is not age but the year of the survey. The
effect found in the previous analysis could also be interpreted as a cohort effect,
where individuals born in earlier cohorts indicate a smaller planned retirement age.
However, if the ongoing time (represented by the variable year) negatively affects
the planned retirement age, the effect cannot (only) be attributed to the birth co-
hort. Results in column 1 concern the full sample. The effect of year is negative and
significant on the 10%-level. On average, participants decrease their planned retire-
ment age by about 0.09 month per year. The effect is smaller compared to the cross
section analysis presented in tables 4.4 and 4.5. However, if the sample is split by the
time preference proxy (columns 2 and 3), results are economically and significantly
stronger for the time inconsistent subsample. Thereby, the effect in the inconsistent
group is about 5 times stronger compared to the consistent group. As hypothesized,
the ongoing time has no significant effect in the time consistent subsample (coeffi-
cients of -0.20∗∗ vs. -0.04). Therefore a significant effect is found, despite the small
number of observations in the inconsistent subsample and the short panel. In the
time inconsistent subsample, participants decrease their planned retirement age by
0.2 months per year on average.
In summary, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed. In the baseline regression we found
that age has a significant negative effect on the planned retirement age. By extension,
this effect is significantly stronger for participants who could be classified as time
inconsistent. Finally, the negative effect of age or ongoing time not only has been
found in the cross section, but also in a three year panel. Thereby, the effect is again
stronger for participants classified as time inconsistent.
Time preferences and the actual retirement age
As a second robustness test, the analysis regarding the actual retirement age (see
table 4.6) is repeated with data from the SAVE 2010 cross section. In the FAZ sur-
vey, only about 200 retirees participated. In SAVE, however, about 900 participants
indicated that they are already retired. The advantages of this robustness test are
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∆PFRA full sample time inconsistent time consistent
(1) (2) (3)
Demographics
Year -0.077* -0.191** -0.035
(0.046) (0.098) (0.054)
Gender - - -
Income (log) -0.396*** -0.252 -0.446***
(0.132) (0.345) (0.169)
Number of Children 0.020 -0.038 0.019
(0.141) (0.286) (0.166)
High School Degree 0.309 1.148 0.167
(0.365) (0.925) (0.397)
University Degree -0.242 -0.507 -0.170
(0.386) (0.816) (0.439)
Married 0.064 0.158 0.030
(0.258) (0.461) (0.324)
constant 222.758** 450.169** 139.846
(93.266) (196.582) (107.362)
Proxy for time preferences no no no
Controls no no no
Health controls yes yes yes
Number of groups (participants) 1653 340 1180
Overall R2 0.0082 0.0075 0.0130
Table 4.7: Robustness hypothesis 1: results of three OLS fixed effects panel regressions with ∆PFRA as dependent
variable. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Data used for the analysis comes from SAVE 2008, 2009 and
2010. The sample is split using a dummy for participants which indicated to smoke in all three waves. Thereby,
smokers are classified as time inconsistent (column 2) and non smokers as time consistent (column 3). The gender
dummy is omitted since its effect is captured by the fixed effect model. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the
1%, 5% and 10%-level. The SAVE data is multiply imputed with five different implicates. All five implicates are
used.Coefficients and standard errors are calculated according to Rubin (1987).
therefore the higher number of observations and the more representative dataset. A
drawback, on the other hand, is that time preferences have to be proxied by partic-
ipants’ smoking habits. Smoking has negative effects on health and negative health
effects influence the actual retirement age. Therefore, we include variables regarding
participants health status in the analysis. A second concern is a potential survivor-
ship bias. Studies that analyze the effect of regular smoking on life expectancy find
that it is on average decreased by ten years (see e.g. Doll et al., 2004; Sakata et al.,
2012; Jha et al., 2013). Therefore, the health status of the smokers in the dataset is
biased upwards. However, for our analysis this actually is an advantage since we are
interested in the part of the smoking dummy that is correlated with time preferences
and not with health.
Table 4.8 presents results of three OLS regressions with the actual retirement
age as dependent variable. In column 1, only the time preference proxy is included.
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In column 2, control variables regarding participants health status are added and
column 3 presents the full specification with demographics, controls and health con-
trols. In all three specifications, the smoking dummy significantly reduces the actual
retirement age. Thereby, the average difference between smokers and non smoker is
3.6 years (column 1). Adding health variables only slightly reduces the effect. The
smoking dummy has about the same magnitude and significance compared to the
simple specification in column 1. However, bad health predicts early retirement. The
self-assessed health status on a 1-5 scale is significant on the 1%-level. Higher val-
ues indicate poor health. On average, a one unit increase in the scale reduces the
retirement age by about 1.5 years. In the full specification (column 3), the magni-
tude of the smoking dummy is weakened. Here, participants who indicate to be a
smoker on average retired 2.5 years earlier compared to non-smoker participants.
Since we control for health variables, life expectancy and other personal character-
istics, this effect seems to be driven by other factors differing between smokers and
non-smokers. As stated in section 4.3.1, a pronounced difference between these two
groups are time preferences with smokers being more likely to follow hyperbolic dis-
counting (e.g. Bickel et al., 1999; Baker et al., 2003; Reynolds and Fields, 2012). In
summary, in the SAVE 2010 cross section, participants that can be classified as more
time inconsistent also retire significantly earlier. The robustness of hypothesis 2 can
be confirmed.
Additional robustness: participants born after 1963
For this robustness test, only participants born after 1963 are taken into account.
This allows to test whether the increase in the full retirement age for younger par-
ticipants affects the results and provides additional evidence for time preferences as
the driver of our results:
1) In the previous analysis, it is shown that age negatively influences the difference
between the planned and full retirement age. Even if the effect becomes stronger for
more time inconsistent and older participants, one could argue that the effect is partly
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ARA
(1) (2) (3)
Proxy for time preferences
smoker -3.604*** -3.548*** -2.532***
(0.709) (0.700) (0.708)
Demographics
Gender 1.354***
(0.460)
Income (log) -0.264***
(0.068)
Number of Children -2.778***
(0.423)
High School Degree 1.732**
(0.811)
University Degree -0.211
(0.894)
Married -0.369
(0.485)
Controls
Financial Literacy Score -0.077
(0.221)
Life Expectancy 0.131***
(0.035)
Owns Private Pension Insurance -3.389***
(0.820)
Health
Health status -1.577*** -0.904*
(0.503) (0.497)
Happiness health status 0.017 0.075
(0.162) (0.160)
prolonged disease 0.397 0.535
(0.661) (0.636)
constant 59.395*** 63.506*** 51.554***
(0.259) (2.062) (3.506)
Number of Obs 907 907 905
Adj. R2 0.0325 0.0622 0.1895
Table 4.8: Robustness hypothesis 2: results of an OLS regression with the actual retirement age (ARA) as
dependent variable. Subjects are retirees. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Data used for the analysis
comes from the SAVE 2010 survey. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level. The SAVE data
is multiply imputed with five different implicates. All five implicates are used. Coefficients and standard errors are
calculated according to Rubin (1987).
driven by other factors. One of these other factors is the fact that not all participants
in our sample have the same full retirement age (FRA). Figure 4.2 shows the full
retirement age for different birth cohorts. Especially participants born between 1947
and 1963 may not be aware of their exact full retirement age since for them it is not
a whole number in terms of years. Therefore, to test the robustness of the results
regarding hypothesis 1, the FAZ sample is reduced. All participants born before 1964
are excluded from the analysis.
2) Hypothesis 1c states that the age effect should be stronger for participants
close to retirement since the closer retirement comes, the more tempted they are to
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retire early. The oldest person in a subsample in which everyone born before 1964
is excluded is 49 years old. Therefore, we expect no increasing negative effect of age
for participants close to retirement since no one is close to retirement.
Table 4.9 presents results of four OLS regressions with ∆PFRA as dependent
variable. The specification is identical with the one presented in table 4.5. Interaction
effects are included (column 1) and participants are assigned to a group of time
inconsistent (column 2) an time consistent (column 3) participants. Thereby, the
self-assessed impatience is used to split the sample and only participants with a full
retirement age of 67 years are included.
PRA Full sample Sample split by time preference proxy
(1) (2a) (2b)
Demographics
Age (years) -0.711** -2.112** 0.223
(0.337) (0.963) (0.670)
Age (c) squared 0.045 - -
(0.077)
Interaction age-TP -0.055*** - -
(0.018)
Gender 3.195 4.401 1.183
(3.174) (4.210) (5.010)
Income -7.090*** -3.901 -6.672***
(1.757) (2.401) (2.385)
Number of Children 3.521*** 3.313** 2.766
(1.194) (1.434) (2.181)
High School Degree 2.587 -1.659 5.283
(5.324) (7.216) (7.976)
University Degree 6.590** 7.169* 10.831***
(2.885) (3.760) (4.161)
Married -4.222 -5.576 -1.470
(2.811) (3.701) (4.433)
constant 20.056 79.943* -53.415
(22.762) (42.700) (38.680)
Controls yes yes yes
Number of Obs 1541 858 683
Adj. R2 0.0653 0.0398 0.0891
Table 4.9: Robustness: hypotheses 1b and 1c: results of three OLS regressions with ∆PFRA as dependent
variable. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Data used for the analysis comes from the FAZ survey. Only
participants with a full retirement age of 67 are taken into account. The sample is split by the self-assessed impatience
(1-7 scale). Participants who indicate an impatience median (=4) are classified as time inconsistent (column 2a)
and vice versa (column 2b). ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5% and 10%-level.
The main results from the previous analysis can be confirmed. In the specification
with interaction terms (column 1), age as well as the interaction of age with time
preferences is significant and negative. Coefficients are of similar magnitude compared
to the main analysis. The split of the subsample into a group of time inconsistent and
4.5. DISCUSSION 139
time consistent participants (columns 2a and 2b) also confirms the main analysis.
The age effect is significant and negative in the former group and insignificant in the
latter. Coefficients of the two groups are significantly different (5%-level) from each
other. Therefore, the main effect is not driven by the fact that participants exhibit
different FRAs. In addition, the effects of other demographic variables are similar to
the ones in the previous analysis.
In contrast to the analysis presented in table 4.5, the squared mean centered age
(age(c)2) now has no effect on the planned retirement age8. As predicted, the negative
effect of age(c)2 is driven by participants close to retirement.
4.5 Discussion
How important is the age effect?
This paper analyzes the relation of time preferences and the decision when to
retire. Empirical results show that people who behave as if they discount the future
hyperbolically plan to retire earlier with increasing age and in fact, follow that plan.
The question addressed in this section is whether this inconsistent decision is re-
ally unplanned and how it affects the financial well being in retirement. To analyze
the first part of this question, information regarding participants private pension
insurance is used. The idea, here, is as follows: if the plan to retire early increases
the likelihood of owning private pension insurance, then people seem to incorporate
their retirement plans into their savings decision. However, as hyperbolic discounting
leads to early retirement, the question is whether it also increases the likelihood of
owning private pension insurance. If this is not the case, as suggested by the models
presented in section 4.2, the early retirement decision of hyperbolic discounters can
be classified as inconsistent and unplanned. Thereby, the causality of the effect is
8The mean centered age in this analysis differs from the one in the main analysis. Since only participants born
after 1963 are taken into account, the mean age of this subsample is smaller compared to the full sample. Therefore,
the age variable has to be centered again using this smaller mean.
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not of interested. Whether people who save more plan to retire early or vice versa
does not effect our conclusion.
Table 4.10 presents results of three logistic regressions with an indicator, that
equals 1 if the participant owns private pension insurance, as dependent variable.
Specification one presents result for the full sample. ∆PFRA has a highly signif-
icant and negative effect on the probability of owning private pension insurance.
Therefore, the plan to retire later (∆PFRA ↑) decreases the probability of owning
private pension insurance. Looking at it the other way round, the plan to retire early
(∆PFRA ↓) increases the probability of owning private pension insurance. The ef-
fect of the time preference proxy is now important. The self-assessed impatience is
negative and insignificant. Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.10 show results for two sub-
samples. The first subsample includes participants with ages below 50 (column 2)
and the second the respective other group (column 3). It can be seen that the effect
of ∆PFRA on the probability of owning private pension insurance is only present
in the former group. This means that participants who initially plan to retire early
incorporate their retirement plan into their savings decision. However, this is not the
case for older participants. Therefore, changes in the decision when to retire are not
affected by the savings decision or vice versa. Combining our previous results with
this finding gives the following result: being more time inconsistent leads to early
retirement. Since early retirement is not planned from the beginning, the decision
to retire early is not taken into account within the savings decision. In addition,
being more time inconsistent does not increase the probability of owning private
pension insurance. The retirement decision of hyperbolic discounters can therefore
be classified as inconsistent and unplanned9.
9We obtain a similar result using the SAVE 2010 cross section (not reported). Thereby, the time preference proxy
even reduces the probability of owning private pension insurance. This result is in line with the predictions made by
the theoretical models presented in section 4.2.
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Private Pension (0/1) Full sample Participants with age
< 50 ≥ 50
(1) (2) (3)
Demographics
∆PFRA -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Age (years) 0.009 0.012 -0.240**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.121)
Gender 0.006 0.069 -0.239
(0.137) (0.158) (0.291)
Income (log) 0.254*** 0.290*** 0.244**
(0.068) (0.087) (0.114)
Number of Children -0.052 -0.093 0.046
(0.048) (0.060) (0.083)
High School Degree -0.064 0.245 -0.662**
(0.195) (0.263) (0.318)
University Degree 0.147 0.010 0.538**
(0.118) (0.140) (0.236)
Married 0.284** 0.324** 0.109
(0.118) (0.144) (0.215)
Proxy for time preferences
Impatience Scale -0.016 -0.028 0.016
(0.029) (0.035) (0.055)
Controls
Risk Aversion -0.043 -0.078 0.034
(0.042) (0.050) (0.077)
Loss Aversion -0.038 -0.030 -0.057
(0.038) (0.046) (0.071)
Financial Literacy Score -0.009 -0.071 0.188**
(0.044) (0.051) (0.093)
Life Expectancy 0.020*** 0.019** 0.026*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
Certainty of Social Security -0.006 -0.004 -0.014
(0.027) (0.033) (0.048)
Full retirement age 0.027** - -0.152*
(0.013) (0.088)
Time Sum 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
constant -24.413** -3.010*** 129.805
(10.380) (1.036) (76.775)
Number of Obs 2128 1541 587
Correctly classified 0.6553 0.6571 0.6407
Area under ROC curve 0.6239 0.6352 0.6377
Table 4.10: Importance: results of a logistic regression with an indicator that equals 1 if the participant owns private
pension insurance as dependent variable. Data used for the analysis comes from the FAZ survey. Column (1) presents
results for the full sample. In columns (2) and (3) results for a sample split are presented. Thereby, the sample is split
by age. In column (3) only participants who are older or equal to 50 years of age are taken into account. Column
(2) presents results for participants younger than 50 years of age. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%, 5%
and 10%-level.
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Financial impact
In a second step, the financial consequences of the unplanned and inconsistent
retirement decision is analyzed. The difference in actual retirement age from the
least to the most impatient participants in the FAZ sample is about 2.8 years. A
similar result is found using the SAVE 2010 dataset, where the actual retirement
age of smokers and non-smokers differs by about 2.5 years. The pension system in
Germany allows people to retire earlier than their full retirement age. However, this
will result in a constant decrease of monthly benefits. It is important to understand
the financial consequences of behaving more impatient or impulsive, because the
lifespan after retirement steadily increases due to an increasing life expectancy, and
therefore, the decision when to retire influences a persons well-being for many years.
In Germany, social security benefits are determined according to the social security
formula for old age pension benefits10, presented in equation (4.5).
Benefits = EP · EC · CPV (4.5)
The pension system is based on earnings points (EP) where the accumulated
points determine the monthly social security benefits after claiming. For each year
that a person is employed, he or she earns points relative to his or her yearly gross
income. Thereby, per year t, EPt =
Gross Incomet
Average Gross Income in Germanyt
are accumulated.
However, the maximum EP per year are capped at 2.1066. When claming social
security benefits, all accumulated earning points EP enter equation (4.5). The second
factor is the entry coefficient (EC). It equals 1 for people who claim at their full
retirement age and is decreased by 0.3% points for each month a person claims before
the FRA. Delaying claiming, however, increases the entry coefficient by 0.5% points
per month delay. The last factor, the current pension value (CPV), is determined on
the 1st of July each year by the government. In 2013 it amounts to EUR 28.14.
10The pension formula is explained in detail in: §64, SGB VI.
4.5. DISCUSSION 143
The decision to retire earlier affects the accumulated earnings points (EP) as well
as the entry coefficient (EC). Thereby, the reduction in monthly benefits due to a
decrease in the entry coefficient can be calculated easily. The participants classified
as time inconsistent in the previous analysis retired on average 2.5 years earlier com-
pared to the consistent group. This results in a reduction of the entry coefficient
of 0.003 · 30 = 9.0%. To calculate a lower estimate for the reduction due to a de-
crease in earning points, two assumptions have to be made: 1) we assume that a
person is employed for 40 years when entering retirement. 2) The income that is
forgone due to retiring 2.5 years earlier is assumed to be equal to the average in-
come of that person. Since the income normally increases with years of employment,
assumption 2 results in a conservative estimate of the reduction in social security
benefits. With these two assumptions, the reduction in earning points can be calcu-
lated as Number of Years Retired Earlier
40+Number of Years Retired Earlier
. In our case, the number of years participants
retire earlier is 2.5, leading to a reduction of 2.5
42
= 5.95%11.
Overall, monthly social security benefits are reduced by about 15% (9.0% +
5.95% = 14.95%). Time inconsistent decision makers suffer a remarkable loss of
pension payments due to early retirement. Thereby, it is important to keep in mind,
that only the difference in impatience (i.e. time preferences) leads to the reduction in
retirement age. In the regressions presented in section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, we control for
demographics and personal characteristics such as risk and loss aversion, financial
literacy and subjective life expectancy. The results indicate that simply the fact that
a person is more or less patient strongly influences his or her financial well being in
retirement.
Future research: international comparison
In the theory section of this paper, three models who study how hyperbolic dis-
counting influences the savings decision when retirement is endogenous are presented
11The second reason why we classify this estimate as conservative is the fact that it does not take the forgone
income into account. Retirement benefits in Germany only cover about 65% of the income earned close to retirement.
Therefore, if the median income the FAZ participants (EUR 3,000) is taken into account, 2.5 years of early retirement
also results in about 2.5 · 12 · 3, 000 · (1− 65%) = 31, 500 forgone income.
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(see section 4.2 or Diamond and Ko¨szegi, 2003; Zhang, 2013; Findley and Feigen-
baum, 2013). All models make predictions about how hyperbolic discounting influ-
ences the retirement decision. The main results are twofold: 1) hyperbolic discounting
leads to early retirement since the decision maker is tempted to trade future income
against immediate leisure time. However, 2) hyperbolic discounting also leads to un-
dersaving and therefore might result in later retirement since the decision maker fails
to accumulate enough wealth to finance early retirement. The German social security
system is designed to cover the main fraction of old-age insurance. According to the
2012 pension report by the German government, about 75% of the income of retirees
consist of social security benefits12. Therefore, for Germany, we focus on the first
prediction and show that indeed hyperbolic discounting leads to early retirement. In
contrast, the U.S social security system is designed to only guarantee a basic financial
security at old age. The fraction of old age income due to social security amounts
to about 50% (e.g. Banerjee, 2013). According to the theory, lower social security
benefits combined with hyperbolic discounting lead c.p. to “less early retirement”.
Therefore, one possible direction for future research is to compare the effect of time
preferences across different countries and thereby study how differences in the social
security system influences the retirement decision.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper empirically relates the decision when to retire with individuals’ time
preferences. Thereby, the effect of hyperbolic discounting on the planned and actual
retirement age is analyzed. Two sources of data enter the analysis: 1) an online sur-
vey which is conducted in cooperation with a large German newspaper and 2) the
representative German SAVE panel. We find that inconsistent retirement exists in
the following way: participants of both surveys decrease their planned retirement age
with increasing age. The temptation of early retirement seems to get stronger, the
closer retirement comes. In a panel specification we show that the negative age effect
12source: Alterssicherungsbericht 2012, Bundesministerium fuer Soziales und Arbeit.
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is not an effect of a specific birth cohort. Since we attribute this effect to hyperbolic
discounting, additional tests to confirm the idea are conducted: the sample is split
into a time inconsistent and time consistent group using variables that proxy for
participants’ time preferences. We find that the negative age effect becomes between
3 and 10 times stronger in the time inconsistent group and mostly fades away in
the time consistent group. Moreover, the effect gets stronger for participants who
are closer to retirement. Therefore, the behavior seems indeed to be driven by time
preferences. In the last specification, the actual retirement age of already retired
participants is used to analyze the effect of the time preferences on the actual retire-
ment decision. It is shown that participants classified as time inconsistent not only
plan to retire earlier than consistent ones but also follow that plan. On average, time
inconsistent participants retire 2.5 years earlier. This behavior has financial conse-
quences during retirement. In the German social security system, early retirement of
2.5 years results in a constant decrease of retirement benefits of about 15%.
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Appendix A
Online Survey
A.1 Promotion in FAS
Figure A.1: Promotion in the FAS, published on October 14th.
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A.2 Survey
Figure A.2: Page 1 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
Dear participant,
On the following pages you will find a survey of University of Mannheim in cooperation with
FAZ.NET. We will ask you to answer a number of questions about retirement planing, financial literacy
and personal preferences. All data is collected anonymous and will be treated confidentially.
If you are interested, we will send you a detailed analysis of the results by e-mail after the survey is
completed.
All participants have the chance to win a mydays voucher "little delicacies" and five copies of the
book "Genial einfach investieren" by Prof. Martin Weber of the University of Mannheim.
Thank you for your participantion!
No imprint available  0% completed
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Page 2 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
We want to start our survey with a financial quiz. The following six questions are all
related to the field of financial markets, good luck!
1. Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 4% per year. After
10 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to
grow? [F502]
More than EUR 140
Exactly EUR 140
Less than EUR 140
Don’t know/ don’t want to answer
2. Normally, which asset displays the highest fluctuations over time? [F505]
Savings accounts
Bonds
Stocks
Don’t know/ don’t want to answer
3. Which of the following statements is correct? [F508]
Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year
Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds
Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance
None of the above
Don’t know/ don’t want to answer
4. Consider a call-option with a stock as underlying. Please judge the following statement:
“The price of the call-option should increase if the volatility of the underlying stock increases”
[F522]
The statement is true
The statement is false
The statement can’t be judged with the information given
Don’t know/ don’t want to answer
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Page 3 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
5. If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices? [F509]
Rise
Fall
Stay the same
Don’t know/ don’t want to answer
6. What is measured by a stocks “beta”? [F523]
The stocks book to market value
The stocks volatility
The sensitivity of the stock price to price changes of a benchmark index
None of the above
Don’t know/ don’t want to answer
No imprint available 7% completed
A.2. SURVEY 163
Page 4 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
Thank you for answering the quiz.
The following questions are about your personal preference, so there are no right or wrong
answers.
Suppose you receive a tax refund. You are give two options regarding the point in time when the
payment is received. If you choose option A the money is transferred to you earlier compared to option
B where you will receive the money later. Please indicate for all six situations which option you would
prefer:
Question [F402]
A: you receive EUR 1,100 immediatley
B: you receive 1,130 € in 10 month
Question [F405]
A: you receive EUR 1,100 in 18 month
A: you receive EUR 1,130 in 28 month
Question [F403]
A: you receive EUR 1,100 immediatley
A: you receive EUR 1,200 in 10 month
Question [F406]
A: you receive EUR 1,100 in 18 month
A: you receive EUR 1,200 in 28 month
Question [F404]
A: you receive EUR 1,100 immediatley
A: you receive EUR 1,380 in 10 month
Question [F407]
A: you receive EUR 1,100 in 18 month
A: you receive EUR 1,380 in 28 month
No imprint available  21% completed
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Page 5 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
Below we ask you to evaluate some statements.
Please indicate on a scale of 1 - 7 how strong you agree to the each statement (1 = not at all, 7 = fully
agree).
Question [F516]
not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6
fully
agree
7
“I’m a risk averse person.”
Question [F517]
not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6
fully
agree
7
“I’m afraid of losses”
Question [F401]
not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6
fully
agree
7
“I’m an impatient person.”
Question [F520]
not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6
fully
agree
7
” I’m confident that the
Government will fullfill its
pension payment
commitment.”
A.2. SURVEY 165
Page 6 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
For the second part of our survey, we need some personal information. Therefore we ask you
to answer the following questions:
7. Are you... [F101]
Male
Female
8. What year were you born? [F102]
9. What is your highest education level? [F103]
Unfinished high school
High school
Secondary School
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
PhD
10. What is your maritial status? [F106]
married, live together
married, live seperate
unmarried, live together with partner
single
divorced
widowed
11. Do you have children? [F107]
Yes, I have  child/ children
No
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Page 7 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
12. Do you ave grandchildren? [F109]
Yes, I have  grandchild/ grandchildren
No
13. Are you retired? [F108]
Yes
No
No imprint available 36% completed
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Page 8 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
Below we ask you to answer some questions about your current job and your
retirement plans:
For some questions in this questionnaire, we need information regarding your monthly net income (for
example to calculate a corresponding pension).
Therefore we ask you to make a statement about your net monthly income. If you prefer, you can also
specify a range and later questions will refer to this range then.
I want to give my net monthly income:
Question [F204]
After tax income:  EUR per month
I want to specify a range for my monthly net income:
Question [F207]
less than EUR 1,000.-
EUR 1,000.- to EUR 2,000.-
EUR 2,000.- to EUR 4,000.-
EUR 4,000.- to EUR 6,000.-
EUR 6,000.- to EUR 10,000.-
more than EUR 10,000
14. Please indicate how strong you agree to the following statements: [F201]
not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6
fully
agree
7
“I’m happy with my current
job”
15. I will later receive a monthly pension from private pension insurance or receive this already.
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Page 9 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
[F521]
Yes
No
16. At what age do you plan to retire? [F203]
I plan to retire at age
17. If you think about it, how old are you expecting to get? [F515]
 years.
No imprint available 57% completed
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Page 10 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
18. Please consider the following situation:
At the end of your working life (at age 66) you saved up for retirement an amount of EUR 300,000
which you now have access to. There are two different payout schemes available:
You can have the entire EUR 300,000 paid out as a lump sum, or
You will receive a monthly payment of EUR 2.354,16 for the rest of your life.
[VF01]
Which option would you choose?
Option 1: the lump sum
Option 2: the monthly payment
No imprint available  64% completed
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Page 11 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
19. Now consider the following situation:
At the end of your working life (at age 66) you saved up for retirement an amount of EUR 300,000
which you now have access to. There are now different payout schemes available:
You can have the entire EUR 300,000 paid out as a lump sum, or
get everything or only parts of it as a lifetime monthly payment.
The more you take directly (lump sum), the lower the monthly payment.
[VF03]
Please indicate, what fraction you want to have paid out as a lump sum (immediately) and what
fraction you want to have paid out as a monthly payment:
100% lump sum (300,000.00 EUR) and no monthly payment
90% lump sum (270,000.00 EUR) and 10% monthly payment (235.42 EUR/month)
80% lump sum (240,000.00 EUR) and 20% monthly payment (470.83 EUR/month)
70% lump sum (210,000.00 EUR) and 30% monthly payment (706.25 EUR/month)
60% lump sum (180,000.00 EUR) and 40% monthly payment (941.66 EUR/month)
50% lump sum (150,000.00 EUR) and 50% monthly payment (1,177.08 EUR/month)
40% lump sum (120,000.00 EUR) and 60% monthly payment (1,412.50 EUR/month)
30% lump sum (90,000.00 EUR) and 70% monthly payment (1,647.91 EUR/month)
20% lump sum (60,000.00 EUR) and 80% monthly payment (1,883.33 EUR/month)
10% lump sum (30,000.00 EUR) and 90% monthly payment (2,118.74 EUR/month)
no lump sum and 100% monthly payment (2,354.16 EUR/month)
No imprint available  71% completed
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Page 12 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
20. Suppose you receive a monthly rent of EUR 1.625,00 given you retire at age 67.
You are given the opportunity to retire earlier, at age 63, but you would have to give up a portion of
your monthly pension.
What amount would you be willing to give up if you could retire at age 63 instead of 67 and pension
payments would start at 63? [F301]
I would be willing to give up an amount of EUR  per month
No imprint available  79% completed
172 APPENDIX A. ONLINE SURVEY
Page 13 of the online survey for an exemplary participant.
21. Now you receive a monthly rent of EUR 2.750,00 given you retire at age 67.
Now you are given the opportunity to retire earlier, at age 63, but you would have to give up a portion
of your monthly pension.
What amount would you be willing to give up if you could retire at age 63 instead of 67 and pension
payments would start at 63? [F304]
I would be willing to give up an amount of EUR  per month.
No imprint available  86% completed
Appendix B
Derivations with respect to r
B.1 Derivation of D(x) with respect to r
Immediate case
In the immediate case D(x) is defined as EPVHB(x)− L:
EPVHB(x)− L = L
∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + t)−r∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t
− L. (B.1)
The first derivative of D(x) with the respect to r is:
δ[EPVHB(x)− L]
δr
=
δ[EPVHB(x)]
δr
= −L
∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + t)−r ln (1 + t)∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t
< 0.
(B.2)
The probability p(x+ t|x), the hyperbolic discount factor (1 + t)−r, the exponential
discount factor (1 + i)−t and the term ln (1 + t) are always positive. Therefore the
whole fraction is positive and multiplied by −L which results in a negative first
derivative of D(x) with respect to r.
173
174 APPENDIX B. DERIVATIONS WITH RESPECT TO R
Future case
In the future case D(x) is defined as EPVHBannuity(x)− EPVHBlumpsum(x):
D(x) = L
∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + (t+ 66− x))−r∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−t
− L
(1 + (66− x))r (B.3)
The first derivative of D(x) with the respect to r is:
δ[EPVHBannuity(x)− EPVHBlumpsum(x)]
δr
(B.4)
⇔ −L
∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + (t+ 66− x))−r ln (1 + (t+ 66− x))∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−t
+L
ln (1 + (66− x))
(1 + (66− x))r
(B.5)
⇔ −L[ ln (1 + (66− x))
(1 + (66− x))r ]
·
[∑(120−66)
t=1 p(66 + t|66)(1 + (t+ 66− x))−r ln (1 + (t+ 66− x))∑(120−66)
t=0 p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−t
− 1
] (B.6)
The part outside the square bracket is always negative for x < 66.1 The part inside
the square bracket is always positive if :
(120−66)∑
t=1
p(66 + t|66)(1 + (t+ 66− x))−r ln (1 + (t+ 66− x))
>
(120−66)∑
t=0
p(66 + t|66)(1 + i)−t
(B.7)
Assuming i = 0 gives an upper bound for the right side of the inequality. Using the
latest German life tables leads to:
(120−66)∑
t=1
p(66 + t|66)(1 + (t+ 66− x))−r ln (1 + (t+ 66− x)) > 16.11. (B.8)
This inequality is only fulfilled for all x as long as r < 0.3479. Therefore the sign of
the first derivative of D(x) with respect to r strongly depends on the parameter r.
1For x = 66 the derivative of D(x) would be zero as the immediate case would then be considered.
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B.2 Derivation of ∆D(x) with respect to r
Immediate case
∆D(x) is defined as D(x + 1) − D(x) = EPVHB(x + 1) − L − (EPVHB(x) − L)
which can be written as EPVHB(x+ 1)− EPVHB(x). Therefore the first derivative
of ∆D(x) with respect to r is:
δ∆D(x)
δr
=
δD(x+ 1)−D(x)
δr
=
δD(x+ 1))
δr
− δD(x))
δr
(B.9)
this leads to:
δ∆D(x)
δr
= −L
∑119−x
t=0 p(x+ 1 + t|x+ 1)(1 + t)−r ln (1 + t)∑119−x
t=0 p(x+ 1 + t|x+ 1)(1 + i)−t
+L
∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + t)−r ln (1 + t)∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t
.
(B.10)
The difference between the two fractions depends on the difference of the survival
probability of an x+1 year old decision maker and the survival probability of an x
year old one (p(x + 1 + t|x + 1) vs. p(x + t|x)). Using the latest German life tables
results in:
L
∑119−x
t=0 p(x+ 1 + t|x+ 1)(1 + t)−r ln (1 + t)∑119−x
t=0 p(x+ 1 + t|x+ 1)(1 + i)−t
< L
∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + t)−r ln (1 + t)∑120−x
t=0 p(x+ t|x)(1 + i)−t
,
(B.11)
∀ x ∈ [0; 120] and i, r ∈ (0;∞). Therefore the first derivative of ∆D(x) is positive.
Future case
For the future case the sign of the first derivative of ∆D(x) depends on the
parameter r. This can be seen by writing δ∆D(x)
δr
as:
δ∆D(x)
δr
=
δD(x+ 1)−D(x)
δr
=
δD(x+ 1))
δr
− δD(x))
δr
(B.12)
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It follows that the sign of δD(x+1))
δr
and δD(x))
δr
depends on the parameter are and
therefore also the sign of the whole derivative depends on it.
Appendix C
Financial literacy questions
C.1 FAZ Survey
1. Suppose you had EUR 100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 4% per year. After 10 years,
how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?
(i) More than EUR 140; (ii) Exactly EUR 140; (iii) Less than EUR 140; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
2. Normally, which asset described below display the highest fluctuations over time:
(i) Savings accounts; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Stocks; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
3. Which of the following statements is correct?
(i) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year; (ii) Mutual
funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds; (iii)
Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance; (iv) None
of the above; (v) Do not know/Refusal.
4. Consider a call-option with a stock as underlying. Please judge the following statement: “The price
of the call-option should increase if the volatility of the underlying stock increases”
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) The statement cannot be judge with the information given; (iv) Do not
know/Refusal.
5. If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices:
(i) Rise; (ii) Fall; (iii) Stay the same; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know/Refusal.
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6. What is measured by a stocks “beta”?
(i) The stocks book to market value; (ii) The stocks volatility; (iii) The sensitivity of the stock
price to price changes of a benchmark index; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know/Refusal.
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C.2 SAVE Survey
1. Suppose you had EUR 100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years,
how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?
(i) More than EUR 102; (ii) Exactly EUR 102; (iii) Less than EUR 102; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
2. Suppose you had EUR 100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 20% per year. After 5 years,
how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?
(i) More than EUR 200; (ii) Exactly EUR 200; (iii) Less than EUR 200; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
3. Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per
year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account?
(i) More than today; (ii) Exactly the same; (iii) Less than today; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
4. Suppose that in the year 2012, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have doubled too. In
2012, how much will you be able to buy with your income?
(i) More than today; (ii) The same; (iii) Less than today; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
5. Normally, which asset described below displays the highest fluctuations over time:
(i) Savings accounts; (ii) Bonds; (iii) Stocks; (iv) Do not know/Refusal.
6. Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market?
(i) The stock market helps to predict stock earnings; (ii) The stock market results in an increase in
the price of stocks; (iii)The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together
with those who want to sell stocks; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know/Refusal.
7. Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund?
(i) True; (ii) False; (iii) Do not know/Refusal.
8. Which of the following statements is correct?
(i) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year; (ii) Mutual
funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds; (iii)
Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance; (iv) None
of the above; (v) Do not know/Refusal.
9. If the interest rate falls, what should happen to bond prices:
(i) Rise; (ii) Fall; (iii) Stay the same; (iv) None of the above; (v) Do not know/Refusal.
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Figure D.1: Page 1 of the social security information letter with short translation.
Pension benefits („Regelaltersrente“) that can be paid if the full retirement age is 
reached amounts to 736,79 EUR per month. For this calculation only the contributions 
until today are taken into account. You will reach full retirement age on 03.08.2017. 
If you contribution until you reach full retirement age would amount the average 
contribution of the last five years, pension benefits would amount to 882,40 EUR per 
month at full retirement age. 
a 
b 
a 
b 
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Page 5 of the social security information letter with short translation.
Besides pension benefits at full retirement age it is also possible to claim benefits 
earlier. This will permanently reduce pension benefits as well as a possible dependent’s 
pension.  
 
The reduction amounts to 0.3% per each month of early claiming. 
c 
c 
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Page 8 of the social security information letter with short translation.
(The following is true for people that contributed at least 35 years): 
You will receive full pension benefits at 01.09.2017 (NRA). The earliest you can claim 
benefits is 01.03.2015. Claiming early will lead to a reduction of 9% of benefits. 
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